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Abstract 
The 1992 currency crises in the foreign exchange markets saw the collapse 
of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. The Pound and the Lira left the system 
and a number of other currencies devalued voluntarily. 
The purpose of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, I present three theoretical 
chapters which aim to explain particular features of currency crises and hence 
model certain aspects of the currency crises of 1992. Secondly, I perform two 
experiments to test a model of herd behaviour since it is argued that, in 
some circumstances, speculators may behave as if they are following a herd. 
Finally, I examine the empirical data of the currencies of Italy and the UK 
since comparatively little work has been produced for these currencies. The 
aim is to offer a model which successfully accounts for the periods both in 
and out of the EMS. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to model the events surrounding the currency crisis 
which led to the UK departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
in 1992. In order to do this, I draw from a wide literature in economics. I 
consider theoretical models of currency crises and also those models which 
have examined the empirical data. 
In terms of the theory, there are two main schools of thought which seek to 
explain currency crises. Firstly, there are fundamentalist theories based on, 
for example, limited reserves of foreign currency (Krugman, 1979). Secondly, 
there are speculative theories which emphasise the role of self fulfilling spec- 
ulative attacks (Obstfeld, 1986). However, neither of these approaches con- 
sider the timing of a speculative attack on a currency or the factors which 
determine the duration of a crisis. 
In chapters 2-4 of this thesis I address these issues. Initially I provide a 
literature survey offering a background and justification to my research. I 
then set up a model of information externalities and search based on Caplin 
and Leahy (1998) which helps to explain the timing of a speculative attack. 
After consideration of the effect of a Tobin tax in such a context, I proceed in 
chapter 3 to examine a 'war of attrition' model based on the work of Alesina 
and Drazen (1991). In my thesis, this is used to explain the duration of a 
currency crisis. 
In the next theory chapter, I provide an adaptation of the work of Morris 
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and Shin (1995). They argue that the ERM was 'ripe for attack' before the 
September 1992 crisis. If the state of the economy lies in a particular 'ripe 
for attack' region, each investor will sell his holdings of the currency if there 
is a lack of common knowledge among the investors regarding the state of 
the economy. However, in my adaptation, the state of the economy is known 
to all players. It is the value placed by the government in remaining in the 
ERM which is observed by each of the speculators with a degree of error. I 
show that a lack of common knowledge concerning government type leads to 
the same scenario as in the Morris and Shin case. 
Recent literature in economics has related informational cascades and 
herding to financial data. This represents a growth area in economics and is 
also of particular relevance to this thesis. In chapter 5,1 examine a model of 
informational cascades developed by Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch 
(1992). After setting up their framework, I show how this may apply to the 
events of 1992 in the foreign exchange markets. I further show the experiment 
designed by Anderson and Holt (1997) which tests this model. 
With the exception of this paper by Anderson and Holt, there has been 
very little experimental work in this area. However, the work on inform- 
ational cascades and herding lends itself very well to experimental testing. 
Therefore, in the following chapter, I describe an equally valuable model by 
Banerjee (1992). 1 argue that this may apply to currency crises and I set up 
an experiment to test its validity. While this model is not directly related 
to the mainstream currency crisis literature, it is still valid since it helps to 
analyse the behaviour of speculators. In particular, it can help to determine 
the timing of a crisis. A simulation of the actions of the subjects within the 
Banerjee framework can be used to establish the point in the sequence at 
which speculators are most likely to choose to follow the herd. This is then 
compared with the results of a laboratory experiment. A particular assump- 
tion is then removed from the Banerjee framework, and the actions of the 
subjects are simulated once more and a further experiment is carried out. 
In chapter 7,1 examine the empirical evidence. The aim is to model the 
exchange rate data before, during and after the 1992 crisis. As in previous 
chapters, I initially present the literature in this area. Much work has been 
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done on the French Franc against the German Deutschmark primarily be- 
cause of the length of time in which it has been in the ERM. However, there 
is still a comparatively small literature on the British Pound or Italian Lira. 
Hence my work has focused on these two currencies. 
The literature in this area has formed two basic strands. Many empirical 
economists have suggested GARCH models for the modelling of exchange 
rates across the period in question. However, Markov processes have also 
been used to model the switch from one exchange rate regime to another. I 
present the literature in these two areas and then apply the models to the 
Pound and Lira. 
The final chapter contains my concluding remarks and also addresses 
some of the potential lines of inquiry. 
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Chapter 2 
A Model to Explain the Timing 
of an Exchange Rate Collapse 
2.1 Introduction 
In January 1992, the ERM celebrated sixty months without a realignment. 
However, by the September, two of the currencies had left the system (the 
Pound and the Lira) and the Peseta and Escudo had devalued voluntarily. 
There has been a vast literature in this area which debates on the causes of 
the collapse. The arguments put forward are summarised in the paper by 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993). There are four main explanations offered 
to explain this crisis. 
Firstly, inflation differentials are blamed for the downfall of the ERM. 
However, the empirical evidence suggests that this reason is only applic- 
able in the case of Italy. Secondly, it is argued that German unification 
brought about an asymmetric shock which required an appreciation of the 
Deutschmark. Germany was denied the right to revalue its currency so this 
implied that either inflation should rise in Germany or there needed to be 
a depreciation in the other currencies. It is argued that the crisis simply 
forced governments to accept this depreciation. However, this is not com- 
pletely plausible since it does not explain the timing of the attack which was 
more than two years after unification and directly after the Danish referen- 
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dum. 
The third category of explanation is based on Krugman's theoretical dis- 
cussion in 1979. He argued that a currency crisis is inevitable when a govern- 
ment's stock of foreign exchange reserves become exhausted. He argues that 
a speculative attack occurs long before the reserves are exhausted as a result 
of maximising behaviour on the part of the speculators. It is argued that 
this may apply to the situation in Europe in 1992 since it is noted (Eichen- 
green and Wyplosz, (1993)) that the members were undergoing 'deteriorating 
economic conditions'. 
Finally, it is argued that the crisis was generated by a self fulfilling spec- 
ulative attack. This can be seen in the pioneering paper by Obstfeld (1986). 
It is the fact that investors believe that monetary policy will be modified 
as a result of a speculative attack that makes the attack possible. Eichen- 
green and WYplosz note that the incentives for such an attack were built 
into the Maastricht Treaty. A devaluation in a currency would disqualify 
it from EMU participation. This would mean there would no longer be a 
reason to maintain a tight monetary policy. Therefore, there is an incentive 
to launch an attack on a currency even when policy is consistent with balance 
of payments equilibrium. Eichengreen and Wyplosz found that the evidence 
supports this explanation of a crisis. They note that 'The only mystery is 
how its outbreak was deferred for so long'. This is one of the issues which I 
wish to address in this chapter. 
I explain the timing of a crisis in terms of an information externality in 
the foreign exchange market. Using a model originally developed by Caplin 
and Leahy (1998), 1 explain the long period without a realignment in the 
foreign exchange market and the sudden flurry of activity culminating in a 
series of speculative attacks. 
This chapter will be organised as follows. The literature survey provides 
a background to this model and also that of the following chapter. I set 
out the model of information externalities and note its sequence of events. 
Having done this, I will solve the model. I will then consider the effect of 
a Tobin tax in deterring a crisis. In particular I consider the effect on the 
timing of the currency crisis. I will then add concluding comments on this 
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framework. 
2.2 Literature Survey 
There is a vast literature in the area of currency crises. In this section, I will 
highlight the most significant contributions in this area and explain their rel- 
evance to my research. There are two basic schools of thought explaining the 
collapse of an exchange rate regime. Firstly, there are the 'fundamentalist' 
theories. These are based on, for example, asymmetric shocks, competitive- 
ness or, as in the case of Krugman (1979), limited reserves. In his paper, 
he develops a model in which exchange rate regime switches are the result 
of incompatible monetary and exchange rate policies. A balance of payment 
crisis is generated when a government operates a policy of domestic credit 
expansion while simultaneously fixing the exchange rate. Inevitably, reserves 
are depleted and so the fixed rate must be abandoned. His major finding 
is that with forward looking exchange markets, the final stage of the crisis 
involves a sudden discrete loss of reserves in a 'speculative attack'. This 
is because speculators with foresight will attack the currency before the re- 
serves are fully depleted and purchase all remaining reserves at a particular 
moment in time. 
However, Krugman notes that there are limitations to such a framework. 
The analysis of those factors triggering a balance of payments crisis is very 
limited due to a highly simplified model. Furthermore, the model assumes 
that there are only two available assets. This places a constraint on the 
government since the only means of pegging its exchange rates is by selling 
its reserves. However, despite these drawbacks, this model pioneered much 
of the research into currency crises and a great deal of the literature in the 
area has grown out of this. Hence it is important to consider it here since it 
provides a starting point for much of the current work in currency crises. 
In this and other models including the ones which I set up later in the 
chapter, it is assumed that the alternative regime to a fixed rate is a per- 
manent float. However, this need not be the case. Agenor, Bhandari and 
Flood (1992) consider a temporary period of floating followed by a new peg 
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which was also seen in Obstfeld (1984). They set up a framework similar to 
that of Krugman. However, they extend his wialysis to look at alternative 
post collapse regimes, uncertainty, the possibility of external borrowing and 
capital controls, sticky prices and asset substitutability. This paper is relev- 
ant to my research since it considers the issue of timing of an exchange rate 
collapse. In my research, I am concerned with the timing of the speculative 
attack and also the timing of the eventual abandonment of the exchange rate. 
They find that the timing of the collapse is linked to the size of the expected 
devaluation and also the length of time for which the currency is allowed to 
float. 
The second basic school of thought is based around 'speculative theor- 
ies'. These focus on the idea of self-fulfilling speculative attacks and was 
originally developed by Obstfeld (1986). He considers the possibility that a 
speculative attack is generated by private sector expectations of a loosening 
of monetary policy after the collapse of a fixed rate regime. In his model, it 
is the expectation of a devaluation which triggers the attack which exhausts 
reserves. This forces the authorities to abandon the fixed rate. As a result, 
if the authorities in fact loosen monetary policy, the exchange rate will de- 
preciate and the expectations of speculators will be fulfilled. The important 
finding of this paper is that rational expectations equilibria can exist with a 
speculative attack even when the initial policy stance of the government is 
sustainable. 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) argue that this model is appropriate 
for explaining the September 1992 crisis in the foreign exchange markets. 
Furthermore, the incentives for self fulfilling speculative attacks were built 
into the Maastricht Treaty. A speculative attack which forced a devaluation 
would prohibit a country from participating in the EMU and thus allow a 
shift towards a more accommodatory policy. They note that the knowledge 
that there is an incentive to change policy in the event of an attack provided 
the speculators with an incentive to attack. 
However, in theory governments could have prevented the collapse of the 
regime by raising interest rates to a sufficiently high level. The fact that they 
choose not to do so implies something about their preferences. It follows that 
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the exchange rate switch was the result of an optimising decision and not a 
policy action forced upon the government through a lack of reserves as in the 
Krugman analysis. 
This would suggest that the pioneering work of Krugman (1979) and 
Obstfeld (1986) provides only a partial analysis of the events of the 1992 
currency crisis. What is omitted from their framework is the inclusion of an 
optimising policy maker. 
The work of Ozkan and Sutherland (1995) introduces an optimising policy 
maker into the literature. The model stresses the relationship between the 
government and expectations of private sector agents. It is this interaction 
which determines the timing of an exchange rate collapse. This model is par- 
ticularly significant in terms of m'y research since I focus on the determinants 
of the timing and duration of a crisis. 
The government chooses to maximise its welfare function which depends 
on domestic output. It cannot influence domestic monetary policy since 
the domestic interest rate is set to maintain currency parity under a fixed 
regime. However, under a floating rate it can use its exchange rate to offset 
any adverse shocks. Within the model, the government has a once and 
for all option of switching to the floating rate. Having done so, it cannot 
return to the fixed rate system. They show that the optimal strategy for 
the government is to select a trigger level for the interest rate of the centre 
country. If the interest rate exceeds this then the domestic country should 
abandon the fixed rate system. 
It is assumed that private agents know the preferences of the government. 
Therefore, it can calculate the trigger point of foreign interest rates and 
deduce the level at which the government will abandon the fixed regime. 
Therefore, as foreign interest rates approach the trigger level, expectations 
of a devaluation increase domestic interest rates. The gap between domestic 
and foreign interest rates increases thus influencing output. 
However, Ozkan and Sutherland show that the government abandons the 
fixed rate earlier than it prefers. This is because the private sector is aware 
that the government wishes to influence expectations. Since the government 
is unable to pre commit to a trigger point, the private sector will not believe 
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a policy announcement that a devaluation is unlikely. Hence the timing of a 
crisis is the result of the interaction between an optimising policy maker and 
private sector agents. 
A further paper which considers the interaction of private sector agents 
and an optimising policy maker is that of Obstfeld (1994). He argues that 
any explanations of crises based purely on limited foreign reserves are by 
implication, based on fiscal weakness. If the fiscal position were strong, it 
would be feasible to borrow sufficient funds in order to defend the currency. 
Within his two period model, he finds two factors determining the probability 
of an attack; the maturity structure of the government's debt obligations 
and the currency composition of the overall debt. He assumes that foreign 
reserves can be borrowed on the world capital market subject only to the 
government's intertemporal budget constraint. 
Having set up his framework, Obstfeld shows that by assigning certain 
values to the variables, more than one equilibrium arises. The government 
then faces an inconsistency problem since its loss is lower in the low de- 
preciation equilibria but there is no guarantee that the bond market will 
choose the corresponding low interest rate. He concludes that the inabil- 
ity to precommit to a policy together with the importance of private sector 
expectations in the budget constraint leads to multiple equilibria. 
The model developed by Bensaid and Jeanne (1997) is similar to that 
of Ozkan and Sutherland (1995) and Obstfeld (1994) since expectations of 
a devaluation create a cost for the government. However, it differs in its 
treatment of the dynamics of the crisis. They model crises as having a 
specific beginning, duration and end which implies that the crisis may be a 
short or long lasting process. This paper is of particular importance in the 
context of my research since it addresses the issue of the duration of a crisis. 
Effectively, it models the length of time of the crisis before the collapse of 
a fixed rate regime. However, the method employed by the authors differs 
from my approach since I use a 'war of attrition' framework. 
They assume that there is a trade off between the cost of leaving the 
fixed rate system and the cost involved in raising the nominal interest rate 
to defend the currency. It is optimal for the government to devalue when the 
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cost of defending the currency exceeds the opting out cost. However, they 
further assume that the market does not know the opting out cost of the 
government and so is always expecting a devaluation. They show that this 
generates self fulfilling crises since the nominal interest rate rises until the 
government abandons the peg. 
It follows that the outcome of this scenario is always a devaluation. Fur- 
thermore, it demonstrates that a currency crisis can occur even when agents 
do not expect a more expansionary policy after the abandonment of the 
fixed rate. In considering the duration of the crisis, Bensaid and Jeanne 
show that it is longer when the opting out cost is higher and shorter when 
the government has a better reputation. The reasoning behind this is that 
the reputation of the government in this model is achieved at such a high 
cost that it does not translate into a corresponding increase in credibility. 
They note that this finding is similar to that of Drazen and Masson (1994) 
who show that an improvement in the reputation of the policy maker does 
not necessarily increase the credibility of a 'tough' policy. 
2.3 A Model of Information Externalities and 
Search 
A number of economists share the opinion that the downfall of the Pound in 
1992 was the result of a self fulfilling speculative attack. However, the timing 
of the collapse is an issue which is yet to be explained. As noted earlier, the 
EMS had been characterised by considerable stability in exchange rates. The 
puzzle is why the attack should occur in September 1992 and not at some 
earlier date. 
In this framework, the argument is as follows. Speculators in the market 
originally hold a given quantity of Pounds, although it is possible to hold 
their funds in other ways. There is a cost involved in switching away from 
Pounds which must be borne by the speculator. This cost need not be a tax 
but may represent the time and effort of switching funds from one currency 
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to another'. It follows that, if lie can learn about the best destination for his 
funds from observing the experiences of other speculators, he has an incentive 
to wait and see if someone else moves first. Therefore, it is optimal for each 
speculator to play a waiting game in the hope that one of the others will move 
from Pounds to another currency and thus reveal some valuable information 
regarding the market. This public information concerns the strength of the 
Pound and implies that speculators will be able to distinguish between a 
cwet' or 'dry' central bank. Once this information is revealed, the remaining 
speculators can make a more informed decision of the best place to put their 
funds. 
The salient feature of this model is the delay until the first speculator 
moves. This is generated by an information externality. When deciding 
whether to move their funds from one place to another, speculators do not 
take into account the value of the information revelation to others. 
I consider a scenario in which there are a number of large speculators, 
N, in the foreign exchange market each holding a given amount of Pounds. 
I concentrate on those speculators who hold large amounts of the currency 
since they have a degree of influence in the foreign exchange market. The sale 
of a few Pounds is likely to have a very small effect on government policy. 
However, if a speculator moves a considerable amount of funds, this may 
induce the government to act. In so doing, it will reveal some information 
about its ability and willingness to remain in the ERM. It is the fact that 
a large speculator can cause information to be released that is the central 
feature of this model. 
I assume that a speculator may hold his funds in Pounds or transfer to 
Deutschmarks (DMs) or, alternatively, he can invest in something which will 
give him a fixed return on his money. For the sake of argument, I am assuming 
that the commodity, gold, will give him a guaranteed level of earnings. 
The task of a speculator is to discover the best place for his funds. I 
assume that in each time period, each speculator receives a private piece of 
news concerning the relative merits of holding Pounds or DMs. I assume that 
'This cost is not modelled explicitly since its inclusion would not qualitatively change 
the results. 
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p is uniformly distributed over [0,11. The larger the value of p, the greater 
the perceived benefit to the speculator in moving from Pounds to DMs than 
for someone receiving a value of p close to 0.1 am not necessarily assuming 
that this payoff is financial. The payoff could represent the benefit to the 
speculator in terms of peace of mind. Hence, a large value of p tells him 
that the benefit in switching immediately to DMs is greater for him than if 
he waited for further pieces of news. Once he receives this information, he 
decides whether to shift his funds into DMs. If he chooses to keep his funds 
in Pounds, he will receive another piece of news, p, in the next period and 
the process is repeated. Note that the switching of funds from Pounds to 
DMs is irreversible in this model. 
Each speculator must calculate the expected value of the payoff for each 
value of p from switching to DMs. Uncertainty arises here since he does not 
know the value of the public information, s. I assume that s is uniformly 
distributed on [0,2] and that the payoff to a speculator receiving news, p, 
from switching to DMs is p. s. 
The vital assumption in this analysis is that the public information can 
only be realised after the first speculator moves his funds into DMs. Once 
this becomes public knowledge, the speculators are aware of the payoffs in 
holding Pounds or DMs. 
A further assumption I make involves the outside option. I assume that 
the return to holding gold takes on a fixed value, G>0. This alternative 
use is necessary since it means that the public information, 8, is relevant to 
the decisions of the speculators once one speculator has moved into DMs. 
If s takes on a value close to zero, once the first speculator moves, the re- 
maining speculators can move their funds into gold which will yield a higher 
return than if they simply continued to hold Pounds. In addition, I include 
a discount rate, 6E (0,1), since speculators would rather move sooner than 
later. 
The above argument ensures that there are two main phases within this 
model. Firstly, there is the uninformed phase in which the speculators do 
not know s. This terminates when one speculator moves into DMs. In the 
second phase s is known. The speculator is fully informed about the public 
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information and can decide whether to wait for ýi higher value of p or to move 
into gold. If he decides to wait, he must choose those values of p at which 
he is prepared to move into DMs. 
This framework implies that there will be reservation levels of p in each of 
the two phases. In addition, there will be a cut-off level for s in the informed 
phase. Nash equilibrium implies that all decisions must be optimal given 
that every other speculator is operating using the same decision rules. 
2.4 Sequence of Events 
At the beginning of each period, each speculator receives a piece of private 
information about the government and the relative merits of holding Pounds 
or DMs. This information is uncorrelated across speculators and also over 
time. One must also consider the issue of how a devaluation and a speculative 
attack are defined in this framework. 
In the literature, a speculative attack occurs when investors change the 
composition of their portfolios so that they reduce the proportion of the do- 
mestic currency which they hold and increase the share in foreign currency. 
There is pressure on the domestic exchange rate to devalue and the gov- 
ernment's foreign currency reserves begin to deplete. The government must 
then decide whether to continue to support the exchange rate which it could 
achieve through the acquisition of a loan. However, it may be compelled to 
devalue the currency. 
In terms of this model, a speculative attack is defined as follows. If a spec- 
ulator receives private information which tells him that there is a greater be- 
nefit in holding DMs, he will move out of the domestic currency. This reveals 
the public information concerning the government type. If the government 
proves to be 'wet' then other speculators will follow. Hence a speculative 
attack occurs as a result of an individual receiving a piece of information 
which induces him to move out of the domestic currency. 
A devaluation is not modelled explicitly in this framework. It is assumed 
that the speculative attack does not have any effect on the probability of a 
devaluation. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is no correlation between 
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the probability of a devaluation and the action taken by the government 
which reveals its type. Clearly, these are simplifying assumptions which have 
been included in order to solve the model. A more realistic model would relax 
these assumptions. 
If none of the speculators have moved from the domestic currency in this 
period, each speculator receives a piece of information in the following period. 
This process continues until an individual receives information which induces 
him to move. 
2.5 Solution 
I use dynamic programming to solve this two phase model. I start by examin- 
ing the decision process for the speculator in the second phase. Notably, the 
public information is now known so the speculator can calculate the optimal 
reservation level in the informed phase. He can also compute the cut-off level 
of the devaluation below which it is optimal to choose the outside option, G. 
The speculator can use his optimal decision in the informed phase to decide 
the reservation level of p in the uninformed phase. 
The first step is to solve for the reservation level in the informed phase, 
I(s). A speculator who has received the news, p, and knows the public 
information, s, has an optimal strategy whose value is given by VI(p, 8). 
This translates into the Bellman equation: 
I 
VI(p, s)=max P. 8,6 
fo 
V, (pl, s) dpf 
The first term on the right hand side represents the payoff from moving 
into DMs while the second denotes the discounted payoff from waiting and 
receiving a different piece of news, pi. It follows that there will be a certain 
reservation level, 1(s). Below this value, the speculator will find it optimal 
to wait for further news. Above this level, he will switch from Pounds to 
DMs. The value of the optimal strategy is therefore: 
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1,1(p, S) = S-P Zf P 
VI(PI 8) = IC5-48) zf P< i(s) (2.2) 
This can also be seen graphically as follows: 
VI 
S. I(S) 
0 
Figure 2.1: Optimal Strategy of a Speculator 
In figure 2.1, it is clear that if a speculator receives a value of p below the 
reservation level, 1(s), he will prefer to remain in Pounds than to move into 
DMs. In short, he will not accept a payoff which is less than s. 1(8). At a 
value of p equal to 1(s), the speculator will be indifferent between remaining 
in Pounds or switching to DMs. Combining this property with (2.1) and 
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I(s) p 
(2.2) gives the following: 
VI(p, s)dp = s6 
(I +I(S)2 
(2-3) 
2 
From (2.3), it follows that 1(s) =- I is independent of s. It is now possible to 
write: 
6 (1 + J2) - 21 (2.4) 
which illustrates the point that for any value of the discount rate, there is 
a unique solution for the value of I in the interval (0,1). This is found by 
solving (2.4) for I so that: 
I 
I± V/-l 
--62 
(2.5) 
6 
Notably, for any value of 6 between 0 and 1, there is a unique value for I. 
At this stage, the outside option may be added to discover whether it is 
optimal to continue to wait once the public information has been revealed. 
The value of holding out for a higher value of p is given by: 
IIII(p, s)dp =s+ (2.6) 
f2 
The decision of whether to continue waiting or to switch into gold involves 
comparing (2.6) with G. The speculator will move his funds into gold if the 
size of s falls below a certain level, -9, where: 
2G 
I+ 12 
(2.7) 
At this stage, it is important to impose an assumption regarding the size of 
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G to ensure that waiting occurs in the uninformed state. If G were too large 
then it would never be optimal to wait since the speculator would receive a 
higher payoff from moving out of Pounds and into gold instead of DMs. The 
required condition is: 
2G 
(2.8) 1+ 12 
As in the Caplin and Leahy framework, I am hicluding a transformation: 
G 
I+ 12 
(2.9) 
The purpose of this is merely to simplify the derivation of the solution to the 
model. 
Having set up the second phase and the decision rule of the speculators, 
it is now appropriate to examine the first phase. Dynamic programming is 
used once more to establish the decision rule. The optimal strategy for the 
speculator who receives the news, p, but does not know the public informa- 
tion, is given by Vu (p). He compares the value of moving into DMs with what 
happens if he remains in Pounds. If none of the speculators move, then the 
first state is repeated. The probability of this occurring is Pr(U). However, 
if one of the speculators switches, then the public information is revealed. 
The probability of this occurring is Pr(I) -I- Pr(U). This translates into 
the following Bellman equation: 
Vu (p) = max P, 6 
IPT 
(U) 
-f Vu 
(pl) dpf + Pr (1) EVI] 
Once again, the first term represents the expected payoff from moving into 
DMs now while the second term denotes the value of waiting. The speculator 
chooses the larger of the two. Note that EVI is the ex ante expected value at 
the start of next period of being informed of s. This expected value is given 
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by: 
max g++P ds 
12)] 
Note that the first term is the value of the outside option, gold. The second 
term represents the value of waiting. This reduces to: 
E= g2(l + 12) + 
f2,3 (I + 12 ) ds 
2g 22 
V, (2.12) 
Expansion of this gives: 
E V, = 
(I + g2) 
I+ 12 
(2.13) 
(2 
The reservation level, U, is defined by the point at which the speculator 
is indifferent between holding Pounds or DMs. Since f Vu(pi)dpi - 
1±2-u 27 
equation (2.10) may be used to show that: 
U=6 Pr(U) 
I+ U2 
+ PT (I) 
I+ 12 
+ g2) 
I(2)(21 
U= Pr(U). I. 
I+ U2 
+ Pr (1). 1. (1 + g2) (2.14) 
(I+ 
J2 
) 
The right hand side of (2.14) shows the expected value of rejecting U in the 
hope of a higher value of p in the future. In order to remain uninformed next 
period, each of the other N-I speculators should also receive a value of p 
below the reservation level. The probability of this occurring is denoted by 
Pr(U) = UN-1. Substituting this into (2.14) then gives: 
1+ U' 
+ UN-1). I. (I + g2) 
1+ J2 
) 
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This is the solution for the reservation level in the uninformed phase. The 
main result of this analysis is that the reservation level is higher for the unin- 
formed phase than for the informed phase. This is caused by the information 
externality and produces the delay in speculative behaviour. The intuition 
behind this is as follows. The speculators measure the value of moving into 
DMs against the value of remaining in Pounds. If they wait, another player 
may make the move into DMs and reveal the public information. The pur- 
pose of the outside option, gold, is to ensure that the speculator receives at 
least a certain payoff. It follows that the outside option has the effect of 
raising the expected value of the next period's value function. Hence, the 
benefit from another agent making the first move is increased relative to the 
value of moving straight away. It follows that the reservation level in the first 
phase is higher than in the second phase. Once one speculator has moved, 
there is increased activity on the foreign exchange market. See the appendix 
for a proof of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. This is taken 
from the Caplin and Leahy paper (1998). 
Having set up this framework, it can now be used to evaluate the effect- 
iveness of a Tobin tax in deterring an attack. 
2.6 Capital Controls -A Tobin Tax 
The purpose of capital controls is to protect currencies from volatility in the 
foreign exchange market. In the case of the ERM, these controls safeguarded 
against speculative attacks on the currency. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) 
note that they allowed countries a degree of policy autonomy for a period 
of time. Italy, for instance, desired a looser monetary policy than that of 
Germany and so it was apparent that the removal of capital controls would 
inevitably lead to a devaluation of the Lira. The controls therefore provided 
protection from foreign exchange market pressures. 
As noted by Eichengreen and Wyplosz, these controls took on a variety of 
different forms. They included restrictions on banks' ability to lend abroad 
and also taxes on holdings of foreign currency assets. In 1988 the countries 
subject to the most restrictions were Italy, Ireland, Spain, Greece and Por- 
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tugal. However, the bulk of these controls were terminated in 1990 as part of 
the '1992 Program', a move towards the completion of the internal market. 
Notably, the removal of capital controls appeared successful initially since 
there were no speculative attacks on the currency. However, the time span 
between the removal of controls in 1990 and the crisis in 1992 may be ex- 
plained by the presence of an information externality. 
It is argued that the imposition of a control contradicts the spirit of a 
monetary union in Europe. However, Eichengreen and Wyplosz argue that 
while it is not a first best solution to impose a tax, the implementation of a 
suitable policy is not as cumbersome as people may think and would protect 
the EMU against further attacks. 
In terms of the model, a tax such as that proposed by Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz would imply an additional cost to the speculator in switching from 
Pounds to DMs. I have assumed that each of the speculators holds the same 
amount of Pounds and trades with that given amount. He cannot sell a 
fraction of it and hold on to the remaining portion. It follows that a tax will 
be a fixed cost which is the same for each speculator. The structure of the 
model does not hold a great deal of scope for including changes such as extra 
costs. However, one can imagine the tax being incorporated into the payoff 
which the speculator receives if he moves into DMs. This can be seen in 
equations below. Clearly, one would expect a fall in the payoff caused by the 
transactions tax to deter the speculator from moving into DMs. Thus, the 
effect of this capital control is to delay even further, the onset of a currency 
crisis. 
1 
VI(p, s) = max 
f 
P. S(l - t), 6 
fo 
V, (pl, s) dpi 
Equation (2.16) provides the new Bellman equation for this scenario. The 
optimal strategy is as below which can also be represented graphically in 
figure 2.2. 
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I (p, 8) - S. P(l - t) zf P> I(s) 
(p, S) = S. I (S) (I - t) zP<I (S) 
VI 
(1-t)s. I(s) 
0 I (s) 
L-t) 
p 
Figure 2.2: Optimal Strategy of a Speculator when a Tobin Tax is Imposed 
The impact of the tax can be seen by comparing figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
Notably, the reservation level, I(s), remains unchanged. However, the payoff 
from moving into DMs has fallen At the point where p equals I(S), the 
speculator is indifferent between moving into DMs or remaining in Pounds. 
Combining (2.16) and (2.17) gives: 
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t) =6 Vj(p, s)dp = s6(l - t) 
I+ I(S)2 
(2.18) 
12 
Adding the outside option allows: 
VI(p, s)dp = s(I - t) 
+P (2.19) 
f2) 
to be compared with G so that the speculator moves into gold if the public 
information falls below a particular level, 3, where: 
s= 
2G 
(2.20) (I 
- t)(1 + 
12) 
Proceeding as in the previous case with the same transformations gives: 
g 
C (2.21) (I 
- t)(1 + 
J2) 
Once again, this helps to simplify the derivation of the solution to the model. 
Having set up the informed phase, it is now appropriate to examine the 
first phase. The Bellman equation is given by: 
VU(p) -max P(l -t), 6 
[Pr(U). f 
VU(pl)dpl + Pr(I)EVI] (2.22) 
in which EV, is given as follows: 
E V, max 
[g 
[(I t) (I + 12 S(l - t) 
I+ 12 ds (2.23) 
[2]] 
Expanding this gives: 
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EV, -- 
(1 +g 2) 
(1 + 12)(1 t) 
(2.24) 
2 
It is now possible to find the reservation level for the first phase. 
t)U =6 Pr(u)(l - t) 
I+ U2 
+ Pr(l) (I - t) 
I+ 12 
+ q2) 
12(21 
t)U = Pr(U). I. (l - t) 
I+ u2 
+ PT(l). I. (l +g 2)(1 _ t) (2.25) 
(I+ 
12 
) 
which under a Nash equilibrium gives: 
t)U - UN-l. j. (l t) 
1+ U2 
+ (I _ 
UN-1). j. (I + g2) (I t) 
I+ 
_T2 
(2.26) 
As one would expect, the imposition of a Tobin tax has had the effect of 
raising the reservation level in the first phase. However, there is no impact on 
the reservation level in the second phase. The logic behind this is as follows. 
As mentioned earlier, a speculator weighs up the value of moving into 
DMs against the value of waiting in the hope that another player will move 
and reveal the information. The crucial factor here is the value of the outside 
option. In effect, the outside option rules out some of the lower outcomes 
(see figure 2.2) so that the expected value of next period's value function is 
increased. Note that when a Tobin tax is imposed, the speculator moves into 
gold if the public information falls below: 
2G (2.27) 
(I 
- t) 
(I 
JT2) 
As the tax increases, so too does the value of -9. Hence the tax has further 
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increased the expected value of next period's value function. The overall 
effect is seen in (2.26) in which the only difference is in the size of g. This 
has increased to: 
C 
(2.28) (I 
- t)(I + 
J2) 
which, in turn, raises the reservation level in the uninformed phase. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have pinpointed a particular feature of a currency crisis 
i. e. the five year period of relative calm in the foreign exchange market 
followed by a flurry of activity culminating in a series of speculative attacks. 
I have shown how this might be explained by the existence of an information 
externality. 
However, this is a highly simplified framework which does not claim to 
capture many of the other features associated with currency crises. For 
instance, it does not incorporate an optimising policy maker. In my model, 
the government may be thought of as an autonomous body which generates 
devaluations according to a random process. Nevertheless, within this limited 
framework I am still able to assess the impact of a transactions tax in the 
market. As discussed earlier, this delays further the speculative attack by 
raising the level at which speculators are indifferent between remaining in 
Pounds or moving into DMs. This would suggest that a Tobin tax would 
help in delaying the onset of a crisis. It has been suggested that, during this 
time, a government may intervene to fix the fundamentals. 
Future lines of enquiry may include extensions to this model. When I 
clarified the sequence of events, I noted that there was no correlation between 
the private signal and public information. However, one can imagine how the 
two may be related. If a government is 'wet', then it might be more likely that 
a speculator receives a piece of news urging him to switch into DMs. As my 
model stands, the two are independent of each other. A second potential way 
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forward involves examining the relationship between the speculative attack 
and the devaluation. I have assumed that the attack does not have any effect 
on the likelihood of a devaluation. In the existing framework, devaluations 
are generated by the government according to a random process. It may 
be more appropriate to allow a speculative attack to generate a devaluation 
when the government is 'wet'. 
In conclusion, I stress that this analysis does not thoroughly account for 
the events of the 1992 crisis in the exchange markets. However it focuses on 
an area which is unexplored in the currency crisis literature. I have shown 
that an information externality can play a part in generating a speculative 
attack. 
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Appendix 2.1 - Existence and Uniqueness of 
Solution 
It can be shown that for any IE (0,1), N>2 and g Cz (0,1] there exists 2 
a unique equilibrium. The task is to show that for any values of I, N and 
g in the specified ranges with 1(s) = 1, s -- 2g there is a unique value of 
UE (1, mM [1, (1 + g2). I]). To prove the above, it is also important to show 
that initially waiting for a higher value of p is more beneficial than opting 
for the alternative of gold. It follows that the condition for this is: 
+ u2 
>G g(l + J2) (2.29) 
2- 
The value of g is smaller than ý' so it follows that U I. This is an important 2 
characteristic which I have already discussed and which makes the delay until 
an attack possible. This implies that existence and uniqueness of a solution 
requires a proof that (2.15) has a unique solution for U in the range (1,1). 
This can be done by rewriting (2.15) as: 
AIV + AN-1 UN-1 = Ao + 
AN+l UN+l (2.30) 
in which: 
+ 
_[2 
AN-1 ý= 
[(I + g')(1 + 
") 
- 111 
Ao = (I +g 
2). 1. (1 + J2) 
AN+l -I 
Note that when U=0, the right hand side of the equation is greater 
then the left hand side. Thus, it follows that AO > 0. Conversely, when 
U=1, the left hand side of the equation exceeds the right hand side since 
A, + AN-I > Ao + AN+1 . 
Both sides are continuous so this implies that a 
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unique solution exists. Furthermore, the value of U must exceed that of I 
since if they are set equal, the right hand side of (2.29) exceeds the value of 
the left hand side. This establishes the existence of a solution. The next step 
is to ensure that this solution is unique. 
As in the Caplin and Leahy framework, I set out to prove that the dif- 
ference between the left and right hand sides of (2.29) is quasi concave in U 
over its range [0,1]. Note that: 
D(U) = Al. U + 
AN-1 UN-1 _ Ao - 
AN+l UN+l 
In order to satisfy the condition of quasi concavity, it must be shown that 
for any value, -U in the range, [0,1], where DI (U) = 0, the second order 
derivative, D11 (-U) < 0. The second order derivative takes on the value: 
Dii (U) = (N - 1)(N - 
2)AN-l. UN-1 _ (N + 1). N. AN+l -U 
N+l 
Dif (U) < 
(N - I) DI (U) 
= 0 u 
This proves that the function is locally concave at any point, U implying 
that there can only be one such critical point. This establishes the uniqueness 
of a solution. 
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Chapter 3 
A Model to Explain the 
Duration of a Currency Crisis 
3.1 Introduction 
I have already shown how the timing of a speculative attack may be explained 
by the presence of an information externality within the market. However, 
the duration of the crisis and the subsequent collapse of the currency may 
also be explained using a 'war of attrition' model such as that described by 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) in the context of a fiscal stabilisation. 
The chapter is set out as follows. Firstly, I will set out the 'war of attrition' 
model and solve it to show the optimal time of concession. I will then analyse 
the effect of changing the parameter values. In particular, I am concerned 
with the effect on the delay until one side concedes. In an extension to 
the model, I will introduce asymmetric post stabilisation utilities into the 
framework. I will then draw conclusions. 
3.2 A 'War of Attrition' Model to Explain 
the Duration of a Crisis' 
The logic of the Alesina and Drazen argument is as follows. If a stabilisation 
has particular implications i. e. a burden to be borne by the parties in ques- 
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tion, then each group will attempt to shift the burden onto the other. This 
leads to a 'war of attrition' in which each group attempts to hold out in the 
hope that the other will concede first and bear the larger share of the bur- 
den. In the Alesina and Drazen case, the initial shock reduces available tax 
revenues to pay off a budget deficit and each party tries to shift the resulting 
tax incidence onto the other. 
The framework also lends itself to the issue of foreign aid. This has been 
shown by Casella and Eichengreen (1996) who investigate the importance of 
the timing of aid. They find that foreign aid decided upon and transferred 
earlier in the game can lead to an early stabilisation. However, if it is decided 
upon and transferred late in the game, the effect can be destabilising. This 
encourages the further postponement of reforms. 
My model uses the Alesina and Drazen approach and applies it to a cur- 
rency crisis. In this model, I consider two governments; Germany and the 
UK. A speculative attack is launched on the Pound at time t-0. This 
has the effect of imposing a cost on each of the member governments. This 
can take the form of a political burden since an attack on a currency can 
jeopardise the future of the ERM and thus have serious consequences for all 
members. It may also be thought of as purely financial in terms of undesired 
movements in foreign currency reserves. The attack implies that investors 
sell their holdings of sterling and purchase Deutschmarks. In the absence 
of intervention, this would generate a decrease in the UK money supply 
and a corresponding increase in the German money supply. However, as 
a temporary measure, the UK and German authorities can overcome these 
movements in foreign currency reserves by the use of sterilised intervention. 
This instrument is costly for each government and hence it becomes increas- 
ingly difficult to maintain this situation. As a consequence, the governments 
endure a mounting pre stabilisation utility loss which is a function of the cost 
imposed by sterilisation. 
The situation can onl be restored by a fundamental change in policy 
undertaken by one of the governments. This could take the form of a change 
to fiscal policy, a change in interest rates or the abandonment of the fixed 
rate regime. This would halt an attack on the currency and hence resolve 
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the currency crisis. Thus, in this context, a stabilisation is brought about by 
a change in policy by one of the two governments. The government carrying 
out the change in policy is deemed the 'losing' country. It therefore bears 
a utility loss in excess of the 'winning' country but this loss is smaller than 
that which each country was enduring prior to stabilisation. 
The crucial feature of this model is that the governments differ in terms 
of their welfare loss and that neither government knows the welfare loss of 
its opponent. Hence, as time passes prior to stabilisation, each government 
can only make deductions about the relative strength of its opponent. Given 
this scenario, it is possible to calculate the optimal time of concession for a 
government and hence the timing of the collapse of an exchange rate regime. 
3.3 Model 
Within this framework, I consider two governments, namely the UK and 
Germany. However, the model can be extended to include more than two 
players. These governments differ in the welfare loss they suffer as a result 
of an attack. This is private information i. e. each government knows its 
own welfare loss but does not know that of its opponents. It is assumed 
that reserves are undepleted before time t=0. At this time, a speculative 
attack is launched on the Pound. This generates a cost of c per period. I am 
assuming that this level is constant. ' 
The utility loss for each government is proportional to the size of the cost 
but differs across governments. Each government's utility loss is determined 
by the parameter, Oi which lies between the values, ý and 6. It is assumed 
that prior to a stabilisation, the flow utilities for each government are given 
by: 
'In the Alesina and Drazen framework, government spending before a stabilisation is 
financed through a combination of new bond issues and distortionary taxation. It follows 
that although initial expenditure is constant, there is an increase in interest payments 
over time caused by the rising stock of bonds. Casella and Eichengreen note that this is 
misleading since it implies that an increasing burden hastens the stabilisation. This is not, 
in fact, the case. Therefore, I present the model in a simple form with a constant cost 
which causes a welfare loss. 
S. 
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u 
D=_ 0, +l 
i (3.1) 
where i= 11 2 denotes each of the two governments. Each government es- 
timates the opponent's cost using the cumulative probability distribution 
function, F(O) and the associated density function, f (0). For simplicity, the 
distribution of 0 is assumed to be uniform between 0 and #. 
A resolution of the crisis implies that there is no longer a political and fin- 
ancial cost imposed on the governments arising from the crisis. Thus, there 
is an incentive to concede and end the crisis. However, the resolution of the 
crisis involves costly policy changes which are divided unequally between the 
governments. The loser bears the larger portion of the burden, a, which is 
assumed to be greater than 1. The winner bears the smaller share of (I - a). 2 
It is assumed that this share of the burden is not bargained over. Further- 
more, the governments bear this cost forever. Notably, a value of a close to 
I would indicate what Alesina and Drazen refer to as 'political cohesion' i. e. 2 
it would indicate a willingness for each country to bear approximately the 
same portion of the burden. I will develop this idea in the next section. 
It follows that after a stabilisation, the utility losses borne by each gov- 
ernment will be determined by the value of a and the cost, c, so that flow 
utility will become: 
UL = _aC (3.2) 
for the loser and: 
uw = -(I - a)c (3-3) 
for the winner. The important point to note is that the flow utilities for the 
winner and loser are higher than the pre stabilisation utility. Before one side 
concedes, each government has a utility given by (3.1). The loss is determined 
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by the cost per period and each government's value of 0. Following a stab- 
lisation, the governments share the cost, c, with the winner bearing a smaller 
burden. It follows that it would be better to be the losing government than 
to endure (3.1). However, the crucial point is that each government does not 
know the strength of its opponent as given by the opponent's 0. This implies 
that it is optimal to wait in the hope that the opponent will concede first. 
The discounted lifetime utilities at the point of stabilisation are as follows: 
vL ac (3.4) 
for the loser and: 
VIV a)c (3.5) 
for the winner. Note that 6 is the discount rate. It follows that the lifetime 
utility from the date at which the crisis begins of the winner and loser may 
be written as: 
T 
Uj (T) = 
fo 
uD (x) e -'x dx + (, -, rTVj (T) (3.6) 
where j-W, L. 
It is now possible to evaluate the expected utility as of time 0 as a function 
of the chosen concession time of a government, Ti. This is the sum of Uw (X) 
multiplied by the probability of the opponent conceding at any time, X< Tj 
plus U' (Ti) multiplied by the probability that the opponent has not conceded 
before Ti. The solution of the game is the function, T(Oj) which maps the 
cost parameter, Oj, onto its optimal time of concession, Ti. The expected 
utility of a government can now be written as: 
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Ti, 
UL (T EU(Ti) = [l - H(Tj] i+ 
10 
U' (x) h (x) dx (3.7) 
where H(T) is the distribution of the opponent's optimal time of concession 
and h(T) is the density function. Substituting (3.6) into (3.7) gives the 
following: 
0n 
EU(Ti) - [I - H(Ti)] 
[f Ti 
UD (x)e-'xdx +e -rTi VL (Ti)] 
X=Ti x [10 
(z)e-'zdz + e-"V""(x) 
1 
h(x)dx (3-8) 
It is possible to find the optimal time of concession by finding the value of 
Tj which maximises (3-8). Differentiating (3.8) with respect to Tj and setting 
the resulting expression equal to zero gives: 
dEU [VW(T i) _I -L(T dTi = 
h(Ti) i)] 
D(T 
,)_ UL(T 0 (3-9) H(Ti)] 
IN 
i) + dTi 
] 
Substituting in the values of (3.1), (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) gives: 
dEU 
h(Tj)(2a-I)c+[I-H(Tj)] c oz- 2 
Oi =0 (3-10) dTi 61( 
)l 
Differentiating with respect to Oi gives: 
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d2 EU [I - H(Ti)] c<0 dTid0i 
Hence the optimal concession time, Ti, is monotonically decreasing in Oi - This 
result is significant since it defines the relationship between H(T) which is 
unknown and F(O) which is known. This relationship is: 
I- H(T(O)) = F(O) 
Differentiating this gives: 
-h [T(O)] Ti(0) =- f (0) (3-13) 
The Nash equilibrium is described by the function, T(Oj). This defines 
the optimal point of concession given that the opponent is following the 
same decision rule. Using (3.10), (3.12) and (3.13), the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium can be described as follows: 
Ti(0) -f 
(0) 2ce -1 (3.14) 
F(O) 6 (0 +1- ce) 2 
It is assumed that a government with the highest possible cost of waiting will 
concede immediately. Hence this gives the boundary condition of: 
T (ý) -0 (3-15) 
The differential equation, (3-14), can now be solved to find the function, 
T(O). This is given by: 
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2a -10+a 0-0) T (0) -- In-- ln - (3-16) 6+6+a 22 
An additional assumption is imposed here. It is assumed that 0>a- ý'_ 
This implies that a government will concede in finite time. If the government 
possessed a0 such that 0+ ý' < oz, it would never be optimal for the gov- 
ernment to concede because before stabilisation, it is bearing a utility loss 
which is smaller than the utility loss of a loser. 
In summary, the working of the game is as follows. At the outset there 
is a speculative attack the resolution of which imposes a large political and 
financial cost which is divided unequally between the governments. The 
winner takes on the smaller share while the loser adopts the larger part of the 
burden. They know what payoffs they will receive if they win or lose. At time 
0 immediately following the speculative attack, there will be a probability 
that the opponent will concede i. e. a probability that the opponent has a 
0=#. If it does not concede straight away, the government realises that its 
opponent is not of the 'weakest' type. As time progresses, if the opponent 
still does not concede, the government learns more about it. It learns that 
the opponent does not have a value of 0 above a particular level. This process 
continues until the conditional probability of the opponent conceding is such 
that (3-16) holds. This denotes the optimal time for the government to give 
in and accept being a loser. 
I argue that the speculative attacks on the Pound in 1992 may have 
generated a 'war of attrition' set up similar to the one described above. 
Each government was reluctant to accept the policy changes required to halt 
the crisis. The UK hoped for outside support while Germany had financial 
commitments elsewhere. The result was a 'waiting game' while each hoped 
the other side would concede. 
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3.4 The Effect of Different Parameter Values 
on the Expected Time of Stabilisation 
In this section, I am concerned with the effect of changing certain parameter 
values on the solution to the model. 
3.4.1 Political Cohesion 
In the model, the value of ce is not bargained over. It is det ermined exo- 
genously and both players know this value at the beginning of the game. 
It follows that if a= ý' stabilisation will occur immediately since there is 27 
nothing to be gained from delaying. This is because V' = V' and since 
there are costs to not conceding, it is optimal to concede straight away. Con- 
versely, where a is close to 1, there is an incentive to wait in the hope that 
the opponent will concede first. Therefore, the closer is a to 1, the larger is 
the delay, other things being equal. 
This is an important result in terms of the ERM since it indicates the 
level of political cohesion within the community i. e. the willingness to share 
equally (or not) the burden of reserve depletion. Clearly, if there had been a 
great degree of political cohesion in 1992, a speculative attack on the Pound 
would have resulted in an immediate stabilisation with the UK and German 
governments sharing the burden. The fact that there was a delay in which 
the UK held out hoping for support indicates a lack of cohesion within the 
system. This then raises the issue of how political cohesion may be achieved. 
One possibility may be to require member governments to agree to share 
equally any burden arising from a currency crisis. Clearly, this introduces 
the idea of precommitment and may strengthen the credibility of the ERM. 
This has serious implications for a future attempt at monetary union. 
It suggests that unless there is a willingness to share the costs incurred, a 
speculative attack on a currency will merely lead to a repeat performance of 
the 1992 crisis. 
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3.4.2 Size of the Political and Financial Cost 
Significantly, a change in the size of c has no effect on the optimal time of 
concession. This is the point stressed by Caselhi and Eichengreen (1996). It 
is not an increasing burden which causes stabilisation. Instead it is generated 
by groups who do not know the 'type' of opponent they are facing. It becomes 
individually rational for each to hold out in the hope that the other has a 
value of 0 larger than its own. Consequently, the size of the costs to the 
government following a speculative attack do not affect the optimal time of 
its concession. In considering future monetary union, this would suggest that 
the size of the total burden is not the issue. What is important is the share 
of this cost apportioned to each of the players. 
3.5 Extension to the Framework 
In the above analysis, I made an assumption that the exchange rate mech- 
anism would survive the attack on the currency. The ' war of attrition' was 
concerned with who bears the larger share of the burden. In this extension 
to the framework, I shall consider the effect of country dependent payoffs 
for the winner and loser. In particular, I shall assume that if the UK wins 
the 'war of attrition' then the system survives and the result is as before. 
However, if Germany is the winner, I shall assume that the UK leaves the 
system. This generates a lower payoff for both countries than in the previous 
scenario. 
I assume that the pre stabilisation utility is (3.1) as before. However, 
following the stabilisation, the flow utility for Germany will be: 
-GC 
if it loses or: 
(3.17) 
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U It - _-yc (3.18) g 
where -y >I-a if it is the winner. The payoff in being the winner is smaller 
than in the previous case since the UK has left the system. Conversely, the 
flow utility for the UK will be: 
L 
Uuk :::::::: -OC 
if it loses, where 0>a. This is also lower than in the initial case since, in 
this scenario, the UK will have to leave the exchange rate mechanism. If it 
wins the 'war of attrition' the flow utility will be: 
U 
uýk =-(I - a)c (3.20) 
By including the discount rate in the above results one may arrive at 
the corresponding discounted lifetime utilities at the point of stabilisation. 
The optimal times of concession for each country may now be calculated as 
before. The above results are substituted into (3.9). For the UK, this gives: 
dEU 
=h(Ti)(a+ý-I)c+[I-H(Ti)][c(O-1-0i)]=O dTi 62 
As before, I use (3.12), (3.13) and (3.21) to arrive at the differential equation: 
Ti(0) =f 
(0) (ce +0- 1) (3.22) 
F(O) 6 (0 + il - 0) 
Solving (3-22) given the initial boundary condition of (3.15) gives: 
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(a+ 0+1-0 
T(O) ln 2 ln 
0-0) 
(3.23) ý+ ý, 22 
Firstly, if I is assumed that 0> then the government will concede 2 
in finite time. However, the main result here is that the optimal time of 
concession has increased. This is apparent when the term outside the brackets 
is examined. The value, 0, exceeds oz. The significance of this is that the 
disparity between the winning and losing payoffs has increased. Therefore, 
there is a greater incentive to hold out in the hope that the opponent will 
concede. 
For Germany, the opposite applies. Substituting into (3.9) gives: 
dEU 
= h(Ti)(oz - -y) 
c+ [1 - H(Ti)] 
[c (a 
- Oi)] =0 (3.24) dTi 62 
which, together with (3.12) and (3.13) gives: 
Ti(0) =f 
(0) ce - -y 
- (3.25) F(O) 6 (0 + -' - a) 2 
Solving for (3.25) with the initial boundary condition, (3.15) gives: 
( ce - -ý T (0) = 
(Ino +1- 0'. 
- lno 
- 0) (3.26) 
+ ý, oz) oz 2 
As in the initial case, an assumption that 0>a-1 ensures that the 2 
government will concede in finite time. However, the important result here 
is that the optimal time of concession has decreased. The reason behind this 
is that the difference between the winning and losing payoffs has narrowed. 
Hence, the incentive to hold out for the opponent's concession has been 
reduced. The greater the utility loss endured by the German government 
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as a result of the UK leaving the system, the more likely is the German 
government to concede. 
The final step in this analysis is to compare (3.23) with (3.26). The 
first point to note is that each government assumes that the opponent is 
playing the same strategy as itself. Hence it believes that the only way in 
which its opponent will differ will be in its value of 0. However, since each 
government receives a different flow utility according to whether it wins or 
loses, its optimal time of concession will also be governed by these factors. 
Hence, for a given value of 0, the closer is -y to I-ý, the smaller will be the 
difference between the countries' optimal times of concession. 
One may argue that this analysis is a more accurate description of the 
events of 1992 since the attack on the pound led to the UK leaving the 
exchange rate mechanism. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would argue that this basic 'war of attrition' framework is 
extremely versatile. It lends itself, not only to the scenarios of foreign aid 
and tax distribution but also to the topical area of currency crises. My 
aim was to offer a possible explanation for the duration of a currency crisis 
and ultimately the timing of the UK exit from the regime. In the initial 
framework, it is assumed that the system remains intact. However, despite 
its simplicity, it has produced some interesting points with regard to political 
cohesion. Notably, in the case of the UK, there was a considerable delay until 
the decision was taken to leave the system. This delay would indicate a lack 
of political cohesion between countries in the ERM. 
In the extension to this framework, I consider the effect of asymmetric 
payoffs for the winner and loser. I find that the larger the difference between 
the payoffs of winning and losing, the larger is the optimal time of concession. 
I do not claim to have fully accounted for the events of the 1992 crisis. 
However, I have demonstrated, using a 'war of attrition' model, how the dur- 
ation of the crisis may be explained. If each government knew its opponent's 
'type', then there would be no delay prior to a stabilisation. It is the fact 
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that neither government knows the strength of its opponent, that creates a 
situation in which each finds it optimal to hold out in the hope that the 
opponent will concede first. 
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Chapter 4 
A Model of Informational 
Events which Triggers a 
Currency Crisis 
In this chapter I show how informational events can trigger currency crises. 
In order to put my reseach into context, I outline two of the more influential 
papers in this area. Following this brief literature survey, I present a model 
based on that of Morris and Shin (1995). Firstly, I set up the model and 
show how it would work if all information were observed without error. I then 
set out the case of symmetric imperfect information and then the revealing 
scenario where differential information is noisy. Finally I discuss the results 
and draw conclusions. 
4.1 Literature Survey 
The literature concerning the aggregation of information in society is relevant 
to this thesis since it can be used to explain speculative behaviour in foreign 
exchange markets. In this section, I outline two of the key papers in the field. 
One such paper is that of Lohmann (1994). She analyses political action 
prior to an election. She argues that by signing petitions or taking part in 
demonstrations, people signal their dissatisfaction with the current policy. 
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These actions can convey information about policy consequences to other 
voters and, therefore, influence other individuals' voting decisions. Hence 
information can be dispersed among society through political action. 
In her model, policy preferences of individuals are correlated. If one per- 
son reveals his preferences, other peoples' preferences are influenced. Fur- 
thermore, voters believe that the incentive to take part in political action is 
weak. Hence, only a small number of political actions are necessary for there 
to be a decisive result. 
Lohmann discovers that those individuals with moderate preferences will 
undertake political action to signal private information to other individu- 
als. Those with extreme preferences will take action whatever their private 
information in order to influence other voters. Individuals make a voting 
decision based on the size of the political action they observe. They discount 
this for extremist political action and base their decision on the result. She 
finds that, ex ante, political action can decrease the likelihood of an incorrect 
voting outcome. However, political action can simply add noise to the system 
when, in the absence of pre election communication, voting could lead to the 
full information outcome. 
Caplin and Leahy (1994) also consider the importance of information rev- 
elation. However, theirs is a three stage model. In the first stage, information 
of common interest is in private hands. Once this information reaches a trig- 
ger level, agents change their behaviour thereby releasing information. In 
the final stage, the market reacts to this revelation. They focus attention on 
industry investment but also note that the same analysis could be applied to 
political crises, bank runs and international debt crises. 
The model is of irreversible investment in which there is a continuum 
of firms. Each can take part in production of a single unit of a consump- 
tion good. They must spread this production over T periods. In this time, 
they can accumulate information on the state of final demand of their good. 
They use this information to decide whether or not to make the additional 
investments to finish the project. 
There are three different sources of information. Firstly, the firm has a 
prior knowledge about the state of demand. There are two equally likely 
49 
states of demand; high or low. The second source of information comes from 
the private signal that each firm receives immediately after paying the initial 
fee. This concerns the state of demand. Thirdly, is the information the firm 
receives each period in which it is in active production. In the final period, 
each firm must decide whether to complete or abandon production. This 
type of approach may be applied to foreign exchange markets. 
4.2 Informational Events which Trigger Cur- 
rency Crises 
The model presented by Morris and Shin shows how the ERM was 'ripe for 
attack' long before the September 1992 crisis. A currency is 'ripe for attack' 
in this framework when speculators need to coordinate to bring about a 
collapse by selling their holdings of sterling. There are three possible regions 
for the value of the fundamentals. In the stable region, a fixed rate regime 
will be maintained even if all investors sell their holdings of the currency 
since the cost of intervention falls short of the value of sustaining the regime. 
In the unstable region, the cost of maintaining the regime exceeds the benefit 
irrespective of the actions of the investors. In the 'ripe for attack' region, the 
decision to sustain a fixed rate regime depends crucially on the behaviour of 
the investors. If they all sell, it is optimal for the government to abandon 
the regime. However, if they all retain their holdings of the currency, the 
cost of intervening to support the currency is less than the benefit. It is then 
optimal to maintain the fixed rate regime. Morris and Shin argue that if the 
state of the economy lies in the 'ripe for attack' region each investor will sell 
his holdings of the currency if there is a lack of common knowledge among 
the investors concerning the state of the economy. 
My contribution to this area is to adapt the Morris and Shin framework 
so as to allow the state of the economy to be known to all players. However, 
the value placed by the government in remaining in the ERM is observed by 
each of the speculators with a degree of error. The benefit from remaining 
in the system may arise, for example, from an improved political reputation 
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or a favourable impact on inflation. It is assumed that a tough government 
places a large value on sustaining the regime whereas a weak government 
places a small value on maintaining the parity. I show that a lack of common 
knowledge concerning government type leads to the same scenario as in the 
Morris and Shin case. Instead of three possible regions existing for the fun- 
damentals, they exist for the value placed by the government on maintaining 
a fixed rate regime. 
Morris and Shin note that imperfect information alone is not enough 
to guarantee the onset of a crisis. In their model, they show that if all 
speculators observe a public signal which gives the true state of the economy 
with error, the content ofthis signal is common knowledge. It follows that 
'nothing more can be said beyond the existence of multiple equilibria'. 
When each speculator receives differential information concerning the 
state of the economy, the outcome will be sensitive to this differential in- 
formation. This is because the state of the economy is no longer common 
knowledge. Even if the degree of noise in the signal is very small, it is 
never common knowledge that the exchange rate parity will be maintained. 
Each speculator knows that his payoff depends on the actions of the others. 
In turn, their actions are determined by their beliefs. It follows that the 
speculator will be concerned about the beliefs of his counterparts. Despite 
receiving a message which rules out certain states, he may still have to con- 
sider these states of the world since they may contain information about his 
opponents' beliefs. His opponents face the same problem. It follows that 
although every player knows that the exchange rate can be maintained at its 
current parity, they must take into consideration what would happen if this 
parity was unsustainable because the actions of other speculators may make 
it unsustainable. 
Within the framework, selling sterling yields a fixed, known payoff. How- 
ever, holding on to the currency is risky. The returns are high if the spec- 
ulators agree not to attack but low if the currency collapses. Unless these 
speculators can agree on how to interpret their news, remaining in the cur- 
rency is not optimal. Therefore, when each speculator receives a signal, 
independently and uniformly distributed around the true state of the eco- 
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nomy, the target rate collapses in both the unstable and 'ripe for attack' 
regions. 
In this adaptation of Morris and Shin's framework, it is the value placed 
by the government on maintaining an exchange rate parity which is observed 
with error. It is uncertainty about how the speculator should interpret his 
information which makes it optimal to attack. I show that with the value of 
maintaining the parity unknown, the same situation arises as with the Mor- 
ris and Shin case. When speculators receive noisy differential information 
concerning the value placed on maintaining the parity, this produces three 
distinct regions for the value. In the 'ripe for attack' region, the government 
will abandon the fixed rate providing that a sufficient number of speculat- 
ors sell their sterling. In this region, a sufficiently high tax rate will deter 
speculators from abandoning sterling. 
4.3 Model 
As in the Morris and Shin framework, I consider the relationship between 
the UK government and a large number of speculators. The reason I assume 
that there are many speculators is to ensure that each one is small in relation 
to the total population. Demand for the currency is determined through the 
foreign exchange market and is denoted by: 
D(e) (4.1) 
where e7 the exchange rate, is the number of Deutschmarks, for example, per 
Pound. A large value of e implies a strong Pound. It follows that demand 
for sterling is decreasing in e. At the start of the game, each speculator holds 
sterling. In total, these holdings have been normalised to 1. The aggregate 
sale of sterling is denoted by s. I assume that even under a floating regime 
there is some degree of government intervention denoted by 1(v) where v is 
the value that the government places on maintaining the parity. I assume 
that a tough government will intervene to a greater degree under a floating 
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regime than will a weaker government. 
If the currency is allowed to float, the exchange rate will be determined 
by the intersection of the supply and demand schedules. The point of equl- 
librium is denoted by: 
(V, 8) (4.2) 
which is that value of the exchange rate at which demand for the currency 
equals supply so that: 
I(v) + D(e) =s (4.3) 
f (v, s) is decreasing in s and increasing in v. 
It is further assumed that the government has an exchange rate target of 
e*. This represents the fixed rate which, it is assumed, exceeds the floating 
rate. This implies that intervention to support the target is necessary if 
the fixed rate regime is to be maintained. The government can achieve this 
through purchasing sterling and thereby incur a cost of c(x) where x denotes 
the number of Pounds to be bought. It is assumed that, firstly, this cost 
increases in x and that it is a one off cost. Secondly, the government will 
undertake some level of intervention. I also assume that the value placed on 
maintaining the target denoted by v is drawn from a uniform distribution 
on the interval [0,1]. If it is at its lowest point, 0,1 assume that the cost of 
intervention exceeds the benefit from maintaining the exchange rate parity. 
As in the original Morris and Shin framework, it is now possible to identify 
three regions for the value of v. Firstly, there is v*. Beyond this point, 
even if all speculators sell their holdings of the currency, the cost of inter- 
vention falls short of the value of maintaining the parity. This is given by 
c (-D (e*) + 1) = v*. Note that -D (e*) +1 is the net supply of sterling 
which the government must purchase when all speculators sell their holdings 
of the currency. This is known as the stable region and is defined where 
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VE [V*) 1]. Here the exchange rate parity will be maintained and the actions 
of the speculators do not affect the decision by the government to remain in 
the exchange rate regime. 
The value v* solves c (-D (e*)) = v*. Below this value of v, the cost of 
intervention is in excess of the benefit even if no speculator sells his cur- 
rency. This is the unstable region defined for values of v where vE [0, vj. 
Once more, the actions of the speculators do not affect the decision by the 
government. This time it chooses not to maintain the exchange rate target. 
For a value of v in the interval, vE [v,, v*], the behaviour of the speculat- 
ors determines the decision by the government to intervene. If all speculators 
choose to retain their holdings of sterling, then the cost of intervening is less 
than the value of maintaining the parity. However, if all speculators choose 
to sell their holdings, it is optimal for the government to abandon the target. 
In this region, it follows that if more than a certain proportion of spec- 
ulators sell their holdings of sterling, the government will be compelled to 
abandon the currency. This proportion of speculators required to trigger an 
exit from the system is called the trigger mass and is given by a(v). Notably, 
where v is equal to v, a (v,, ) =0 and for v equal to v*, a (v*) =L 
As in the Morris and Shin framework, I shall impose the condition on the 
floating rate such that the stronger the government, the smaller will be the 
devaluation i. e. f (v, oz(v)) is weakly increasing in v. 
I have already noted that there are a large number of speculators each 
of which is small relative to the size of the total population. I assume that 
each can sell all of his holdings or retain all his holdings. He does not sell 
a fraction of what he holds. In selling his share of sterling, he bears a fixed 
cost, t>0. This can represent a transactions cost or tax. 
His payoff is dependent on the government's decision to maintain or aban- 
don the target. If the target is maintained and the speculator retains his 
holdings of sterling his payoff is normalised to 0. If the government aban- 
dons the target rate and the speculator does not switch out of sterling, his 
payoff will be the difference between the floating rate and the target: 
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(4.4) 
If he sells his holdings of sterling he can expect the fixed payoff of: 
-t (4-5) 
This is not related to the value of maintaining the target rate. 
Having described the components of this model, the nature of the game 
can be explained. In the first instance, I assume that the speculators can 
observe v without error. The value to be placed on sustaining the target rate, 
e* is determined. The speculators view this perfectly and then decide whether 
to retain their holdings of sterling. This then decides the aggregate sale of 
sterling, s. Having observed this, the government then chooses whether to 
intervene in support of the currency. This determines the exchange rate and 
hence the speculators receive their payoffs. 
This is a very basic scenario in which the speculators have perfect in- 
formation. They know that if v falls in the stable region, the government 
will sustain the target rate irrespective of speculative behaviour. Therefore, 
it is optimal to retain their holdings of sterling. Conversely, if they observe a 
value of v in the unstable region, it is optimal to sell the currency since the 
government will not support the pound even if all speculators retain their 
holdings. 
Within the ripe for attack region, the actions of the government will 
depend on speculative behaviour. This is a situation of multiple equilibria 
since if all speculators co-ordinate their actions and retain their holdings, the 
government will find it optimal to defend the target. However, if they all sell 
their currency then the government will find that the costs of defending the 
target exceed the benefit. Hence, it will devalue the Pound. 
A similar result emerges even when it is assumed that V is observed with a 
degree of error. In this scenario, each speculator views a public signal. This is 
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known to be observed with an error which lies within c of the true value, v, so 
E represents a limit to the distribution. The speculators receive a message, 
m, which is conditional on v and uniformly distributed over the interval, 
IV - E, v+ E]. The significance of this is that the message is still common 
knowledge. Although any decision by the speculators will now be determined 
by the message, m, the three regions will still exist. Furthermore, multiple 
equilibria will still be a feature ofthe ripe for attack region. Therefore, the 
outcome is the same as in the perfect information case. 
However, the result is different if the speculators observe differential in- 
formation which is noisy. It is assumed that each speculator receives a mes- 
sage, m, from the interval, IV - 6, v+ 6]. These messages are assumed to 
be independent across speculators and are uniformly distributed over the in- 
terval, IV - E, v+ E]. As in the Morris and Shin framework, I consider the 
equilibria determined by ak trigger 8trategy. The speculator sells his hold- 
ing of sterling if he receives a message which is less than k. If the message, 
m, is in excess of k, then he retains his sterling. If each speculator behaves 
according to this decision rule then an equilibrium is known as ak trigger 
equffibrium. 
Payoffs for the speculators are as before. They receive -t if they sell 
their holdings of sterling and 0 if they retain sterling and, subsequently, the 
target is maintained. If the target is abandoned by the government and the 
speculators are holding sterling, the payoff is f- e*. The aggregate sale of 
sterling will depend upon the number of speculators who have received news 
less than k. The sale of sterling is denoted by: 
s (v, k) (4.6) 
This is the aggregate sale of the currency when the value of sustaining the 
target rate is v and all speculators employ the k trigger strategy. Notably, 
when the true v lies below k-E, all speculators will have received a message 
that falls short of k. Therefore, they will all choose to sell their sterling. 
Conversely, if the true value of t, exceeds k+c, all speculators will have 
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received a message greater than k. Therefore, none of them will choose to 
sell their sterling. It follows that ,; (v, k) is given by: 
0 
s (v, k) I 
k+E-v 
2E 
v>k+ 
v<k- 
E<vk+c 
(4.7) 
This is best illustrated graphically using figure 4.1. 
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Notably, the floating exchange rate is increasing in v, while S(v, k) is 
decreasing in v. It follows that the function, f (v, s(v, k)) is increasing in v. 
When the speculators decide on whether to sell their currency, they take 
into account the likelihood of government intervention. As in the Morris and 
Shin framework, it is now possible to assign a number: 
d(k) (4.8) 
for any value of kC (v, + e, v* - c) which denotes the value of v at which the 
government is indifferent between sustaining the target rate and devaluing 
the currency. It is, therefore, the value of v which solves 
c (s(v, k) -D (e*)) =v (4.9) 
and also 
s (v, k) = oz (v) (4.10) 
This is known as the devaluation poZnt for ak trigger strategy. Again this 
can be seen using figure 4.1. 
The total intervention necessary to maintain the parity is given by s (v , k) - 
D (e*). It follows that the cost of intervening is then c (s(v, k) -D (e*)) 
which increases in s. The trigger mass is that value of s which solves 
c (s(v, k) -D (e*)) =vi. e. it is the intersection of the cost 
function with 
s(v, k). When v falls below this, the exchange rate at the end of the game 
i. e. the po8t intervention exchange rate will be the floating rate. If it ex- 
ceeds this point, the target rate will prevail. This can be seen in the dia- 
gram by selecting a point for v and then examining the respective values 
of c (s(v, k) -D (e*)) and s(v, k). The post intervention exchange rate 
is 
denoted by: 
59 
, O(v, k) - 
e* 
s (v, 
v> d(k) 
v<d (k) 
(4.11) 
where O(v, k) is non decreasing in v. It follows that the payoff to holding 
sterling given v is V)(v, k) - e*. 
I shall now show that for any k in the interval kC (v, + E7 V* - c), there is 
a tax rate t>0 which makes the k trigger strategy a symmetric equilibrium 
strategy. 
A speculator receiving a message in the above interval will know that the 
true value of v falls in the ripe for attack region. The above statement says 
that for any message that tells him that v is in the ripe for attack region, 
there exists a unique tax rate for which this is a trigger point. I shall now 
set out to prove the above. 
It is assumed that all speculators use the same decision rule in deciding 
whether to hold the currency. If all but the ith speculator follow the k trigger 
strategy and speculator i receives the message, ki, his expected payoff from 
holding sterling given that all others are following the k trigger strategy is: 
11 (k /, k) =I 
kf+f 
(V)(v, k) - e*) dv 2c 
fk, 
, 
Furthermore, speculator i's conditional density over v given the message, 
ki is uniform over [kl - e, k1 + c]. I have already noted that the post in- 
tervention exchange rate is non decreasing in v. Therefore, it follows that 
speculator i's expected payoff is also non decreasing in v and is weakly in- 
creasing in ki. It is now possible to examine the expected payoff for holding 
sterling when all other speculators are adopting the k trigger strategy. Note 
that when v> d(k), the post intervention exchange rate is equal to the tar- 
get rate. This means that the payoff to a speculator who receives message k 
when all other speculators are following ak trigger strategy is: 
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I k+E 
A) - e*) dv 
d(k) 
(f (V s(v, k)) - e*) dv <0 H (k, k) -- (0 (V 17 2cfk 
-E 
2c 
fk 
-E 
(4.13) 
Note that below the devaluation point, the post intervention rate is equal 
to the floating rate, hence the second half of the equation above. The reason 
that there is an inequality follows from the premise that for values of v less 
than the devaluation point, the payoff from retaining sterling is negative. 
Therefore, a tax rate set at the level, t -- -H(k, k) will ensure that a specu- 
lator is indifferent between holding sterling and selling his share. Since (4.12) 
is increasing in ki, it follows that a speculator receiving a message in excess 
of k will prefer to retain his holdings while if he receives a message below k 
he will want to sell sterling. Therefore, k is the optimal trigger point. 
I shall now show that for any message, mG (v, + E) V* - E), there is a 
tax leveI7 to >0 below which all speculators will want to sell their holdings 
of the currency given fn. This is an important result since it suggests that 
when differential information is noisy, a low tax rate induces a speculator to 
sell his sterling if he knows v falls in the ripe for attack region. I shall now 
set out to prove that this is the case. 
Firstly, when the value of maintaining the target v= d(k), the sale of 
sterling, s(V, k) = oz(v). Notably, s(v, k) decreases in v but a(v) increases in 
v. This implies that for a value of v smaller than or equal to d(k): 
(v 
,s 
(v, k)) <f (v, a (v)) 
Again this can be seen in figure 4.1 for a value of v< d(k). Furthermore, 
when kE (v,, + c, v* - 6)ý it can be shown that k-c< 
d(k) <k+E. This is 
because the devaluation point is defined by calculating the value of v which 
solves: 
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k+c (1 - 2a(v)) (4.15) 
where 0< a(v) < 1. For values of k-c<v<k+c, sale of sterling is given 
k+E-v by 2E .A devaluation will occur if the trigger mass is equal to this level 
so that: a (V) - 
k+c-v. Rearranging this yields (4.15). It follows that this 2E 
value of v must lie in the ripe for attack region since kE (v, + E, v* - E). 
It can also be shown that within the interval (v* + c, v* - E), d(k) is in- 
vertible and increasing in k and d(k) -k is decreasing in k. In figure 4.1 this 
is apparent since an increase in k within this interval leads to corresponding 
shifts in the cost function and s(v, k). Algebraically, this can be seen by 
examining k=v-E (I - 2a(v)). Since a depends on v, so too does k. It is 
apparent that d(k) is increasing in k since its inverse is increasing in v over 
the interval (v*, v*). In considering d(k) - k, note that it is decreasing in k 
since oz and d-' are increasing functions in d(k) -k=c (I - 2a (d-1 (k))). 
If a speculator receives a message in the interval mE (v* + E, v* - c), 
then where k<m, the expected payoff produces the following: 
I d(k) I d(k) 
rl (k, k) -- (f 
(V, s(v, k)) - e*) dv < 2c 
(f (v, a(v)) - e*) dv 2c 
f 
-E k-E 
fk 
(f (v, a(v)) (f (v, a(v)) - e*) dv <0 (4.16) 
f- 
e*) dv :5 ý- ,f 2c " -, E 
2E 
This is a similar result to that found by Morris and Shin. The first inequality 
arises since f (v, s(v, k)) is bounded by f (v, a(v)). The second inequality 
results from f (v, a(v)) increasing in v while d(m) -m< d(k) - k. It follows 
that the final integral must be negative since, in the ripe for attack region, 
f (v, a (v)) falls short of the target rate. A tax level of: 
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to (f (v, e*) dv (4.17) 2c  -, 
implies that -to < 7r(k, k) for all k<m so it is never optimal to retain 
sterling for any value of k<m and so it is not possible to find a trigger 
equilibrium. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown how Morris and Shin's model of currency crises 
may be extended to consider the case where speculators have differential 
information regarding government type. When there is a lack of common 
knowledge of the value a government places on maintaining a target rate, it 
becomes optimal for each speculator to attack the currency when this value 
lies in the 'ripe for attack' region. Conversely, when differential information is 
observed with an error in the form of a public signal, an attack need not take 
place in this region. This is because the news received is common knowledge 
and hence, speculators can agree on how to interpret it. It is only when 
this differential information becomes noisy that it becomes optimal for each 
speculator to attack in the ripe for attack region. 
The results from the model would suggest two policy implications. Firstly, 
the government needs to put a sufficiently large value on maintaining the 
target rate. This value must not be so low that it puts the currency in the 
unstable region. Secondly, if v lies in the 'ripe for attack' region, the govern- 
ment can avoid a crisis by imposing a Tobin tax which ensures that no attack 
will be optimal. The debate on taxes in an exchange rate mechanism has 
been raised by a number of economists. It is regarded by some as contradict- 
ing the spirit of a united Europe. However, it is also noted (Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz (1993)) that while taxes represent a second best solution, they also 
represent a plausible way of achieving monetary union in Europe in which 
currencies are defended from speculative attacks. 
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Chapter 5 
Informational Cascades as an 
Explanation For a Currency 
Crisis 
In the last chapter, I was concerned with informational events which trig- 
ger currency crises. In this chapter, I show how informational cascades can 
develop in models where individuals move sequentially. These cascades can 
help to explain the timing of the crises. 
An informational cascade takes place when an individual observes the 
actions which others have taken ahead of him and uses this information to 
formulate his own decision. In so doing, he abandons or pays little attention 
to his own private information. It can be shown that individuals converge on 
a particular action on the basis of very little information. Once an individual 
ignores his own information in favour of the previous actions of others, his 
decision has little informational value to the subsequent players. 
It has been argued that this is the case in many financial markets. Cas- 
cades develop when depositors view other depositors' withdrawal behaviour 
and also withdraw their funds since they believe that the bank will become 
insolvent (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Banerjee (1992) also notes that asset 
markets display 'excess volatility' and this may be due to the herding beha- 
viour of investors. More recently Chari and Kehoe (1997) discuss the role 
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of herd behaviour in a debt-default setting. I apply the standard model of 
informational cascades developed by Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch 
to speculative behaviour in a foreign exchange market. 
In this chapter, I review the extensive literature in the area of informa- 
tional cascades and herding. I then set up the framework of Bikhchandani, 
Hirschleifer and Welch. Having established the model, it is easy to show 
firstly how cascades occur in a foreign exchange market. Also of import- 
ance is the likelihood of incorrect cascades emerging. In this scenario, initial 
investors observe an incorrect private signal and the subsequent investors 
follow suit. This has dire implications for a currency since even a strong 
government may find itself forced to devalue if a run is generated on ster- 
ling. Furthermore, it can be shown that despite the fact that a number of 
people converge on the same action, the 'depth' of the cascades does not in- 
crease. Once a cascade has developed, further adoptions of the same action 
become less informative to subsequent investors. This implies that cascades 
are 'brittle' to use Bikhchandam, Hirschleifer and Welch's terminology since 
the arrival of some new public information can reverse a cascade. 
I then describe the experiment of Anderson and Holt (1997) which tests 
this model. They find that in the twelve sessions, cascades developed in 87 of 
the 122 periods in which they were possible. Of most interest, however, was 
the tendency for subjects to use a simple counting rule of actions rather than 
to behave according to Bayes' rule. Their results were of particular relevance 
to my thesis since they form the basis for the experiment which I set up in 
chapter 6. 
5.1 Literature Survey 
In this section, I focus on the literature which relates herding behaviour 
directly to financial markets. One such paper is that of Avery and Zemsky 
(1995) which argues that if prices aggregate public information, cascades can 
be avoided. This is based on the asset market model of Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) and assumes that a market maker sets bid and ask prices equal to 
the expected value of the asset in question conditional on all the publicly 
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available information. Agents buy or sell a unit of the asset at the posted 
prices. There are two types of trader. The first buys or sells for liquidity 
purposes and is termed a noise trader. The second is an informed trader 
since he has some private information which he wishes to exploit for profit 
making reasons. The market maker must infer the information available to 
the informed traders. However, the informed traders have an advantage over 
him due to the actions of the noise traders. Eventually, the market maker 
will be able to tell whether his price is too high or too low from observing the 
trades occurring on one side of the market or another. He will then adjust it 
accordingly. The authors conclude that the inclusion of price as a continuous 
variable has the effect of aggregating public information so as to avoid an 
informational cascade. 
However, Gale (1995) notes that this is not a critical observation for the 
theory. In Avery and Zemsky's model, there are no gains from trade. In- 
formed traders buy and sell since the value they place on the asset differs 
from that of the market maker. They will trade whatever the size of this 
difference. Furthermore, they will reveal some of their own private informa- 
tion irrespective of how much information has already been revealed. Gale 
notes that if traders had other motives such as hedging, the analysis would 
be different. 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) also examine herd behaviour with regard 
to investment. However, their paper is more concerned with reputational 
cascades. ' Each agent receives a signal concerning the value of a number 
of options but this signal may or may not be informative. The task of the 
individual is to maximise the probability that an outside agent will put on the 
chance that he is an informed agent. In other words, he wants to maximise 
his reputation. It is assumed that informed agents receive signals which have 
correlated errors. Therefore, it follows that subsequent agents maximise their 
appearance of being an informed agent by taking the same action as their 
predecessors. The crucial difference between this paper and those such as 
'A further example of reputational cascades is given by Trueman (1994) and also Froot 
et al. (1992) in this paper, agents accumulate information about what other agents 
know 
rather than about the fundamental in question. 
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Banerjee (1992) is that agents are rewarded for convincing a principal that 
they are correct. Thus there is a distortion in incentives. 
The work of Gul and Lundholm (1995) demonstrates how agents' de- 
cisions may become clustered together and have the appearance of an in- 
formational cascade. However, in this instance, information is being used 
efficiently. In their model, each of the two agents wants to predict the future 
value of a project and wishes to do this sooner rather than later. The value 
of the project is the sum of two independent random variables drawn from a 
uniform distribution between 0 and 1. Each agent receives some private in- 
formation concerning the value of this project. More specifically, he receives 
the realisation of one of the random variables. The utility function for each 
agent shows a trade off between the cost of an error in the agent's predic- 
tion and the cost of delaying the decision in order to get a more accurate 
prediction. 
Gul and Lundholm show that a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium ex- 
ists. They also note that the utility of each agent does not depend on anyone 
else's perception of him. Therefore, there is no incentive to copy the beha- 
viour of another agent. However, clustering of decisions still occurs. This 
is because the squared difference in agents' predictions when forecasts are 
endogenously ordered has a smaller expectation than the squared difference 
when forecasts are exogenously ordered. The authors note that this is useful 
since it enables us to distinguish between a cascade and a clustering of de- 
cisions. The sign of a cascade is that the accuracy of decision making does 
not improve over time. However, when there is clustering, accuracy will im- 
prove since the second agent will know the previous signal and also that this 
exceeds his own. The authors note that, in effect, information has leaked due 
to the trade off between accuracy and delay and this generates clustering. 
Vives (1995) also has some criticisms of the literature on herd behaviour 
on information cascades. He notes that the literature on herd behaviour fo- 
cuses on market failure as a source of herding. However, the rational expect- 
ations literature stresses the role of the market mechanism as an aggregator 
of the information of agents. In his paper he presents a survey of some of the 
social learning models and examines the extent to which these cast a doubt 
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on the workings of the market mechanism. In particular, he examines the 
speed at which full information equilibrium is reached and also the relevance 
of costly information. 
He notes that there are two important assumptions underlying the basic 
herding models. Firstly, the models assume a discrete action space. If the 
action space were continuous and the reward received by the agents varied 
with their proximity to the true action, the actions would converge. As it 
stands, he argues that agents mimic the actions of others since they cannot 
'fine tune' their actions according to the information. His second point is 
that the signals in these models have to be of bounded precision. If signals 
had unbounded precision, an incorrect herd could be terminated by one agent 
who has a signal which is sufficiently informative. 
For these reasons, Vives argues that the models presented are not suf- 
ficiently robust. He argues that they do not correctly model fads, fashion 
or decision making. He also stresses that, as yet, none have attempted to 
model agents as acting simultaneously. For the reasons described above, he 
develops a model which includes smooth and noisy learning from others. 
His main result concerns two properties of learning from others. Firstly, 
he shows that public precision accumulates over time but at a slow rate. He 
describes this as the self correcting policy of learning from others. However, 
he shows that a higher precision of public information induces a low response 
to private information which, in turn, gives a smaller increase in public pre- 
cision. This is termed the self defeating property. According to his theory, 
herd behaviour occurs when the self defeating property is large and so the 
private signals of subjects are overwhelmed by public information. 
Gale (1995) also draws together a considerable amount of the literature 
on social learning. Firstly, he sets up a basic model to describe the features 
of informational cascades. He then proceeds in examining the robustness of 
herd behaviour. He looks at the nature of the signals received and notes 
that, in a considerable number of models, there are only two signals. This 
implies that a cascade may be easily generated and the only way of breaking 
it would be for an individual to haNe a larger or better signal. 
He stresses the importance of models such as the one by Gul and Lund- 
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holm (1995) in which the preferences for agents are defined over a continuous 
variable. It follows that information will eventually be fully revealed. 
In examining endogenous sequencing, he notes that the timing of agents 
decisions is assumed to be exogenous in much of the literature. However, 
if agents were allowed to choose their position in the queue, most would 
want to go last. Again he refers to Gul and Lundholm (1995) and also the 
work of Chamley and Gale (1994)' since these papers study the importance of 
strategic delay. As a final point, he notes the type of equilibria encountered in 
the literature. In particular, the choice of symmetric or asymmetric equilibria 
makes a great difference to the result of the model. 
He concludes that herd behaviour is robust but only subject to certain 
qualifications. Furthermore, he stresses the importance of building on the 
work of Vives in modelling the dynamics of information revelation. 
Finally, I shall examine the recent literature which has evolved from the 
earlier work on herding behaviour. Firstly, there is the model by Chari 
and Kehoe (1997). This applies herding to a standard debt-default setting. 
Within this setting, fiscal crises and frictions in international markets can 
generate excess volatility of capital flows. The frictions in the financial mar- 
ket imply that information is not transmitted efficiently across investors. 
This, in turn, generates herding behaviour among investors which leads to 
debt-default problems for borrowing countries. This model also tackles the 
issue of reputation since these crises act as a test of the government's com- 
mitment to its fiscal responsibility. If it survives such a crisis, its reputation 
improves and future capital flows become more stable. However, if it fails, 
its reputation declines as does future foreign investment. 
The framework is based on that of Banerjee (1992) and also Bikhchandani 
et al. (1992) since there are N lenders with a choice of committing to invest- 
ment in either a domestic or borrowing country. The project in the borrowing 
country will only go ahead if a sufficient number of investors commit to its 
funding. If fewer than the required amount agree to invest, then the project 
2 Chamley and Gale develop a framework similar to that of Bikhchandani et al. 
However, agents choose their timing of actions strategically. Although they find that 
cascades do occur, these results rely on the finiteness of the choice set for agents. 
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is cancelled and the investors can commit to domestic investment. As in the 
aforementioned papers, the ordering of actions is exogenous and each investor 
receives a piece of private information concerning the state of the economy. 
Thus, he will base his decision on his private information, his prior views as 
to the competency of the government and also on the history of actions taken 
by his predecessors. 
Again, this is a paper which illustrates that herding occurs as a result of 
market failure. In this circumstance, inefficient aggregation of information 
results in frictions in the financial markets which in turn, generates fiscal 
crises. Chari and Kehoe note that herding would not occur in this model if 
investors made their decisions simultaneously rather than sequentially. This 
contrasts with the work of Cole and Kehoe (1996) in which crises occur 
because agents move simultaneously. 
Lee (1997) also explains booms and crashes in financial markets as failure 
in the aggregation of information. However, his model introduces a dynamic 
element into the literature. He defines market crashes as evolving through 
four basic stages. Firstly, there is the boom phase followed by a period of 
euphoria which is modelled as an information cascade. Following this there is 
a trigger from which panic sets in. This panic is modelled as what he terms, 
an information avalanche. 
The inefficiency in the aggregation of information occurs because traders 
place a larger weight on the history of previous prices in their decision making 
i. e. they are putting a greater emphasis on this public information rather 
than their own signal. It follows that a trader with a signal containing bad 
news will tend to discount this when a number of his counterparts have good 
news signals. He will instead make an investment choice closer to that of 
the other traders. Lee notes that if this is combined with a transaction cost, 
the actions of this speculator may become indistinguishable from the others. 
Therefore, the price will remain high for this asset. This is based on the 
notion of informational cascades as in the earlier literature. 
However, when there are a large number of these hidden bad news traders, 
a market crash can be imminent. Since they all have bad news as their 
private information, a trigger that implies that the true state is the bad 
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one can provoke a crash. This information avalanche is based on the notion 
developed by Bikhchaiidani et al. which suggests that cascades are fragile 
and thus may be reversed. This will be discussed in greater detail later in 
the chapter. 
The result of Lee's paper is to demonstrate how a large change in the 
price of an asset can occur without there having to be a substantial piece 
of news. Furthermore, small errors due to information-generated frictions in 
the financial markets can lead to large errors in terms of the price of the 
asset. 
5.2 Model 
In the Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch framework, it is assumed that 
individuals move sequentially and that the order in which they move is exo- 
genous. In terms of a foreign exchange market, the model can be interpreted 
as follows. 
The task for each investor is to decide whether to retain his funds in 
sterling or whether to move out of sterling and into a different currency. 
For simplicity, I shall use the same letters as Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and 
Welch to denote each of the variables. If the investor does retain his Pounds, 
he faces a fixed known cost of C= ý'. The gain from doing so is also the same 
for each individual and is denoted by 1'. This takes on the value of 0 or I 
with probability of 1 and is determined by government type. If a government 2 
is weak then the value from remaining in sterling will be zero since a weak 
government is more likely to devalue its currency and leave the exchange 
rate system. Conversely, a strong government is more likely to remain in the 
system and thus the value for the investors from remaining in sterling is 1. 
Each investor receives a private signal concerning V. This signal takes 
one of two forms. If V=I he receives signal, H with probability pi >1 and 2 
signal, L with probability, I- pi. However, if 10 he receives the signal, 
H with probability I- pi and signal, L with probability pi. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that signals are identically distributed so that pi =p for all 
i. If an investor is indifferent between retaining sterling or moving 
from the 
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currency, he will toss a coin to determine his action and thus, the probability 
of remaining in Pounds will be 1. 2 
It follows that the first individual will remain in Pounds if he receives 
signal H, but will abandon the currency if he receives L. The second indi- 
vidual may view the action of the first investor and can use this information 
in addition to his own signal. If the first individual has remained in Pounds 
then the second investor will also retain sterling if he receives a signal, H. 
However, if he receives signal L, he will be indifferent between retaining ster- 
ling and abandoning the currency. This is because the probability that the 
first investor receives the correct signal is the same as that of the second 
investor. Therefore, he will toss a coin to decide the outcome. 
There are three possible scenarios for the third investor. Firstly, indi- 
viduals one and two may both have abandoned the currency. Secondly, the 
first two individuals may have each retained sterling. Finally, one may have 
abandoned the currency while the other has retained sterling. The third in- 
vestor then receives his own private signal. In the first two scenarios, he will 
follow the actions of his predecessors. This is optimal for him since even if 
he receives a signal contrary to the actions of the other players, there is still 
a higher probability that they are correct and that his signal is incorrect. In 
the third scenario, the investor is in the same situation as the first individual 
to move. This is because his own signal determines his choice. 
It is now possible to see a pattern emerging. As in the Bikhchandani, 
Hirschleifer and Welch paper, the ex ante probabilities of a cascade retaining 
sterling, abandoning sterling or no cascade at all after two investors have 
moved are given by: 
p+p22 -P+P 
2 
2 lp-p 2 
After n investors have moved where n is an even number, these probabilities 
become: 
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n 
(p - p2) 
2 
2 
P2) 
'2 
n 
(p-p2) 2 
2 
(5.1) 
Clearly, if p is allowed to vary, then the larger it becomes, the sooner a 
cascade is likely to set in. It is also possible to calculate the probabilities of 
the above cascades setting in given that the true value equals 1. After two 
investors have moved, these become: 
Ap + 1) 
lp(l - P), 2 2 
Again, for an even number, n investors, this is: 
(5.2) 
I Ap + 1) 
1 
_ (p _ p2) 
P2ý 
a 
(p- 
2 
I 2)(p-1) p2) 
1ý 1- (p 2 
2 (1 - 
)2) 
I 
(P-P 
p+ p2) 2 (1 - 
(5-3) 
p+ p2) 
Even for large values of p, the likelihood of an incorrect cascade (the third 
term in (5.2)) is still very high. The reasoning behind this is that investors 
view the actions of previous investors but not the private signal received by 
these individuals. The implication is that when a cascade starts, no further 
information about the private signal received is conveyed. Thus actions do 
not improve the decision making of investors who move later on. 
While this is an important result, the model can be generalised to demon- 
strate how a cascade may be fragile in that it is vulnerable to the release of 
some new public information. Again, Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch's 
model can be used to demonstrate the situation in a foreign exchange market. 
There are a number of investors denoted i=1,2 . ...... n, ..., each 
faced with 
a decision of whether to retain their funds in sterling or switch to another 
currency. The cost of remaining in sterling is again equal to C. However, the 
government type is no longer just equal to 0 or 1. It now has a finite set of 
possibilities where vi `ý- V2 `:: ý ... < v,. 
Furthermore, the cost of remaining in 
sterling falls within this interval so that v, <C<v,. The prior probability 
(p - 2)(p - 1) 
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that V=v, is denoted by pl. 
In this generalisation, there are more than two possible signals which 
the investors may receive. The signals are conditionally independent and 
identically distributed. They take on the values, x, < X2 < X3 < ... < XR- 
The probability that an investor receives signal, Xqwhen the true government 
type is v, is Pq1. The corresponding cumulative distribution of the signals 
given V- vi is given by: 
q 
Pql =- Pr (Xi < Xq IA VI) = 
Epjl 
j=l 
Ji denotes the set of signal realisations which induce the investor to retain 
his funds in sterling. 
A cascade will occur when an investor's action is not a product of his own 
signal but of the actions of others. His decision to retain or reject sterling is 
based on the following. 
The ith investor observes the history of actions adopted by his prede- 
cessors denoted by Ai == (a,, a2 , .... aj). It is assumed that Ji 
(Ai-1, aj) is the 
set of signal realisations that induce this investor to choose action ai for the 
history Ai-1. It follows that an individual n+I who has a signal Xq and a 
history of signals, An will have a conditional expectation of government type 
given by: 
Vn+l (-1q, An)=- E [V jXn+l=lq7XiGJj(Aj-j7aj), forall i<n] 
He will remain in sterling if the value in doing so exceeds the cost i. e. if gov- 
ernment type is sufficiently large so thatVn+l (Xq; An) ý: C. The assumption 
here from the action of investor, o+I is thatXn+l E J, +, (An, an+1) . This 
implies that he will remain in sterling if: 
J,, +, (An, remain) "IXq such that 
(Xq; A,, ) > Cl 
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and will switch currency if: 
J,, +, (A,,, smitch) -fXq such that 
1"'n+1 (Xq; An) < Cl 
To complete the model, Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch impose 
two conditions. Firstly, it is assumed that the conditional distributions 
Pr (Xi IV= vi) are ordered by the monotone likelihood ratio property. This 
implies that if an individual receives a high signal realisation he will conclude 
that the government type is high. Furthermore, this means that the condi- 
tional expectation for each investor increases in his signal realisation. 
Secondly, it is assumed that if an investor can learn a sufficient amount 
about government type by observing his predecessors, he will no longer be in- 
different between retaining and rejecting sterling. This implies that a cascade 
will inevitably set in. 
However, Bikhchandani, Hirschlelfer and Welch show that once a cascade 
has set in, it need not persist if new public information is revealed. It has 
already been argued that once a cascade has started, actions taken by fu- 
ture investors contain no new information regarding government type. It 
follows that a public signal will make him more informed without reducing 
the information conveyed to him through the actions of his predecessors. 
Furthermore, a small amount of public information can break a cascade 
even when this signal is less informative than the private signal of the indi- 
vidual investor. This is best illustrated by using an example. Consider the 
decision of the third investor. The two predecessors may both have chosen to 
abandon sterling. This information tells him that either they both received 
an L signal or that the first investor received an L while the second received 
an H but tossed a coin. In the absence of public information, the investor will 
be induced to abandon sterling whatever his private information. However, 
just one public signal of H is enough to make him pay attention to his own 
signal. This new information now induces him to retain sterling if he receives 
an H signal or abandon sterling if he receives an L. This has the effect of 
shattering a cascade even if the investor moves late in the sequence. 
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5.3 Policy Implications 
In terms of the foreign exchange market, this model has some important 
implications. Firstly, there is the inevitabilitY that a cascade will set in. 
This was seen in the generalised model. This implies that whatever form 
a future exchange rate system would take it would still be dogged by cas- 
cades. More significantly, is the likelihood that these cascades would be in 
the wrong direction. This would suggest that even a strong government with 
a substantial commitment to maintaining the parity, may find itself having 
to defend speculative attacks on sterling. 
However, it has been shown that a cascade is very fragile in that a small 
piece of public information may have the effect of reversing it. This may be 
seen as an advantage in that an incorrect cascade may be reversed through 
the disclosure of public information regarding the government type. This 
may take the form of a government pledge to remain in the ERM and defend 
the parity. However, it is also possible that a correct cascade may be broken 
by a piece of public information. In terms of the foreign exchange market 
this may for instance be an unfavourable result in a referendum. 
The speed with which cascades set in and also their vulnerability to pub- 
lic information has the overall effect of making such markets tremendously 
volatile. This feature of exchange markets has already been remarked upon 
by a number of economists. 
5.4 Experiment 
The model by Bikhchandam, Hirschleifer and Welch has been tested by An- 
derson and Holt using experimental techniques. Experimental economics 
provides a very successful way of evaluating such a model. In particular, it 
allows them to analyse the degree to which subjects deviate from the model 
and examine the strategy employed by subjects when they do not follow the 
Bayesian approach. This is a particularly valuable contribution since there 
has been a growing interest in cascades and their application to financial 
markets as shown in the literature survey presented earlier in the chapter. 
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It is also relevant to this thesis since I carry out my own experiment in the 
following chapter testing the assumptions of the Banerjee framework. 
5.4.1 Experimental Design 
It is assumed that an individual observes a private signal which reveals some 
information concerning the occurrence of one of two equally likely events. 
These events are denoted by A and B. Each individual receives a signal 
which is either a or b. 
Each individual selects from one of two urns. These look identical but 
their contents differ. In urn A, two of the three balls are labelled a. The 
third ball is labelled b. In urn B, two of the balls are labelled b and one 
is labelled a. A die is thrown to determine the urn that was used in each 
period. 
Clearly, the posterior probability of event A given that the individual has 
selected a ball labelled a is ý3. Similarly, the posterior probability of event 
B given that the individual has drawn a ball labelled b is also ý. The order 3 
in which individuals move is exogenous and each views the decision of his 
predecessors but, significantly, not the signals which these people received. 
If each individual makes his decision assuming that everyone else is be- 
having according to Bayes' rule, then he will use the following to calculate 
the posterior probability of events A and B: 
Pr(A I n, m) -- 
Pr (n, mI A) Pr (A) 
Pr (n, m A) Pr (A) + Pr (n, mI B) Pr (B) 
(ý)n (1)m (1) 
32 
2)n (I)m (1) + (I)n (ý)m (1) 
332 
2n 
2n+ 2m 
where n is the number of a signals and m, the number of b signals. It is 
now possible to calculate the posterior probabilities of each event for any 
combination of a and b signals. 
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5.4.2 Experimental Procedure 
There were 12 sessions in all with 6 subjects used in each session. Each 
session consisted of 15 periods. In each period, a die was thrown to establish 
which urn was to be used. The subjects were partitioned off from each other 
to prevent communication and each was approached at random and asked to 
select a ball from the urn. They were then asked to report their decision, A 
or B. This information was then conveyed to the other participants. Once 
all participants had made their choice the correct urn was revealed and the 
participants recorded their earnings. They each received a participation fee 
upon arrival and the subsequent payout had been calculated so that earnings 
were on average $20. The subjects were paid privately in cash when they 
were released from the experiment. This procedure was carried out for 3 
of the sessions. In a further 3 sessions, Anderson and Holt included public 
information. In the remaining 6 sessions, they considered asymmetry in 
terms of the contents of the urns. 
5.4.3 Results 
Anderson and Holt show that an informational cascade can occur when an 
individual receives a signal which is contrary to the signals he believes are 
received by his predecessors. They find that in total there are 56 periods 
in which there is the potential for a cascade. Cascades occur in 41 of these 
56 periods. In order to examine the data more closely, they consider the 
efficiency of their subjects' decisions together with observed biases in inform- 
ation processing. Furthermore, they consider the extent to which subjects 
make their decisions based on the number of signals in each direction. I 
shall summarise these results and then discuss the implications in terms of a 
foreign exchange market. 
Efficiency 
Anderson and Holt use the expected earnings from behaving according to 
different strategies to arrive at a method for measuring how well individuals 
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use their information. Payoffs are defined as follows. The optimal expected 
payoff is that which will be earned if the individual uses Bayes rule to estab- 
lish his decision. The random choice expected payoff is that which is earned 
if the subject chooses randomly. The private information payoff is earned if 
the individual bases his decision on his private information alone. Finally, 
the actual expected payoff is the expected earnings for the individual's actual 
decision. 
These payoffs are then used to derive how efficiently individuals use the 
information available to them. Actual efficiency is the difference between the 
actual expected payoff and the random choice payoff as a percentage of the 
difference between the optimal expected payoff and the random choice payoff 
i. e. 
actual efficiency = 
100 (7A - 7R) 
(7FO 
- 7FR) 
where ITO 7 7FR 7p, and 7rArefer respectively 
to the sum of the expected payoffs 
for all 15 periods for optimal, random choice, private information and actual 
expected payoffs. Private information efficiency is calculated as follows: 
private information efficiency = 
100 (7TP - 7FR) 
(70 
- 7R) 
Anderson and Holt found that over all subjects the actual efficiency aver- 
aged at 91.4%, while private information efficiency averaged at 72.1%. Sig- 
nificantly, two thirds of the participants attained actual efficiencies of 100% 
implying that they behaved according to Bayes' rule. Furthermore, two thirds 
of the remaining subjects performed better than they would have done if they 
had used only their private information. 
Biases 
Anderson and Holt examined the data for evidence that there was a system- 
atic bias in favour of following the decision of the previous subject. 
They 
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analysed the 6 sessions for which the content of the urns was symmetrical. 
They found that there were 68 cases in which the Bayes distribution was 
and the private signal received by the subject differed from the previous 
decision. In 57 out of the 68 cases, the subject did not follow the previ- 
ous decision but, instead his behaviour was consistent with his own private 
information. Therefore, it would appear that there was little or no bias in 
favour of the actions of the previous subject. 
They also examined bias in terms of 'representativeness'. This has been 
discussed by Grether (1980 and 1992) and suggests that subjects have a 
tendency to underweight prior probabilities and pay more attention to the 
comparison between their own sample and that of a particular population. 
Anderson and Holt introduce public draws in sessions 4 and 5 and this makes 
representativeness possible. The fifth and sixth subjects see two public draws 
plus their own private signal. Before this information is conveyed to them, 
the subjects form prior probabilities based on the decisions of their prede- 
cessors. They are then able to form posterior probabilities when the public 
information and their own private signal are made known to them. 
Anderson and Holt found little evidence for representativeness since the 
subjects' behaviour was consistent with Bayes' rule rather than information 
conveyed from the public draws. 
Do Subjects Use Simple Counting or Bayesian Decision Making? 
Anderson and Holt set up 6 sessions in which the contents of the two urns 
is asymmetrical. The reason behind this is that when the contents are sym- 
metrical, the optimal Bayesian decision is to predict the urn which has the 
highest number of inferred signals. In order to distinguish between simple 
counting and Bayesian behaviour, the contents must be asymmetrical. Thus, 
for these sessions, urn .4 contains 6a 
balls and Ib ball whereas urn B con- 
tains 5a balls and 2b balls. As before, the urns are equally likely to be 
chosen. The difference now is that merely counting the inferred signals will 
not necessarily provide the correct Bayesian decision. 
In these sessions, cascades occurred in 46 out of the 66 periods in which 
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they were possible. Reverse cascades were higher in this set up. The effect 
of counting reduced the Bayesian cascades from 73% to 70%. Anderson and 
Holt found that when Bayes' rule predicted one action and counting predicted 
a different action, the subjects made a Bayesian decision approximately 50% 
of the time. Over all 6 sessions, 115 out of the 540 decisions were inconsistent 
with Bayesian decision making. Over a third of these inconsistencies were 
due to counting. 
The authors also reported figures for the expected gains and losses from 
applying different decision rules. They found that across the subjects in 
these 6 sessions, the actual efficiency was 67.6% while the private efficiency 
was 45.2%. These are both lower than in the original case. Furthermore, 
they define another form of efficiency. Counting efficiency is the percentage 
of expected gains over random decision making of using a counting rule. 
Algebraically this is denoted by: 
counting efficiency -- 
100 (7FC - 7FR) 
(7TO 
- 7FR) 
where 7C is the expected gains from counting. Of the 36 subjects in the 
asymmetric design sessions, 21 performed better than counting since their 
actual efficiencies were greater than the counting efficiencies. However, across 
all subjects the counting and actual efficiencies were approximately equal. 
The reasoning behind this lay in the fact that a few subjects experienced 
low expected payoffs since they did not conform to either the counting or 
Bayesian rules. 
5.5 Implications for a Foreign Exchange Mar- 
ket 
Anderson and Holt found that across all 12 sessions, cascades occurred in 87 
out of the 122 periods in which they were possible and where the incentive 
to follow the crowd was minimised. They found that subjects followed other 
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subjects' actions when it was rational to do so. In terms of a foreign exchange 
market this implies that cascades are to be expected since it proves to be 
rational to follow the crowd under certain circumstances. It is particularly 
disturbing that incorrect cascades were so prevalent. There were approxim- 
ately half as many as correct cascades. This implies that a run can occur on a 
currency even when a government is committed to maintaining an exchange 
rate parity. 
Anderson and Holt's public information results are also a concern. They 
found that there was little evidence to support the idea of 'representative- 
ness Hence this suggests that subjects did not place a large weight on 
public information when forming their decisions. This implies that a public 
announcement stating a government's commitment to maintaining a parity 
would not be sufficient to deter a run on the currency. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Clearly, there a number of drawbacks with this model. One criticism which 
could be made is that individuals move sequentially and that in a foreign 
exchange market, this is not typically the case. Investors tend to move sim- 
ultaneously. Furthermore, the order in which they move is not an exogenous 
process as explained by the model but may be determined by the amplitude 
of the signal. One may also argue that the choice of participants in the ex- 
periment was inappropriate since the behaviour of students could be very 
different from that of investors. 
Given these limitations however, the experiment still shows that cascades 
occur as the theory predicts. However, the introduction of public informa- 
tion into the setting did not have the predicted effect in the experiment of 
reversing a cascade. 
In terms of future research into this area, I consider two different avenues. 
Firstly, in the Anderson and Holt experiment, the individuals receive one of 
two signals. In reality there may be a large number of signals and a large 
number of actions which the individuals may be able to follow. I perform 
an experiment on a related paper by Banerjee (1992) in which there are a 
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large number of signals and actions. In addition, he considers the scenario 
in which investors may not receive a signal at all. In this situation, their 
actions depend crucially on the behaviour of their predecessors. 
As a second possible way forward, it would be a valuable, although lo- 
gistically tough, exercise to set up a stock exchange environment. My aim 
here would be to allow subjects to move as and when they chose rather than 
sequentially. It would also be possible to monitor their reactions to private 
and public signals. I feel that this would come closer to testing speculative 
behaviour. However, this is not attempted within this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Two Experiments to Test a 
Model of Herd Behaviour 
6.1 Introduction. 
In chapters 2-4 of this thesis, I modelled particular features of currency crises. 
The currency crises of 1992 saw the UK and Italy leave the exchange rate 
mechanism and a number of currencies devalue. The Bank of England inter- 
vened in support of the currency earlier in the summer of 1992 yet speculators 
continued to sell their holdings of the Pound. It can be argued that herding 
or an informational cascade may be responsible for the ERM collapse. 
There has been a considerable literature in the field of herd behaviour 
and informational cascades which has been used to explain certain beha- 
viour in financial markets. Froot et. al (1992) and also Scharfstein and Stein 
(1992) provide examples. However, in terms of experimental economics this 
has remained largely untested. This represents a very significant omission 
since experimental work can be used to analyse the dynamics of speculative 
behaviour in foreign exchange markets. 
In chapter 5,1 discussed how the model developed by Bikhchandani, 
Hirschleifer and Welch (1992) can apply to a foreign exchange market. This 
was tested by Anderson and Holt (1997) who find that information cascades 
occur in 85 of the 117 periods even when incentives are provided to deter 
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herding. This would suggest a strong tendency to follow the crowd and ignore 
one7s own information. However, while this is a valuable result, we feel that 
our experiment takes the analysis one step further. Unlike the Bikhchandani, 
Hirschleifer and Welch paper, the model that we test includes the possibility 
that people do not receive a signal. Furthermore, the winning option is 
drawn from a set of options given by a line segment. In the Bikhchandani, 
Hirschleifer and Welch model, the subjects face a simple choice between 
two possible outcomes. Therefore, it is argued that our experiment is a 
generalisation of that performed by Anderson and Holt. 
The experiment is based on the model developed by Banerjee (1992). We 
have focused on this model for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a corner- 
stone to a great deal of the more recent literature in informational cascades. 
Secondly, we argue that, to an extent, it can be applied to a foreign exchange 
market. Banerjee shows that when people observe the actions of others and 
attempt to use this information in their own decision rule, each person's 
decision becomes less informative to other people. Following the optimal 
strategy implies that, firstly, the equilibrium can be inefficient in terms of 
welfare. Secondly, the probability that no one in the population chooses the 
winning option may be large. Finally, the pattern of decisions over a number 
of plays of the game are volatile. This is because the onset of the herd and 
the direction it takes will depend upon the signal received by the first few 
people. 
Banerjee's model presents some very powerful results. Firstly, the prob- 
abilities of receiving a signal and of that signal being correct do not influence 
the optimal strategy. This seems counter intuitive since one would assume 
that these probabilities would play a role in an individual's choice of action. 
Secondly, individuals are privately optimising. However, the result is socially 
suboptimal. Thirdly, herds set in at an early stage in this model. If the first 
two individuals follow the same course of action then a herd cannot be broken. 
Finally, the probability of an incorrect herd may be high. This does depend 
on the values of receiving a signal and of that signal being correct. 
In addition to peforming two experiments to test the validity of this 
model, we stress an important theoretical point. Our investigation reveals 
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that a particular assumption of his model which he claims merely reduces 
the probability of herding is crucial to the solution of the model. The Baner- 
jee strategy produces an elegant result in which the decision rule remains 
the same regardless of (a) an individual's position in the sequence, (b) his 
probability of receving a signal and (c) the probability of that signal being 
correct. We show that the removal of this seemingly innocuous assumption 
generates an optimal decision rule differs according to each of these factors. 
The aim of this chapter is to test the null hypothesis that individuals be- 
have according to the optimal strategy given by Banerjee. This is important 
since if they do behave in this manner, this implies a large degree of herding. 
This is particularly relevant to markets of foreign exchange. The chapter is 
set out as follows. Firstly, we set up Banerjee's model showing the optimal 
strategy. We then illustrate the importance of the assumption in the con- 
text of his model. In order to do this, we show how the signals received by 
the players generate a particular set of observations under the model with 
the assumption. When this assumption is removed, the same combination 
of signals generates a different set of observations. It thus follows that an 
individual's action differs according to whether the assumption is made. We 
then simulate the actions of the individuals when the Banerjee rule is used 
both with and without the assumption in question. We use this simulation to 
arrive at an appropriate design and procedure for the experiment. We then 
analyse the results from each of the two experiments and draw conclusions. 
Finally, we suggest promising future lines of research. 
6.2 Model. 
The model has a relatively simple framework in which there is a set of options 
given by a line segment. Within this set, there is one correct option. Subjects 
must find the winning option and thereby gain an award, z. All other subjects 
receive a payment of 0. The population consists of N people who move 
sequentially. The order in which they move is determined exogenously. If 
an individual is informed, he receives a signal. This occurs with probability 
oz. However, this signal is only correct with probability 0. If an individual 
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is uninformed, he does not recejý, e a signal. To solve the model, Banerjee 
analyses a 'Bayesian-Nash equilibrium' ' since he finds that, for this setting, 
the equilibrium decision rule holds for all parameter values. 
Banerjee introduces three assumptions into the game. ' These are as fol- 
lows: 
Assumption A- If a player has received no signal and all other previous 
players have chosen 0, he must also choose 0. 
Assumption B- If a player is indifferent between following his own signal and 
another player's choice, he will follow his own signal. 
Assumption C- If a player is indifferent between following more than one of 
the previous players, he will follow the one with the highest signal. 
In terms of an experiment, B and C are difficult to impose since it is not 
easy to establish individuals' indifference between options. Therefore, these 
have not been included in our experiment. In our first experiment, we include 
assumption A while in the second experiment, assumption A is dropped and 
subjects are allowed to make a guess at the winning option. 
Given assumptions A, B and C, Banerjee offers a solution to the model 
in the form of an optimal decision rule for each individual. This optimal 
strategy is adopted by each individual irrespective of their order of play. 
This is a particularly interesting point since the optimal strategy is the same 
for each player despite the fact that they move sequentially. This rule is 
illustrated in the figure over the page reproduced from Banerjee's paper. 
'This is Banerjee's terminology. However, we shall henceforth refer to this as the 
coptimal strategy' since the game is a sequential one. Individuals base their decisions on 
the actions of previous players plus their own signal. 
'He states that 'The nature of the equillibrium play, however, turns out to depend 
on certain critical assumptions. Some of these assumptions may be dispensed with by 
strengthening the equilibrium concept, but it seems more natural to introduce them as 
explicit assumptions ...... the relevance of these assumptions will 
become clear in the appro- 
priate context. It should also be possible to see that each of the assumptions is made to 
minimise the possibility of herding. ' 
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The first player follows his own signal if he receives one. If he does not 
get a signal, he is obliged by assumption A to choose i=0. The subsequent 
individuals will adopt the following rules. They will follow their own signals 
either if and only if: 
(i) the signal matches that of another player or if this does not hold 
(ii) no option has been chosen by more than one person apart from Z-0. 
If a player receives a signal which does not match the action of a previous 
player, he will choose the option chosen by more than one of the individuals. 
If the option with the highest value of Z has been chosen by more than one 
person, he will choose this option providing that no other option has been 
chosen by more than one person and no one else's choice matches his own 
signal. 
If the player does not receive a signal, then he will choose i=0, due 
to assumption A, if everyone else has chosen this. If some option has been 
chosen by more than one person, then he will also choose this. However, if 
no option has been chosen more frequently than any of the others, he will 
choose the one with the highest value of i. 
A crucial point to note here is that, according to his rule, the decision 
rule forming the optimal strategy holds irrespective of the values of a and ý. 
If Assumption A is removed, this feature no longer holds. Furthermore, the 
results of the experiments revealed that our subjects appeared to use these 
values in their decision rule and modified their behaviour accordingly. 
6.3 Importance of Assumption A. 
The crucial difference between the model including assumption A and the 
model omitting assumption A is that the same sequence of signals will gen- 
erate different sequences of observations. In discussing the experiment, we 
refer to assumption A as Rule A. The reason is that in the first experiment, 
this assumption is imposed whereas in the second experiment it is omitted. 
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A player bases his action on the signal lie receives and the actions of the pre- 
vious players. Thus, his own action depends on whether the rule is imposed 
or omitted. We demonstrate this through decision trees and a table which 
analyse the possible decisions facing player 3 in the sequence. The decision 
tree, figure 6.2, shows the combinations of signals which may produce a par- 
ticular set of observations when assumption A is included. Figure 6.3 gives 
the decision tree when this assumption is omitted. 
In table 6.1, we have shown each possible combination of signals received 
by each of the three players. These are denoted by bold type and are given 
in the first three columns. 
The signals of players I and 2 generate actions which player 3 observes. 
Notably, he observes their actions but not the signals which they have re- 
ceived. Columns 4 and 5 illustrate the actions of players I and 2 when 
assumption A is included. The sixth column indicates the relevant branch 
(or branches) in the decision tree of figure 6.2. Each of these points in the tree 
represents a combination of signals which could have produced the observed 
actions of players I and 2. The seventh column shows player Ts optimal 
action given the signal he has received plus the observations he makes of 
previous players' decisions. Actions of players are denoted by italics. 
Columns 8 and 9 give the the actions of players I and 2 when assumption 
A is omitted. The tenth column represents the corresponding branch (or 
branches) in the decision tree of figure 6.3. Again, these points represent 
possible combinations of signals producing the observed actions of players 1 
and 2. Player 3 bases his decision on his observations and his own signal if 
he receives one. The result is seen in the eleventh column. 
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The main point to note is that player Ts optimal decision differs consid- 
erably when the assumption is removed. In the first nine rows of table 6.1, 
we show those sequences of signals for which the optimal strategy of player 
3 is the same irrespective of assumption A. 
In the first row, the signals received are (0, x, x). In each scenario, 
player 3 finds it optimal to follow his own signal since it matches the action 
of a previous player. In the second row, the signals received are (0, y, x). 
With assumption A, player 3 observes this sequence and follows his own 
signal. Without assumption A, lie observes (z, y, x) and again follows his 
own signal from assumption B. 
In the third row, the signals received are (x, x, x). In each scenario, 
player 3 notes that his signal matches the action of a previous player and 
finds it optimal to follow his signal. The same outcome arises when the 
signals received are (x, 0, x) as seen in row 4. 
In row 5, three different signals are received giving (y, z, x). This se- 
quence is observed by player 3 under each of the two scenarios. By assump- 
tion B, he follows his own signal. When the signals received are (x, 0,0), 
as in row 6, player 3 observes (x, x, 0). He follows the herd irrespective of 
whether assumption A is included. 
In row 7, the signals received are (y, x, x) . In each instance, player 
3 
finds it optimal to follow his own signal since it matches the action of another 
player. The same argument applies when the signals received are (x, y, x) 
as in row 8. Finally, in row 9, the signals received are (x, x, 0). Player Ts 
decision is always to follow the herd. 
We now review those sequences of signals for which the optimal strategy 
for player 3 differs depending on whether assumption A is made. Row 10 in 
the table shows the sequence of signals, (0,0,0). When assumption A is 
made, players 1,2 and 3 are obliged to choose zero. However, on removal 
of this assumption, player 3 observes (x, x, 0) and follows the incorrect herd 
(x, x, x). This confirms Banerjee's suggestion that imposing assumption A 
4minimises the possibility of herding'. Clearly, if the probability of receiving a 
signal is small, the omission of this assumption will imply a large proportion 
of incorrect herds. 
92 
Consider row 11 in the table for which the sequence of signals is (0, x, 
0). When assumption A is included, the third player knows that player 2 
has received a signal. Therefore, it is optimal for him to follow this player's 
action. When assumption A is omitted, player 3 observes player I choosing 
y and player 2 choosing x. He is not indifferent between the two cases under 
this scenario since lie knows that the first player may not have received a 
signal and has guessed at the winning option. However, he knows for sure 
that the player 2 has received a signal. Therefore he finds it optimal to choose 
x since: 
P(y = correctl(y, X10)) = 
(ao) a (I - 0) (1 - a) 
P (y, X, 0) 
while 
P(x - correctl(y 
(a, 3) a (I - 0) (1 - a) + (I - oz) I (ozo) 
,, X, 
O)) -- P 0) 
Since the first term in each equation is the same, it is always optimal to 
choose x. 
However, when the signals received are (x, y, 0), as in row 12, assumption 
C comes into play. When assumption A is included, player 3 observes (x, y, 
0), and is indifferent between following players I and 2. By assumption C, 
he chooses to follow the one with the higher signal. 
By contrast, when assumption A is omitted, he will no longer be indif- 
ferent between the actions of players I and 2. He notes that player I may 
not have received a signal and thus may have guessed that x is the winning 
option. He knows for certain, that player 2 has received a signal since his 
action differs from that of player 1. Therefore, he finds it optimal to follow 
player 2 as shown in the above proof. 
We now show three instances where omitting assumption A leads to am- 
biguity in the decision making process. Player Ts decision to follow his own 
signal or the action of ýi previous player will depend on the value of a and ý. 
If the sequence of signals received is (0,0, x), players 1 and 2 do not 
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receive a signal but player 3 receives the signal, 'r. With assumption A, player 
3 observes the fact that the previous players have not received a signal. He 
thus finds it optimal to choose x. However, on removal of this assumption, 
he observes (y, y, x). His decision now depends on the relative sizes of a and 
0 since: 
P(x = correctl(y, y, x)) = 
Ce(1 - 
0)(1 
- a)ao + 
(1 
- a)20Z0 
(Y, Y, x) 
P(y - correctl(y, y, x)) - 
a(' - 0) (1 - a)ceo + (ao), a(l - 0) 
(y, Y, 
This implies that the third player will only follow y if: 
a 
20(l 
_ 13) > 
(I 
_ OZ)2 
i. e. if 
7(1_2 
I 
The same scenario emerges for the signal sequence (y, 0, x) as given in 
row 14. When assumption A is included, player 3 observes (y, y, x). He 
abandons his own signal irrespective of the sizes of a and 13 since: 
P(x = correctl(y, y, x)) 
ce(1 - 0)(1 - a)a0 
(Y, Y, 
P(y = correctl(y, Y, X» = 
oz (1 - 0) (1 - a) ce0 + (a, 3)' ce (1 - 0) 
p (Y, Y, x) 
Since the first term in each equation is the same it follows that the prob- 
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ability that y is correct exceeds the probabilitY that x is correct given the 
sequence (y, y, x). The player will thus find it optimal to abandon his own 
signal and follow the herd. 
However, when this assumption is omitted, the decision rests on the values 
of a and 0 as in row 13. 
In row 15, the signals received are (y, y, x). When assumption A is 
included, player 3 finds it optimal to abandon his own signal. Once again, 
when this assumption is omitted, this decision depends on the relative sizes 
of a and 0. 
Therefore, we see problems emerging in the lower half of the decision tree. 
The fact that a player is allowed to make a guess at the winning option when 
he has no signal reduces the information available to others. We have shown 
that, as a result, player 3's decision becomes more complex and depends on 
the relative sizes of a and 0. This has repercussions for the decisions of 
players later in the sequence. They will use the sizes of a and 0 to arrive 
at their own optimal decision. Furthermore, they will assume that previous 
players have also used these values in their decision rules and build this into 
their own decision. The model becomes very complex. It follows that there 
is no single strategy which applies to each player irrespective of his position 
in the sequence. 
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Winning No. (a) 
Winning No. 
Losing No. 
0 
Player 1 
Losing No. (b) 
Follow Ist Player 
(C) 
Winning No. (d) 
Losing No. (e) 
0- Follow Ist Player 
M 
Winning No. (g) 
Losing No. (h) 
0 (1) 
Player 2 
Figure 6.2: Decision Tree For the Banerjee Rule With Assumption A 
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Winning No. (a) 
Winning No. 
Losing No. 
So Guess. 
Losing No. 
Chosen With 
ProbabilitY 1. 
Losing No. 
0- Follow 1st Player 
(C) 
Winning No. (d) 
Losing No. (e) 
Follow Ist Player 
M 
Winning No. (g) 
Losing No. (h) 
0- Follow 1st Player 
W 
Player 1 Player 2 
Figure 6.3: Decision Tree For the Banerjee Rule Without Assumption A 
97 
6.4 Simulations of the Banerjee Framework. 
The aim of these experiments was to test the null hypothesis that the Baner- 
jee strategy was being followed. If individuals followed the Banerjee rule, 
this would imply a large degree of herd behaviour. In order to test the hypo- 
thesis, we simulated the actions of individuals when they used the Banerjee 
rule. In the first simulation, we included assumption A and in the second 
case, we omitted this assumption. This established the number of subjects to 
be used and the number of times that each experiment should be performed. 
We were particularly interested in the role of each of the parameter values 
in the framework. 
The simulations were designed so as to allow the user to insert the required 
number of iterations of the model, the values of a and 0, the number of 
participating subjects and also the upper bound of the random variable used. ' 
The results were displayed so as to show the signal received by each subject 
together with the corresponding choice of that subject. It then reported the 
number of true and false herds for these parameter values plus the number 
of iterations in which no herd occurred. 
A herd occured when the first two subjects chose the same option. Al- 
ternatively, a herd also set in when two or more subjects chose the same 
option later in the sequence. For the purpose of our experiments, we dis- 
tinguish between a 'run' and a 'herd'. A 'herd' is described above whereas 
a (run' occurs when two or more subjects follow the same option but this 
is subsequently broken. Clearly, under the Banerjee rule, this only occurs 
when the run is incorrect and a subject earlier in the sequence has chosen an 
option which matches the signal received by the current subject. 
We also reported the expected number of winners for each position of play. 
This became relevant later in the analysis when we examined the behaviour of 
the subjects in the experiment. In particular, we wanted to know if players in 
'Correspondence with Professor Banerjee revealed that the herding result would hold 
even if the set of options was not a continuum providing that the number of options was 
sufficiently large. This is necessary when the probabilities of true and false herds are 
considered. Even in situations when the probability of ýi false herd exceeds that of a true 
herd, players still find it optimal to herd. This is because the probability that the player's 
signal is correct is less than the probability of a true herd. 
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each position of play all adopted the same strategy or whether they modified 
their behaviour according to the order in which they played. 
We used 7 subjects for each session since, according to each of the sim- 
ulations, this gave a large amount of information concerning the probability 
and direction of herding. As can be seen in tables 6.3 and 6.9, this number 
of subjects implied that a herd would occur at least 85 per cent of the time. 
We allowed a and 0 to take on each of the values of 0.25 and 0.75 since these 
combinations provided results which were significantly different from each 
other. Again, this can be seen in tables 6.3 and 6.9. The probabilities of true 
and false herds were significantly different from one another. Furthermore, 
these values were simple to implement in an experiment. 
The results of the simulated Banerjee model for different values of a and 
0 are given in tables 6.3 and 6.9. As one would expect, large values of a and 
ý produced a high probability of a true herd and, conversely, small values of 
a and ý produced a high probability of a false herd. 
6.5 Experimental Design. 
In carrying out our experiment, the first task was to decide which form this 
should take. One possibility was to computerise the set up so as to allow a 
large number of iterations for each set of parameter values. This procedure 
would have been easy to implement and not time consuming for the subjects. 
However, the main drawback with this approach was that it would have been 
difficult to prove to the subjects that they were actually making a random 
draw. We wanted to avoid the scenario in which the subjects thought that 
the experiment was rigged in some way. ' In order to do this we settled on a 
less elegant but effective approach. We presented our subjects in turn with 
16 bags. ' These appeared identical but their contents differed. Where the 
4 In our pilot experiment, we used a spinner to determine whether a subject received 
a signal. If the pointer fell in a certain region, the subject was allowed to choose 
from 
one of the 4 bags available. However, we found this approach to be particularly awkward 
and time consuming. We decided to dispense with the spinner and allow the subjects to 
choose from one of the 16 available bags. 
5We are very grateful to Irene Griffiths for her assistýince in the making of the bags. 
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probability of receiving a signal was 0.25,12 of these bags contained discs 
which were blank. The contents of the remaining 4 bags depended on the 
value of 0. If this equalled 0.25,3 bags contained 10 discs numbered from 
I to 10 and I bag contained 10 discs each displaying the winning option. 
When the probability of receiving a signal was 0.75,4 of the bags contained 
10 blank discs. Of the 12 remaining bags, 3 contained 10 discs with the 
winning option and 9 contained the numbers I to 10 when ý took on the 
value of 0.25. When 0 equals 0.75,9 bags contained the winning option and 
3 contained the discs numbered I to 10. 
In order to establish the number of rounds that we wanted for each com- 
bination of a and 0, we wanted there to be a sufficient number to reflect the 
findings of the simulation but not so many that the subjects would be becom- 
ing bored and disinterested. We found that 10 rounds for each combination 
giving a total of 40 rounds in the experiment proved to be satisfactory for 
each of the two experiments. Our pilot experiment revealed that each session 
lasted approximately one hour. 
In order to arrive at an appropriate figure for payment when the subjects 
chose the winning option, we used the two simulations to calculate the expec- 
ted number of winners per game. We based our calculations on a payout of 
approximately ýU per person per hour. This meant a payout of E4 for each 
successful subject in each round of session I where a and 0 both took on the 
value of 0.25. In session 2 where a was 0.25 and ý was 0.75 the payout was 
L2 for each subject choosing the winning option in a round. For session 3 
where a was 0.75 and 0 was 0.25 the payout was also L2. In the final session 
in which a and 0 were both 0.75, this payout was L1. 
6.5.1 Experimental Procedure. 
The subjects were students from a variety of disciplines. The number of 
subjects to be used raised another issue. There would clearly have been 
problems in using the same set of subjects throughout each session. Equally, 
it would have been impractical to use different subjects for each round since 
each group would have had to digest the instructions and understand the 
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rules. We decided to use a different set of subjects for each of the 4 sessions 
of 10 rounds. 
At the start of each session, they were brought into the room and were 
seated between large dividing screens to prevent communication during the 
experiment. We handed each subject written instructionS6 (as seen in the 
appendix) and also read these aloud so as to ensure that each group received 
the same information and understood what was expected of them. 
We then approached each subject at random and asked them to select 
one of the 16 bags available. From this, they drew a disc which was either 
blank or had a number between I and 10 printed on it. They were instructed 
not to reveal this information to the other subjects. We made a note of the 
disc drawn for future reference. We then asked them for their guess at the 
winning option. We wrote this on the board at the front of the room for all 
to see and then approached the next subject. 
When all 7 subjects had chosen the number they believed to be the cor- 
rect option, we announced the winning option and awarded the cash prizes. 
The process was then repeated for another 9 rounds after which the session 
was completed. Notably, for each session the subjects were informed of the 
number of bags containing the winning option, the numbers I to 10 and 
the blank discs. We found the results of the experiment interesting since 
they used this information in their decision making process. According to 
Banerjee's rule, the values of a and 0 do not play a part in the subject's 
choice. 
6.6 Results. 
Firstly, our experiment revealed that herding did not occur as frequently as 
the theory predicted under certain sets of parameter values for the experi- 
ment with rule A. When this rule was not imposed, the degree of herding 
was consistent with and sometimes exceeded that predicted by the Banerjee 
simulation. Secondly, contrary to Banerjee's theory, the subjects appeared 
61n the experiment omitting Rule A, the paragraph placing restrictions on subjects if 
they chose a blank disc from the bag Nviis dropped. 
101 
to use the values of a and ý in formulating their decision. 
The results of each of the sessions are reported in the appendix. They are 
laid out so as to show the number drawn by each of the subjects together with 
their corresponding choice. In the final column, the winning option is stated. 
This has allowed us to analyse the behaviour of our subjects. Although we 
only have 10 rounds of observations for each set of parameter values, there are 
particular patterns emerging. In the first instance, we will set out the results 
for the experiment in which Banerjee's rule A was enforced. We will then 
compare these results with the experiment in which this rule was relaxed. 
6.6.1 Experiment Including Rule A. 
Firstly, it was important to establish the relative frequency with which signals 
were received and the proportion which were correct. Table 6.2 illustrates 
the expected and actual number of signals for each session together with the 
expected and actual proportion of correct signals. It also illustrates a 95% 
confidence interval for the predicted values. These confidence intervals were 
defined as follows: 
L) Up±1.96 
Al 
in which L is the lower boundary of the confidence interval, U is the upper 
boundary, n is the total number of decisions made in each session (in all 
cases this was 70) and p is the predicted proportion of signals. Note that the 
normal approximation can be used here since np >5 and n(I - p) > 5. 
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In each session, the actual nurnber of signals received fell within the 95% 
confidence interval for that which was predicted. In examining the actual 
number of correct signals received, all but those of session 3 lay within the 
95% interval. In session 3, the actual number of correct signals received 
was 22 which exceeded the upper limit of the confidence interval. However, 
since this is a small sample, it does not have severe implications for the 
experimental results. 
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Under Banerjee's definition, a herd occurs when 2 subjects choose the 
same action. However, while we find that herds started, inspection of the 
data in the appendix reveals that these were frequently broken. Therefore, 
we distinguish between a 'run' and a 'herd'. If 2 or more consecutive subjects 
follow the same number but this is subsequently broken by another subject 
choosing a different option, we denote this as a 'run'. However, if this is 
not broken we describe this as a 'herd'. Table 6.3 illustrates the actual 
and predicted proportions of true and false herds and also the proportions 
of true and false runs in each of the two experiments. For each of these 
predicted proportions we have included a confidence interval calculated as 
before. However, note that the n value is now equal to 10 since we are now 
considering the number of rounds in each session. This implies that np and 
n(l -p) are no longer greater than 5 and hence the proportions can no longer 
be approximated by a normal distribution. We have included this measure 
in the absence of a suitable alternative but the results must be viewed with 
a degree of caution. 
In session 1, there are no true herds but one true run. This is not signi- 
ficantly different from that which the theory predicts. However, there were 
significantly fewer false herds setting in than the theory predicted. We found 
that the subjects displayed a much stronger tendency to follow their indi- 
vidual signals or appeared to choose randomly. 
In session 2, the number of true herds was smaller than predicted by 
Banerjee. However, there were a number of true runs occurring. The same 
pattern emerged for the number of false herds. There was just one false herd 
in this session. However, there were three false runs. 
In session 3, the proportion of true herds was close to that predicted by 
Banerjee. There were also two runs occurring. However, the number of false 
herds was significantly lower than predicted. However, there were a number 
of false runs emerging. If these had not been broken, the total number of 
false herds would have been close to that predicted by the Banerjee strategy. 
In session 4, the actual proportions of true and false herds corresponds 
to that predicted by the Banerjee rule with just one true run occurring. 
In table 6.4, we report the proportion of rounds in each session which 
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0 
0.25 0.75 
0.25 0.125 0.2222 
0.75 0.4 0.9 
Table 6.4: Proportion of Rounds in which the Banerjee Strategy is 
Played For the Experiment Including Rule A 
were compatible with the Banerjee strategy. This proves to be very revealing 
since his strategy is only closely followed in one of the four sessions. This 
would suggest that in the other sessions, subjects are adopting an alternative 
approach. This is examined in more detail in tables 6.6 and 6.7. 
In table 6.5, we have compared the actual and predicted proportion of 
subjects choosing the winning option. Again, confidence intervals have been 
reported. Subjects in sessions I and 4 perform as predicted under the Baner- 
Jee rule. The same can be said for session 2 with the exception of player 6 
who does not perform as well as predicted. In session 3, subjects perform 
as predicted in each position of play with the exception of player 2. His 
performance is statistically better than predicted by the Banerjee strategy. 
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Table 6.6 examines the behaviour of subjects when they receive a signal. 
When a and 3 both equal 0.25, subjects appear to follow their own signal 
if they get one. However, in session 2, with 0 equal to 0.75, there were 
2 occasions in which subjects abandoned their own signal in favour of a 
previously chosen signal and on I occasion, a subject abandoned his signal 
and appeared to choose randomly. In session 3, the strategy appeared to 
change according to the position of play. For earlier players in the rounds, 
there was a tendency to follow their own signal. However, later players were 
equally likely to abandon their own signal and follow a previously chosen 
number. Session 4 was close to the Banerjee strategy. Subjects playing 
early in the round had a tendency to follow their own signal. However, later 
subjects were more willing to abandon their own signal if it did not match 
that of an existing herd. 
In table 6.7, we examine the behaviour of those subjects not receiving 
a signal. Again there was a particular pattern of behaviour emerging. In 
session 1, subjects appeared to choose randomly more often than following 
the most frequently chosen number. This occurred for each position of play. 
In session 2, there was also a strong tendency to choose a number which had 
not already been chosen. However, for later rounds, subjects were equally 
likely to follow the most frequently chosen number. 
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For sessions 3 and 4 there were very few occasions in which a blank 
disc was drawn. In session 3, subjects were more likely to follow the most 
frequently chosen number. In session 4, subjects always followed the most 
frequently chosen number. 
As a final point it is worth examining the extent to which subjects learned 
as the rounds progressed. By the term 'learned' we mean the degree to 
which they altered their behaviour throughout the experiment. In order to 
achieve this, we monitored the position of play of each individual in each 
round. In session 1, we could not detect any real evidence that subjects 
were changing their behaviour. In session 2 we discovered that behaviour 
did change. At round 4, two of the subjects switched their strategies from 
choosing apparently randomly to following the Banerjee rule. Two other 
subjects followed suit in round 8. Two further subjects followed in round 9. 
The final 2 subjects did not appear to learn. 
In session 3, there was also some evidence that subjects conformed to 
the Banerjee rule. One subject appeared to behave according to Banerjee 
from the outset. A second subject followed from the second round onwards. 
A third followed Banerjee in round 3 onwards. Two more subjects followed 
suit in round 6. Again, there were 2 other subjects out of the 7 who did not 
appear to change their behaviour. 
In session 4, behaviour was very similar to that predicted by Banerjee 
from the outset and all had adopted his strategy from round 2 onwards. 
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6.6.2 Experiment Without Rule A. 
As in the previous experiment, it is important to establish the actual number 
of signals received and proportion of those which are correct compared with 
the predicted numbers. This is seen in table 6.8. In each session, the total 
number of signals received lay within the 95% confidence interval. However, 
in session 3, the actual number of correct signals lay slightly outside the 
confidence interval. Those of the other sessions fell within the confidence 
interval. 
Table 6.9 shows the actual and predicted proportions of true and false 
herds for the experiment plus the actual proportion of true and false runs. 
Firstly, it is important to compare the actual results with those predicted. We 
have included the confidence interval in order to achieve this. However, it is 
also worthwhile comparing these results with those of the original experiment 
since this shows the effect of omitting rule A. 
In the first session, the predicted proportion of false herds exceeded that of 
the original Banerjee strategy with assumption A. Conversely, the predicted 
proportion of true herds was less than under the original Banerjee strategy. 
This implies that the removal of assumption A leads to an increase in the 
proportion of incorrect herds when a and 0 are small. In this session, the 
number of herds was close to that which was predicted. However, there were 
more runs occurring than under the original Banerjee rule. 
In session 2, the predicted proportion of false herds also exceeded that 
of the original Banerjee strategy with assumption A. Again, the predicted 
proportion of true herds was less than under the original Banerjee strategy. 
The main feature of this session, however, was the large number of runs. If 
these had not been broken, they would have generated a far greater number 
of herds than predicted. This confirms Banerjee's argument that assumption 
A reduces the possibility of herding. 
In session 3, herding was consistent with that which was predicted. 
However, 
there was a large proportion of false herds. If these had not been 
broken they 
would have created a proportion of false herds significantly greater 
than pre- 
dicted - 
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In session 4, herding was close to that predicted but this time there was 
a large proportion Of tT*Ue runs. The following tables break this information 
down so as to show why these patterns emerged. 
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0 
0.251 0.75 
0.25 0.1 0.2222 
0.75 0.1 0.3 
Table 6.10: Proportion of Rounds in which the Banerjee Strategy 
is Played For the Experiment Without Rule A 
Table 6.10 shows the proportion of rounds in which the Banerjee strategy 
was played throughout. The main point to note there is that his strategy was 
played in only a small proportion of rounds. Also note how this compares 
with the original experiment. Session 2 is the same for each experiment and 
session 1 is very close. However, the Banerjee strategy is played much more 
frequently for sessions 3 and 4 under the original experiment with rule A. 
The probability of receiving a signal here is large at 0.75. Therefore, it is less 
likely that subjects earlier in the experiment are not receiving signals and 
thus guessing thereby generating false herds. Hence, it is more sensible to 
follow the Banerjee strategy. 
Table 6.11 examines the actual and predicted proportions of winning sub- 
jects in each position of play in the experiment. In each session, the players 
perform as predicted and none of the results are statistically significantly 
different from that which is predicted. However, it should be noted that due 
to a small sample size (i. e. 10 rounds), the power of the statistical tests is 
weak. 
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Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show the behaviour of subjects conditional on whether 
they receive a signal. Table 6.12 shows the behaviour of those which receive 
a signal. In session I with the exception of one person, all subjects followed 
their own signal if they received one despite the fact that they knew that this 
was only correct with probability, 0.25. We suggest that this feature may be 
due to an endowment effect. The subject has selected a disc from a bag and 
feels that this number belongs to him. He is therefore reluctant to abandon 
it in favour of some other course of action. 
In session 2 there was also a strong tendency to follow the signal received. 
Players I and 2 always follow their own signal. Players 3 to 7 follow their 
own signal for a large proportion of instances but also follow a previously 
chosen number for a small proportion of cases. 
For session 3, players I and 2 follow their own signal predominantly. In 
those cases when they do not follow their own signal, they appear to choose 
randomly. Players 3,4 and 5 also choose to follow their own signal for the 
majority of cases and when they do not follow their signal, they follow a 
previously chosen option. Players 6 and 7 predominantly choose to follow 
a previously chosen option with only a small proportion choosing to follow 
their own signal. Thus in this session we see a pattern emerging. Earlier 
players favour their own signal while players later in the sequence are more 
willing to abandon their own signal. 
In session 4, there is once again a strong tendency to follow one's own 
signal. This is intuitively appealing since the probability that this signal is 
correct is high. However, this line of thinking is known as the 'gambler's 
fallacy'. Individuals who adopt this approach neglect to consider the inform- 
ation available in the actions of previous individuals. These earlier players 
have also faced a large a and 0. If their actions are different from those of 
the current player and he fails to consider their actions, he is more likely to 
choose the incorrect course of action. However, there is a small percentage, 
particularly later in the session who do follow a previously chosen number. 
119 
C) C=) C) C) C) C) C=) C) CD CD C) 
LO 00 Lrý 00 
LO 
U- 
C) 00 LO t, 00 
t- 
---4 
0C 7 -ý C=; r--i 00 - 00 00 
r--ý C"I cy, ý 'ZI, Lo ý0 t- r--ý c"I cyý 't, LO (ýo U- 
ýý ýý ýý ýý ý-q ý--, ýý ýý ýý ý-q ; 0-4 ýý ýý ýý C) C) w (2) C. ) C) w C) w C) W C) W w 
LO 
CD C) CD CD C: ) C=) C: ) C: ) 4-D 
0 
, 
---1 -4 
CD 
00 
""1 
It co 
(X) 
ý-C) 
10 CD = 
I C A 
C) 
ED 
t- ---i (ýo 
bjO OC) cyý 0C C) 
CC) t- 
ý-4 ; -4 ý-4 ý-4 
ý--4 ý-q 
C) a) a) C) (1) C) C) (2) (1) C) 
od cd cd cd 
0 
4 
4-P 
x 
b, O 
0 
C. ) 
C) 
-c 
Cl) 
C- 
0 
C 
. 
C) 
m 
(ýi 
ýc --4 
120 
Table 6.13 shows the behaviour of those subjects who do not receive a 
signal. In session 1, we cannot find an observable pattern emerging. Players 
2 and 3 have a tendency to choose randomly and follow the most frequently 
chosen number less often. Player 4 follows the most frequently chosen number 
50% of the time, follows another chosen number 20% of the time and appears 
to choose randomly 30% of the time. Player 5 chooses randomly 50% of 
the time and follows the most frequently chosen number or another chosen 
number 25% of the time. Players 6 and 7 follow the most frequently chosen 
number a third of the time with player 6 following another chosen number 
50% of the time and player 7 showing a tendency to follow another chosen 
number or choose randomly. 
There is a pattern emerging in session 2 in that there is an increasing tend- 
ency to follow the most frequently chosen number as the session progresses. 
Note that in sessions 3 and 4 there are only a few subjects who do not receive 
a signal so there is only a small amount of data available here. In session 3, 
Players 3,6 and 7 predominantly follow the most frequently chosen number. 
Player 2 only does this 50% of the time and appears to choose randomly for 
the remaining 50%. Player 4 displays a tendency to choose randomly rather 
then follow the most frequently chosen number. In session 4, subjects always 
follow the most frequently chosen option when they do not receive a signal. 
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6.7 Conclusion. 
Our concluding comments fall into two categories. Firstly there are the im- 
plications of our theoretical findings. We show that, without the assumption 
A which Banerjee claims merely reduces herding, the whole decision making 
process becomes dependent on (a) the position in the sequence and (b) the 
probabilities, a and ý- 
In terms of future lines of research, this implies the ambitious task of 
solving the model without assumption A. 
When carrying out the experiments, we referred to this as rule A. The 
main result of our experiment with rule A was that herding occurred less 
frequently than predicted by the Banerjee framework. The behaviour of 
subjects was far more individual than the theory suggested with subjects 
using the information on oz and 0 and also their position of play in the 
rounds to formulate their decisions. In his model, Banerjee found that there 
was tremendous volatility in the pattern of decision making over a number 
of plays of the game. This was because the onset of herding and its direction 
depended upon the signal received by the first few individuals. However, we 
found that this volatility occurred within rather than between rounds. When 
a run set in, it did not necessarily continue. With certain parameter values, 
players were inclined to break the run using either their own signal or by 
appearing to choose randomly. 
However, in analysing individual behaviour we discovered that there was 
some evidence in sessions 2,3 and 4 to suggest that individuals may have 
followed the Banerjee strategy provided that there were enough rounds in 
which learning could take place. One may argue however, that in real life 
scenarios, people do not always have the benefit of experience from a repeated 
situation. 
In the experiment without rule A, herding was more prevalent than under 
the original experiment with assumption A. Significantly, we also witnessed a 
large number of runs which were subsequently broken. These would indicate 
a willingness on the part of some subjects to follow a herd and then the 
opposite behaviour from other subjects breaking that run. These appeared 
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to occur regardless of the values of a and ý and generated volatility within 
rather than between rounds. 
In this experiment, subjects were even less inclined to follow the Banerjee 
strategy. In sessions I and 2, there was a strong tendency to apparently 
choose randomly rather than the most frequently chosen number when no 
signal was received. Given this t' ype of behaviour, it would be revealing to 
circulate a questionnaire to each subject following each session asking them 
about their strategies in a future experiment to test herding. 
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Appendix 6.1 - Instructions for the Subjects. 
Welcome to the Experiment! 
Firstly, you will notice that you have been partitioned off from the other play- 
ers. There is nothing sinister here: one of the few rules that I am imposing 
is that you do not communicate with the others. 
*I will be running the experiment 10 times and will be awarding a cash 
prize of X4 to each player who chooses the winning number in each 
round. The aim of the exercise is to find this winning number. 
For each game that will be played, the winning number and the order 
in which you play have been chosen at random. I put discs numbered 
I to 10 into a bag and picked a disc from the bag. This is the winning 
number for the first game. I then replaced the disc and repeated this 
to determine the winning numbers for the other 9 rounds. 
I will present each of you, in turn, with 16 bags and you will be asked 
to pick one. The bags all look the same but their contents differ. Each 
contains 10 discs. Twelve bags contain blank discs. Three of the bags 
contain the numbers 1 to 10. The other contains 10 discs with the 
winning number. 
e You will then draw a number from your chosen bag. Do not disclose 
this to anyone. 
*I will then ask you to write your chosen number oil my clip board. This 
may or may not be the number appearing on your disc. You are not 
obliged to stick with the number which is written on your disc if you 
think you know better. 
The only rule I inake regarding your choice of number is that if you 
pick a blank disc from the bag, you are not allowed to choose a number 
if: 
(a) You are the first person to move in the game or 
(b) No one who has moved before you has chosen a number. 
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*I will then write your chosen number on the flip chart for the other 
players to see. 
9 When all the players have chosen the number which they think is the 
winner, I will announce the winning number and award the cash prizes. 
Good Luck! 
126 
Appendix 6.2 - Data from the Experiment In- 
cluding Rule A 
Session I-a and 0 equal 0.25 
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning 
Option 
10 10 61 3 7 6 4 10 
- - 2 1 - - 6 6 8 1 1 
4 4 2 4 4 4 6 2 4 4 10 
8 
8 8 7 2 5 6 5 
3 3 9 8 
6 
4 2 4 2 5 
2 2 2 2 2 9 3 2 
6 6 7 7 
Session 2-a equals 0.25 and 0 equals 0.75 
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning 
Option 
10 10 41 6 6 7 5 10 
2 2 2 3 5 2 3 3 5 2 
3 3 3 4 3 3 
9 9 9 9 9 8 9 6 9 
7 
9 9 6 9 9 9 6 5 9 9 
10 1 - - 
- 
- 10 8 6 10 9 10 
10 
4 9 - - - 9 4 9 8 4 
A 4 4 9 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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Session 3-a equals 0.75 and 0 equals 0.25 
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning 
Option 
4 10 8 - 3 8 - 6 1 10 6 3 7 4 4 9 
9 3 4 3 - - 10 3 3 3 9 _ 4 3 10 3 
4 10 8 8 - I - 4 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 
- 2 4 - - 7 - - 7 4 4 4 7 4 7 
3 1 4 1 1 1 9 1 1 4 1 1 1 9 1 
1 5 5 5 - 5 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
2 2 2 - 7 10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
7 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
9 6 10 - - 4 6 9 6 9 9 9 9 9 1 
8 - 8 7 - - - 8 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 
Session 4-a and 0 equal 0.75 
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning 
Option 
5 5 2 5 5 3 5 5 5 2 5 4 5 5 5 
9 9 2 2 9 9 - 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
4 1 5 5 5 3 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 
3 3 - 3 - - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
9 1 9 1 9 10 9 9 1 9 1 9 9 9 9 
10 10 10 - 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 10 
- 10 - 10 5 1 7 - 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 
2 3 - 2 10 2 6 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
4 4 4 4 5 4 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
3 3 3 10 3 - 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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Appendix 6.3 - Data from the Experiment Without 
Rule A 
Session I-a and 0 equal 0.25 
Nos Picked R-orn Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning 
Option 
2 2 3 10 2 2 3 3 3 10 7 2 
3 3 8 9 8 9 3 8 3 
5 5 8 5 8 9 8 4 
8 8 5 8 8 5 5 5 8 5 7 
3 4 1 1 9 8 3 5 3 
7 10 5 6 - 5 7 10 5 5 6 5 5 8 
- - - 6 - 5 5 5 5 9 6 6 10 
1 6 5 9 9 1 9 4 
7 5 6 8 10 7 6 7 7 
9 6 9 - 9 9 9 5 9 5 9 
Session 2- oz equals 0.25 and 0 equals 0.75 
Nos Picked From Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning 
Option 
3 3 6 7 3 4 3 5 3 3 
- 10 8 - 8 6 6 6 8 6 8 6 8 
- 1 - 1 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 1 
6 2 2 - 2 2 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 2 - 6 7 6 6 6 6 2 
6 3 8 - 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 7 
9 6 4 6 9 9 4 9 9 
4 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 
8 8 8 8 8 6 6 8 8 8 8 8 
2 2 
_2 
2 2 2 2 
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Session 3- oz equals 0.75 and 0 equals 0.25 
Nos Picked R-orn Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning 
Option 
9 5 5 9 5 9 4 9 5 5 9 6 9 4 9 
10 4 - - 8 5 - 7 4 7 8 8 7 8 10 
9 2 8 - 3 1 2 9 3 8 8 3 3 3 2 
8 8 9 1 1 5 1 1 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 
- - 6 6 8 3 - 5 5 6 6 8 6 6 6 
9 8 9 - 8 5 9 8 9 7 8 9 8 9 
7 7 8 10 7 10 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 2 
- 3 7 7 4 6 8 3 7 7 7 7 10 6 
3 - 3 3 6 - 3 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 
8 8 8 2 5 4 - 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Session 4-a and 0 equal 0.75 
Nos Picked M-orn Bags Nos Chosen By Subjects Winning 
Option 
9 9 9 1 5 9 9 9 9 9 5 9 9 9 
1 1 1 - - 6 4 11 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 
6 10 - 10 - 10 10 6 6 6 10 6 10 10 10 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
8 8 10 10 1 - - 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 8 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 10 1 1 10 1 1 10 10 1 1 10 1 1 1 
10 10 10 10 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
3 6 - 3 3 3 6 3 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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Chapter 7 
GARCH and Markov Regime 
Switching Models of Exchange 
Rate Data 
There has been a great deal of literature discussing the empirical evidence 
surrounding European exchange rates. I survey some of these papers in the 
next section. However, many economists have been solely concerned with 
the data contained in the ERM period. This implies that the literature has 
mainly studied the currencies of long standing members of the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Alternatively, they have examined the 
data leading up to or following the collapse of the ERM. 
I argue that this represents an important omission in the literature to date 
especially since a number of currencies have spent a large amount of time 
outside the ERM. In this chapter, I seek to examine the behaviour of the 
Pound and the Lira before, during and after their membership in the ERM. 
In particular, I attempt to provide models which explain their behaviour over 
the entire period. In the case of the Lira, the data stretches from 1978 to 
1997 and in the case of the Pound, the data covers the period 1975-1997. 
The aim of this study is twofold. Firstly, I examine the behaviour of 
each exchange rate when it is restricted to a currency band and compare this 
with the periods outside the band. In order to do this, I employ a GARCH 
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model. I show that a currency's position in the band has an impact upon 
the mean value of the change in the exchange rate and also on the variance 
function within a GARCH setting. Furthermore, I show that shocks to the 
currency, such as monetary policy announcements, have an impact on the 
variance function of the change in the exchange rate. In the case of the Lira, 
I further show that shocks in terms of exchange rate realignments also impact 
upon the variance function. Secondly, I compare the results obtained from 
using GARCH and regime switching models in order to see whether the two 
modelling techniques are interchangeable. 
The chapter is set out as follows. Firstly, I review some of the relevant 
literature in the area. I start by examining those GARCH models which 
focus on studies of floating rates. I then move on to consider those which 
examine the EMS period. Secondly, I examine Markov regime switching 
models since I also use this framework in my analysis of the Pound and Lira. 
Finally, I discuss the jump diffusion literature. Having set out the literature 
in the area, I examine the raw data. I provide plots of each exchange rate 
and summary statistics. I then proceed to look at the EMS period in more 
detail and how the events of this period impacted upon the Lira and Pound. 
I provide a small history of events and explain, in the context of the Lira, 
why each realignment took place. 
In the next section, I set up a GARCH model for the entire period for 
each exchange rate and discuss the suitability of each of these models. I then 
discuss the importance of including into the analysis, each exchange rate's 
position in the band. I re-estimate the models with this modification. The 
next step is to include the realignment dummy for the Lira into the original 
GARCH model. Having examined this, I look at the importance of policy 
shocks to the each of the currencies. For each currency, I set up a dummy 
variable explaining the major shocks over the period. I re-estimate each 
model taking these into account. I then include a model which incorpor- 
ates each of the features of position in the band and policy change dummy. 
Finally, I examine the regime switching model as an alternative approach 
and examine its suitability. I set out the results of this framework and then 
compare the results with the GARCH model. 
132 
In my concluding section, I draw together all my results and suggest 
possible extensions to this work. 
7.1 Literature Survey 
In examining the empirical evidence behind the events of the 1992 crisis, 
the literature has formed two basic strands. Firstly, GARCH models have 
been suggested as suitable for modelling exchange rates across the period in 
question. Secondly, Markov processes have been used to model the switch 
from one exchange rate regime to another. An extension to this notion is the 
jump diffusion literature. 
In this section to the chapter, I will consider each of these strands of 
literature and also show how they have been combined to describe exchange 
rate movements. 
7.11.1 GARCH Models 
Firstly, I will show why GARCH models have proved to be so popular in 
modelling exchange rate behaviour. It was Engle (1982) who first showed 
that it is possible to model the mean and variance of a series simultaneously. 
The recent literature has grown out of this pioneering work. 
The first point to note is that conditional forecasts are superior to un- 
conditional forecasts. This is seen by examining an ARMA process such as 
yt = ao + alyt-, + ct in which the aim is to forecast yt+,. This produces a 
conditional forecast of yt+l given by: 
Etyt+l = ao + alyt (7.1) 
In forecasting yt+,, the forecast error variance is Et[(yt+l - ao - alyt)'] 
E2= U2 tct+l - 
However, an unconditional forecýist produces a forecast error 
variance which is I/ (I -a 2) >I and is therefore greater than the conditional I 
forecast. It follows that conditional forecasts are more suitable since they 
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take into account the known current and past realisations of a series. 
A similar process is used when the variance of Et is not constant. However, 
when the conditional variance is not constant, Engle shows that this may be 
modelled as an AR(q) process using the square of the estimated residuals so 
that: 
ý2 = Go + Olle2 ^2 ^2 t t-1 + Ce26t-2+... + aq'Et-q + Vt (7.2) 
where vt is a white noise process. If the above values of a are non zero 
then the conditional variance evolves according to an autoregressive process. 
This implies that the above equation can be used to forecast the conditional 
variance as at time t+I as: 
E j2 + ale2 ý2 e2 (7.3) t t+j = ao t+ a2 t-I ++ aq t+l-q 
This is an autoregresstve conditional heteroskedashc model (ARCH) and has 
formed the basis for a vast amount of literature. 
Bollerslev (1986) took this one step further and allowed the conditional 
variance to be not solel 'y an 
AR(q) process but an ARMA process. Crucially, 
this model allows for the heteroskedastic variance to be both autoregressive 
and a moving average. He defines the error process as: 
r- et = vt vht 
with a2=1 and v 
(7.4) 
qp 
2 
aiEt-i + Oiht-i lit = OZO + (7.5) 
The conditional and unconditional means of ct are equal to zero. This can 
be seen by taking the expected value of et so that Ect = Evtý, 
Ah-t = 0. The 
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conditional variance of Et is given by Et-, Et' = ht. The important point to 
note is that the conditional variance of ct is given by ht in equation (7.5). 
This is known as a generalised ARCH model or GARCH model. 
This type of approach has proved to be very popular in describing finan- 
cial data. This is due to the ability of ARCH and GARCH frameworks to 
capture particular features of this data. Floating exchange rates have been 
shown to exhibit clustering volatility and a fat tailed distribution. This fea- 
ture has been shown by both Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) and Diebold and 
Nerlove (1989). However, in addition, it has been shown (Engle and Gau 
(1997)) that some EMS rates can share these floating rate characteristics. 
Hence I have chosen to use a GARCH framework to model the Lira and 
Pound exchange rates for the periods in and out of the ERM. 
7.1.2 GARCH Models of Floating Exchange Rate Re- 
gimes 
In this subsection, I will consider those studies which have been devoted 
largely to floating exchange rates. There is a large amount of literature in 
this area. An excellent review of the progress up to 1992 can be found in 
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992). 
Firstly, I consider the work of Diebold and Nerlove (1989) since this rep- 
resents an early work in the area which uses an ARCH model. They examine 
the Canadian Dollar, French Franc, Deutschmark, Italian Lira, Japanese Yen, 
Swiss Franc and British Pound using weekly spot rates. The interval chosen 
is July 1973 to August 1985 and the day of the week which they report is the 
observation on a Wednesday. This is consistent with my analysis since there 
are very few holidays emerging on that day and there is no 'weekend effect'. 
They argue that ARCH is important since it provides a means of modelling 
the idea that large changes in exchange rate tend to be followed by fur- 
ther large changes. Conversely, small changes are followed by further small 
changes. This generates a clustering of prediction error variances. They fur- 
ther argue that ARCH effects are consistent with unconditional leptokurtosis 
in exchange rate changes. 
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However, exchange rates within the EMS, are subject to currency realign- 
ments. When these occur, a large change in the exchange rate generated by 
a realignment is not generally followed by further large changes in the ex- 
change rate. This is because the realignment has the effect of reducing the 
effect of the lagged error term in a GARCH setting. Hence, I take into ac- 
count realignment dates when modelling the Lira and Pound exchange rates. 
Importantly, ARCH can be used to provide a meaningful measure of 
exchange rate volatility. Economists are concerned with volatility in exchange 
rates since it generates uncertaint , \, 
for prices of imports and exports and also 
for values of international reserves. It follows that ARCH is useful since it 
provides a way of modelling an evolving conditional variance. 
Diebold and Nerlove set up a multivariate time series model which con- 
tains a latent variable displaying ARCH tendencies. In effect this is a partic- 
ular type of martingale process which appears to provide a useful description 
of exchange rate movements. The ,y show 
that nominal Dollar spot rates are 
well described by an approximate vector random walk with ARCH innova- 
tions. As they note, 'The 'state of the world' is a serially correlated thing; 
hence we find ARCH. ' 
Hsieh (1988) uses daily data. He examines five different nominal US Dol- 
lar rates and shows that the conditional distributions of the daily nominal 
returns are changing through time. This is seen through significant auto- 
correlations for the squared returns. An ARCH(12) model with a linearly 
declining lag structure captures most of the nonlinear stochastic dependen- 
cies present. 
Baillie and Bollerslev (1991) set up a seasonal GARCH model with hourly 
dummy variables. Their data is hourly and taken from four major floating 
rates against the US Dollar. They use the British Pound, Deutschmark, 
Swiss Franc and Japanese Yen since these rates are the most actively traded 
currencies in the New York and London markets. The spot rate series are 
taken on an hourly basis over 6 months in 1986. 
The reason for taking data of such short intervals is so that they can 
distinguish between currency specific movements in the exchange rates and 
market specific factors. Clearly, their data is of much shorter intervals than 
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that which I use in my analysis because their aims are very different from 
mine. However, it would be interesting to apply their analysis to the 6 months 
leading up to the UK and Italian departure from the ERM to more closely 
analyse speculative behaviour in an EMS setting. 
They apply LM tests and find that the GARCH model is a good repres- 
entation of the data. However, their most interesting find concerns volat- 
ility which they describe as 'distinctive'. They find that volatility is relat- 
ively short lived and there is very little persistence found between different 
days. However, they show that traders with diverse information exploit their 
private information at the same time as other traders are active. This cre- 
ates a greater volume of trade and price volatility. This is apparent from 
examination of each individual market. 
The US market appeared the most volatile on average with the European 
market in second place. The Yen was not volatile. They found an increase 
in this volatility occurring around and immediately preceding the times of 
openings of the London and New York markets. There was a much smaller 
increase associated with the opening of the Tokyo market. There was also 
a drop in volatility occurring around the lunch hours in London and Tokyo. 
The authors suggest that this may be due to a systematic release of news at 
opening time. 
The GARCH model is believed to be very successful at capturing changes 
in volatility caused by variations in the arrival of information. This was the 
focus of the work of Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990). This line of argument 
was confirmed by the work of Engle, Ito and Lin (1990). As in the work of 
Baillie and Bollerslev, they define four separate market locations, Europe, 
New York, Pacific and Tokyo. Using a model of GARCH, they aim to show 
that information processing is the source of volatility clustering. 
Their test works as follows. Information arrives in one market. If this 
is uncorrelated with information arriving in another market, then a test of 
whether volatility increases in one market causes volatility increases in an- 
other market is equivalent to testing if information processing is a source of 
clustering. 
They find for intra da, N11 observations, with the exception of Tokyo, each 
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market's volatility is significantly affected by changes in the volatility of other 
markets. This is known as a 'meteor shower'. 
I close this subsection by discussing the work of Nelson (1992). He invest- 
igates those properties of conditional covariance estimates which are gener- 
ated by a misspecified ARCH model. This is a particularly relevant paper 
since it helps to explain my choice of frequency of data in my own contribu- 
tion to the area. 
He notes that as the frequency of the data increases, the difference between 
the conditional covariance estimates and the true conditional covariance es- 
timates approaches zero. He notes that this may account for the success of 
ARCH models in short term forecasting using high frequency data. Even 
misspecified ARCH models can produce 'good' estimates of volatility. This 
was one of the reasons that I chose to use weekly and not daily data. 
The literature in this section has argued that GARCH modelling is useful 
for a number of reasons. Floating exchange rates exhibit certain charac- 
teristics for which GARCH modelling is most applicable. Typically these 
are clustering volatility, insignificant serial correlation and fat-tailed distri- 
butions. Furthermore, this type of model is ver. y useful in capturing changes 
in exchange rate caused by variations in the arrival of information. It is 
therefore, highly suited for applying to the movement of exchange rates over 
time. As Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner argue 'The linear GARCH(p, q) is a 
natural candidate for modeling exchange rate dynamics'. 
7.1.3 GARCH Models of the Exchange Rate Mechan- 
ism 
In this subsection, I examine those models which have focused on the EMS 
period in particular. The first of these is by Engle and Gau (1997). They 
find that the EMS rates display some of the characteristics described in the 
previous subsection. In particular they note the presence of fatter tailed 
distributions and clustering volatility. 
Their model differs from mine in that it uses an MA(l)-GARCH(l, l) 
model to capture mean reversion and the GARCH effect. A test on the 
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residuals from the regression, Alogst - ao + ct did not reveal substantial 
serial correlation. Hence, 1 model the change in the mean of the exchange 
rate as a serially uncorrelated variable and the variance as a GARCH(IJ) 
process. 
Krugman (1991) argued that exchange rate changes exhibit a nonlinear 
form of mean reversion. The presence of a currency band and central bank 
intervention drive exchange rates away from the edges of the band towards 
its centre. 
Koedijk, Stork and de Vries (1998) find support for this S shaped relation 
between the exchange rate and fundamentals. Their analysis uses weekly spot 
rates of the Belgian Franc, Danish Mark, Dutch Guilder, French Franc, Irish 
Punt and Italian Lira against the Deutschmark. 
Therefore, Engle and Gau introduce a variable showing the deviation of 
exchange rates from the central parity. In my contribution, this is achieved 
by including the position in the actual band into the mean and conditional 
variance functions. However, the authors choose to use the 'effective band. 
This comes from the work of Pill (1994). He argues that it is more appro- 
priate to look at the EMS parity grid as a whole rather than solely the DM 
central parity. Engle and Gau adopt this approach and use it to examine 
the relationship between the position of the exchange rate and its volatility. 
However, likelihood ratio tests show that one cannot reject the null hypo- 
thesis of zero on the coefficient of this new variable. Therefore, I have chosen 
to estimate using the actual bands for each exchange rate. 
A further difference between my estimation and that of Engle and Gau 
is that they examine a multilateral framework. Their reasoning is that they 
wish to examine the co-movement of exchange rates among member coun- 
tries. In order to do this, they include a vector of all ERM currencies' posi- 
tions into the GARCH equation. As a result, they find that other currencies' 
positions do affect the conditional volatility of a specific currency. 
They use daily data from January 1986 to July 1993 from the Belgian 
Franc, Danish Mark, French Franc, Italian Lira and Dutch Guilder. As a 
comparison, they also examine the British Pound, Dollar and Yen. Their 
findings are consistent with what one may expect from a GARCH model. In 
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the non ERM rates, large exchange rate changes are followed by further large 
changes. Small changes are followed by further small changes. They observed 
that these series were characterised by periods of tranquility followed by 
periods of high volatility. In my contribution, much of the data set occurs 
outside the ERM period, hence this type of model is ideal for capturing these 
types of features. 
For ERM rates, they find what they describe as 'abrupt' changes and note 
that many of these correspond to realignments within the ERM. To conclude, 
the authors note that in all six ERM currencies there was mean reversion 
and a GARCH effect. However, they note that an interesting inclusion would 
be the introduction of realignments into conditional volatility. 
This analysis confirms the theory that a realignment generates a large 
change in the exchange rate and a consequent increase in the variance but 
that this is not followed by equally large exchange rate changes and high 
variance since the lagged squared error term no longer plays a role in the 
conditional variance of the series. Note that this is not consistent with volat- 
ility clustering which is observed in floating exchange rate analysis. This 
needs to be taken into account when forming a model to capture exchange 
rate behaviour both in and out of the ERM. For this reason, I have included 
a realignment dummy in my analysis when considering the Italian Lira which 
appears in the conditional variance function in order to model these effects. 
Lastrapes (1989) has made progress in this area. He includes dummy 
variables in the conditional variance to allow for policy changes by the FED. 
He shows that this has the effect of reducing the degree of leptokurtosis in 
the standardised residuals. This is in line with what I have done. I have 
included a dummy for each of the two currencies I consider. These dummies 
account for large movements in the exchange rates which are as a result of 
significant policy changes. 
A similar approach has been adopted by Koedijk, Stork and de Vries 
(1992). In their GARCH model of the EMS, they 'dummy out' realign- 
ments. The reasoning for this is to avoid mixing discontinuous changes in 
the particular distribution with the GARCH process. However, a number of 
criticisms have been made about this type of approach. Firstly, in examining 
140 
the history of the ERM it is noted that not all jumps in exchange rates were 
necessarily realignments. Secondly, not all realignments were actually jumps 
in exchange rates. Although I report the results for the GARCH model in- 
cluding the realignment dummy, I place more emphasis on those results for 
the model including the 'policy change' dummy. As a further justification for 
my approach I note the comments of Bollerslev et al., 'Further work trying to 
endogenously determine the timing of major exchange rate movements and 
changes in regimes would be interesting'. 
7.1.4 Markov Regime- Switching Processes 
Running concurrently with this line of approach has been the strand of lit- 
erature concerned with Markov switching models. This type of model has 
been used extensively by the likes of Hamilton' and stems from the work 
on Markov chains as in Baum et al. (1970). Hamilton (1989) argues that 
changes in a regime are not the result of some past realisations of the variable 
in question. In fact, they may be due to processes which are unobservable. 
He therefore argues that in many circumstance, the approach of Tong (1983) 
is inappropriate since this describes changes as deterministic i. e. they de- 
pend on past realisations of the variable. Instead he recommends Markov 
chains for analysing time series which are subject to changes in regime. I 
shall briefly discuss the progress made in this area. 
In an examination of US stock market returns, Ceccetti, Lam and Mark 
(1990) use an equilibrium model with regime switching in dividends. They 
find that this is successful in modelling some of the previously documented 
features of the stock market returns. In particular, it models the observed 
skewness and mean reversion tendencies. van Norden and Schaller (1993) 
develop this work to consider monthly stock market data from the Centre for 
Research in Securities Prices for the period 1926-89. They simulate a model 
in which fundamentals are switching and then estimate the switching regres- 
sion by using the artificial data from the simulations. They then compare the 
timing of the actual stock market crashes with that of switches in dividend 
'In particular I refer to his 1990 paper and also Engel and Hamilton (1990). 
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growth. They find that both speculative and switching fundamentals are 
responsible for the large swings in stock market prices. 
Much of the earlier work on regime-switching models of interest rates has 
been inspired by the behaviour of the Federal Reserve in the period 1979- 
82. During this time, it deviated from the targeting of interest rates and 
instead used non-borrowed reserves as the targeted instrument. The effect 
was to create volatility in the interest rate. Similar volatility was experienced 
during the crash of 1987, the OPEC oil crisis and also during war time. This 
motivated the work of Cai (1994) and also that of Hamilton (1988). 
A similar approach has also been applied to exchange rates. Vigfusson 
(1996) bases his work on that of Frankel and Froot (1988). They develop 
an exchange rate forecasting model which includes both fundamentalist and 
chartist behaviour. Fundamentalists base their expectations of changes in 
the exchange rate on economic fundamentals whereas chartists form their 
expectations by relying on the past behaviour of the exchange rate. Vigfusson 
argues that a model which combines these two behaviours successfully models 
an exchange rate. In particular, he looks at the US Dollar in the 1980s. He 
stresses the importance of the inclusion of chartism since this is used on a 
day to day basis in financial markets. 
Taylor and Allen (1992) survey the participants in the London foreign 
exchange market and find that 90% of the participants use chartism on short 
term prices and 60% consider this technique to be at least as important 
as fundamentals. However, when forecasting long term prices, the majority 
of those surveyed (85%) thought fundamentals were more important than 
charts. Therefore, a model encompassing the two techniques would appear 
to be favourable. 
Vigfusson notes that empirical testing on this type of approach has not 
taken place since it is difficult to measure the relative importance of each 
technique over time. Furthermore, the extent to which each technique is used 
is not directly observable. It is therefore, difficult to estimate the model using 
standard statistics. His work attempts to overcome this through adopting a 
Markov regime-switching model. In particular, he includes two forecasting 
ive equations in the model each corresponding to the two types of speculat' 
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behaviour. Secondly, he puts a time-varying weight on each of these two 
forecasts. In effect, lie reinterprets the Frankel and Froot model as a Markov 
regime switching model. 
The data used is the Canada-US daily exchange rate from 1983 to 1992. 
Vigfusson finds that the evidence is 'favourable though inconclusive'. He 
encounters different variances in each of the two regimes which proved to 
be a dilemma since the different periods may be determined by high and 
low variance regimes rather than by chartist-fundamentalist behaviour. He 
suggests that this may be overcome by implementing a two regime Markov 
switching process in which each regime shares a common ARCH effect. This, 
he argues, would have the effect of distinguishing the chartist-fundamentalist 
effects on the exchange rate since the variance induced influence would be 
eliminated. 
The Markov regime switching approach has also been considered by Kam- 
insky (1993) and also Engel (1994). Engel uses this type of model since he 
observes that the Dollar exchange rate appears to follow 'long swings'. Typ- 
ically, it drifts upwards for a time and then switches to a downward drift. 
These regimes are not explicitly connected with changes in policy within 
the US. In my regime switching model, I assume that a change in regime 
is associated with a major change in economic policy. Engel uses quarterly 
and also monthly data for 18 exchange rates for the period 1973-1986. Of 
these exchange rates, 11 are non US rates. The period 1986-1991 is used for 
post sample forecasting. The reason that he chooses to use both quarterly 
and monthly data is that there is no particular frequency which measures 
changes in exchange rates. He notes that a particular Markov process may 
successfully model a certain frequency of data but there is no guarantee that 
it will fit the data for a different frequency. For these reasons, he examines 
the results of two different frequencies. 
The results are disappointing in that the models are outperformed by 
forecasts of a random walk or of a forward rate. This is a surprising result 
since the Markov model outperforms generalised versions of the random walk 
in-sample. However, Engel finds that the model does not tend to have a lower 
mean squared error than either of these alternative models. In its favour, 
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the Markov model does prove to be superior in predicting the direction of 
exchange rate changes. 
In considering further research in this area, Engel suggests a third state 
for the process. He notes that the Louvre accord of March 1987 had the 
effect of stabilising all exchange rates and this occurred just one year after 
the end of the period used for estimation. He argues that a regime switch 
at this point may be appropriate. The new state would be characterised by 
low variances and only a small changes in exchange rates. If this were taken 
into account, it may be the Markov model would perform better than in this 
original study. 
In spite of this result, the modelling of Markov processes remains popular. 
It has been shown that Markov processes can be positively serially correlated 
which is an advantage since they can model the exchange rate feature of 
volatility clustering. In the initial work on Markov processes, it was assumed 
that the probability of switching from one regime to another was constant 
throughout. However, Gray (1996) notes that this is no longer the case. 
He points to the work of Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994), Ghysels (1993) 
and Filardo (1993,1994) as examples in which regime switching probabilities 
are allowed to change. Furthermore, Markov processes are flexible in that 
they can model data which has arisen due to different economic mechanisms. 
Gray notes that a single regime model may assume that the short rate is 
mean reverting. This implies that in the long run, the speed of reversion 
will remain the same throughout the period. However, in a regime switching 
model, the speed of reversion may differ in the long run. In effect, he argues 
that regime switching models allow for non linearities but, at the same time, 
are easy to estimate and implement. 
Jump Diffusion Models 
A related area of study has been the literature on jump diffusion models. 
This has grown from the work developed by Jorion (1989) who models jump 
processes in the foreign exchange and stock markets. In this model, changes 
in the exchange rate are assumed to be drawn from a combination of distri- 
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butions. The number of jumps in each period is drawn from a Poisson or 
Benoulli distribution. He discovered evidence of discrete jumps in US Dollar 
exchange rates in addition to ARCH effects. In fact, such discontinuities 
appeared to be typical of the US exchange rate. 
There are two crucial differences between this type of model and the 
Markov model. Firstly, it is assumed that jumps occur independently over 
time. Secondly, the conditional variance is increased each period by a con- 
stant amount due to the chance of discontinuous jumps in the exchange rate. 
It is argued that this type of approach is especially suitable for modelling 
exchange rates within target zones. This is because they model the discon- 
tinuities of realignments associated with the data. Neely (1994) notes that 
a number of papers have explored ERM data using an ARCH framework. 
However, the work such as that of Diebold and Pauly (1988) has overlooked 
the problem of modelling realignments of the bands in which the exchange 
rates are allowed to move. Their paper concludes that the ERM had the ef- 
fect of reducing the conditional volatility of the ARCH residuals of an AR(2) 
process for both the French Franc- D eutschm ark and Lira-Deutschmark ex- 
change rates. Neely argues that it is therefore appropriate to include a jump 
diffusion framework when considering ERM exchange rates. 
This has been considered by Nieuwland, Verschoor and Wolff (1994) who 
use a Poisson specification of Jorion. They focus attention on the mean 
reverting properties of ERM exchange rates and also seek to explain the 
excess kurtosis observed in the data. They conclude that the model which 
offers the best fit for the data is a jump-GARCH model with conditionally 
t-distributed innovations. Vlaar and Palm (1993) also apply jump diffusion. 
They discuss the relative merits of the Bernoulli and Poisson distributions 
and conclude that there is very little between each of these approaches. In 
fact, they choose a normal and multivariate normal distributions for their 
jump diffusion models. 
I shall now consider the recent literature which combines Markov pro- 
cesses with a GARCH framework. These are considered to be an improve- 
ment on the existing literature in modelling exchange rate movements. They 
also form the cornerstone to my own investigation into the data. 
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Of particular interest is the paper by Dueker (1994) who develops a com- 
pound model of GARCH and Markov switching in order to make the exist- 
ing GARCH framework more flexible in analysing exchange rates in target 
zones. He, initially addresses some of the drawbacks with the existing liter- 
ature. Firstly, not all jumps in European exchange rates have been of the 
same magnitude. Therefore, he proposes a model in which the size of the 
jump is endogenous. Furthermore, these changes in exchange rate are not 
limited to purely realignments. Secondly, he argues that models such as the 
one developed by Engel and Hakkio (1993) with a mean variance relation- 
ship assume that all periods of high variance are also periods of skewness. 
However, he argues that the large variance may be due to a large dispersion 
in the GARCH process with no switch in the Markov process. 
As a third point he notes that a large amount of the literature assumes 
that the innovations are student-t rather than normally distributed and the 
number of degrees of freedom remain constant over time. However, his model 
allows these degrees of freedom in the student-t to change over time. Finally, 
he observes that previous models have taken the extreme views that realign- 
ments are innovations or are not innovations to the GARCH process. Dueker 
allows his model to endogenise the extent to which a realignment can be re- 
garded an innovation in the process. 
His model considers weekly data for EMS currencies with respect to the 
Deutschmark commencing in 1980. The bands in the exchange rate are 
defined in terms of the Ecu basket currency. He finds that this type of model 
is a good fit for the exchange rate data. He notes the valuable contribution 
of the Markov switching process in the student-t degrees of freedom in endo- 
genising the weight placed on the previous period's squared residual in the 
GARCH process. He also notes that the use of the Markov process is more 
appropriate than dummying out the EMS realignments from the GARCH 
conditional variances. Furthermore, it allows large shifts in the conditional 
variance so that volatility may return to normal levels within a short time 
after a large jump. 
In estimating goodness of fit, he observes that when the student-t degrees 
of freedom parameter is allowed to switch, four out of the six currencies tested 
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pass the specification test. 
This model raises an important issue which I consider in the latter part 
of this chapter. Dueker finds the Markov process of endogenising regime 
switches is superior to dummying out realignments in a standard GARCH 
model. I compare these two approaches by forming a correlation coefficient 
between a policy change dummy seen in the GARCH model and the smoothed 
probabilitites of being in one regime as opposed to an alternative. The results 
reveal that the two are not highly correlated thereby indicating that each 
approach provides a very different type of information. 
The work by Neely (1994) has already received a mention. This is another 
influencial paper in this area. He develops a model which is a modified jump 
diffusion framework. He combines a time varying jump probability with a 
GARCH model in order to improve upon the existing literature in the jump 
diffusion area when considering target zones. 
He claims that his paper improves upon previous models in three ba- 
sic ways. Firstly, the issue of credibility is handled more thoroughly since 
information regarding this is incorporated into the model. This is achieved 
through a time varying probability of realignment for the ERM exchange rate. 
Secondly, he includes the absolute value GARCH models as used by Taylor 
(1986) and Schwert (1989) in an attempt to provide a better estimate of the 
forecast conditional variance. These are alternative types of GARCH model 
from the ones considered in the previous section and used in my analysis. Fi- 
nally, he observes the conditional volatility at the times of realignment and 
finds evidence that this is higher in the weeks surrounding these periods. 
Neely considers both exchange rates and interest rates from seven ERM 
countries and four non-ERM countries for the period from 1973 to 1992. All 
exchange rates were with respect to the Deutschmark and the sample period 
was chosen so as not to include the speculative attacks of September 1992. 
Bekaert and Gray (1998) take a different approach to the problem. They 
argue that their analysis is more flexible than the original target zone lit- 
erature pioneered by Krugman (1991). Within this literature, the exchange 
rate depends on fundamentals and the expected exchange rate. One of the 
fundamentals is controlled in order to keep the exchange rate within a certain 
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band while the other is assumed to follow a Brownian motion. The result is 
that the target zone is perfectly credible and is defended with only marginal 
interventions. However, tests of this model in Smith and Spencer (1991) and 
De Jong (1994) have not been favourable. As ýi result, a great many exten- 
sions have been made to the Krugman model. Bekaert and Gray propose a 
model which is a generalisation of Krugman's approach. 
This paper is particularly relevant to my work since I adopt a number 
of its salient features. They estimate a single equation reduced form model 
for changes in the French Franc- D eutschmark exchange rate using maximum 
likelihood. They then compare this with the Deutschmark- Dollar rate. They 
use weekly data for the EMS period from 1979 until 1993. 
They argue that Krugman's model can be restrictive and hence they 
offer a model which offers a more 'rich' characterisation of the conditional 
distribution of the exchange rate. They note that, during the EMS period, 
there was evidence of two different types of jump in exchange rate. Firstly, 
there are realignment jumps which occur at the time of realignment of a 
target zone. Secondly, there are jumps within the band for which there is 
no realignment of the target zone. I use this idea in setting up my GARCH 
model. I introduce realignment jumps and also jumps in exchange rate due 
to major policy shifts into the conditional variance function. 
They further argue that they provide a more satisfactory measure of tar- 
get zone credibility. When no jump occurs, the target zone is said to be 
credible. They note that, in the work of Rose and Svensson (1993) and Chen 
and Giovannini (1993), the authors rely on uncovered interest rate parity and 
interest rate differentials to make inferences about expectations of movements 
outside a band. However, since Bekaert and Gray condition the distribution 
of the exchange rate changes on a jump variable, they argue that they have 
a more appropriate measure of the credibility of a target zone. The size and 
probability of this jump are determined by macroeconomic variables. 
Their final contribution is to examine the implied currency risk premia. 
They are critical of the commonI 'v imposed assumption of uncovered interest 
rate parity since the empirical evidence is not entirely favourable. 
They find that, contrary to previous literature in the area, the exchange 
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rate in question is non linear and realignments can be predicted. Further- 
more, they conclude that the credibility of the system did not increase 
after 1987. They also observe that the foreign exchange risk premium in- 
creases during a currency crisis. They compare these results with the Dollar- 
Deutschmark rate to examine the effect of a target zone on exchange rate 
behaviour. They conclude that target zones do have a substantial effect on 
the behaviour of exchange rates over time. 
As in Bekaert and Gray, I distinguish between realignment jumps and 
within the band jumps. I also include the 'position in the band' variable in the 
mean and conditional variance. This allows me to compare the persistence 
of a standard GARCH model with one incorporating dependence on position 
in the band and realignment or policy change jumps. As future research, 
it would also be valuable to follow their analYsis and actually model the 
exchange rate jumps. 
Gray (1996) also develops a generallsed regime-switching model of the 
short term interest rate. He notes that in much of the literature, the mean 
and variance of the short rate are typically held constant. However, in his 
approach, he allows for mean reversion and conditional heteroskedasticity. 
It is an extension of the typical Markov ARCH approach adopted by Cai 
(1994) and also Hamilton and Susmel (1994) since the conditional variances 
are allowed to incorporate the persistence of GARCH effects. Notably, each 
of the parameters in the GARCH process is regime dependent. He argues 
that this is an important feature since it is often observed that the persistence 
of individual shocks is typically lower in periods of extreme volatility. This is 
consistent with the scenario in which a large shock has the effect of reducing 
pressure on the system. 
Furthermore, the conditional variance in each regime depends upon the 
level of the interest rate. The implication is that the conditional variance ac- 
commodates not only volatility clustering but also dependence on the interest 
rate. In addition, the Markov switching probabilities are state dependent and 
depend on the level of the interest rate. Gray argues that this model 'delivers 
sensible results'. He finds that it is more applicable to short term interest 
data than previous models. He further finds that the performance of out of 
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sample forecasting is good. 
7.2 D at a 
The data has been obtained from the PACIFIC exchange rate service (Policy 
Analysis Computing and Information Facility in Commerce). This service 
provides daily exchange rates through an online database retrieval system. 
It is provided by Professor Werner Antweiler from the University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 
In my analysis, I use weekly data. This is consistent with the studies 
of other economists. It is also known that ARCH effects weaken with less 
frequently sampled data. Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) use a Ljung Box port- 
manteau test to illustrate this. They show that this test result decreases 
gradually for the first ten auto correlations for the squared logarithmic first 
difference of exchange rates averaged across six currencies. For daily data, 
this is a highly significant 130.6 whereas for monthly data this is insignificant 
at 10-6.1 have chosen to report weekly data from Wednesday in each week. 
When this data was not available due to a holiday falling on that day, I have 
taken the next available day's observation. 
In figures 7.1-7.4,1 plot the weekly data for each of the exchange rates 
to be considered. Firstly, consider the Pound. Figure 7.1 illustrates a steady 
depreciation against the Deutschmark until the end of 1995 followed by an 
appreciation of the currency. Table 7.9 provides a calendar of economic events 
corresponding to each of the large changes in the exchange rate. Figure 7.2 
illustrates the Pound/Dollar exchange rate. This series is characterised by 
a large appreciation in the early 1980s followed by a large depreciation in 
the mid 1980s. Following 1992, volatility in this rate was greatly reduced 
with only small exchange rate movements. Table 7.10 provides the events 
corresponding to large exchange rate changes for this series. 
Figure 7.3 shows the Lira/DM rate. Again this is characterised by a 
steady depreciation in the exchange rate until the end of 1995 followed by an 
appreciation. Note the period between 1987 and 1992 shows very little change 
in the exchange rate. By 1992, the EMS had celebrated 60 months without 
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a realignment. However, following 16th September, there is considerable 
movement and the exchange rate depreciates rapidly. Table 7.7 describes 
the economic events surrounding this period. By contrast, the Lira/Dollar 
rate given in figure 7.4, shows great volatility in the exchange rate until 1992 
followed by only small exchange rate changes. The events are described in 
table 7.8. 
The Lira spent the period between 1979 and 1992 in the ERM but the 
exchange rate floated thereafter. By contrast, the Pound spent only a small 
period of time in the ERM. It entered in 1990 and left in 1992. My aim is to 
provide a model which incorporates each of the states of being in and out of 
the ERM. I aim to capture the volatility clustering and fat tail distribution 
typical of a floating rate and also the 'abrupt' changes of realignment present 
in the ERM period. 
For each of the exchange rates, I have included a table of summary stat- 
istics. This reports the mean and standard deviation of the data plus the 
maximum and minimum values. In addition, I have included measures of 
skewness and kurtosis. For a null hypothesis of i. i. d. normally distributed 
standardised residuals, has a mean of zero and a variance of 
6 
-- 
for 
t Vfn 
skewness. When the reported value for skewness is significantly greater than 
zero, this indicates skewness to the right. When this value is significantly 
less than zero, this indicates skewness to the left. For each exchange rate, the 
results suggest skewness to the left. Kurtosis is a measure of curvature and 
for a null hypothesis of i. i. d. normally distributed standardised residuals, 
ý" : has a mean of zero and a variance of -ýý4-- . When the reported value is , V/O-, 2 7 V/n- t 
significantly greater than zero, this suggests thicker tails than normal. If the 
tails are thinner than normal, this value is significantly less than zero. In 
all cases, this reveals considerable kurtosis as is typical of this type of data. 
This is particularly noticeable in the Lira rates. 
The Jarque-Bera test is also a test of the normality of the regression 
residuals and combines the measures of skewness and kurtosis. It is given by 
X2 (2) = n(Iri + -1 K, 
2) 
where Ki is the squared reported result for skewness 6 24 2 
andK2 is the reported result for kurtosis. Clearl ' y, 
the data suggests that the 
residuals are non normal and that most of this results from kurtosis. 
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II Lira/DM I Lira/Dollar I Pound/DM I Pound/Doll: aýr] 
Mean -0.0893 -0.0698 -0.0607 -0.0318 
Std. Dev. 0.8252 1.4786 1.1058 1.4699 
Skewness -1-5852 -1.0641 -0.5834 -0.2529 
Kurtosis 16.0301 10.7920 3.2321 3.3917 
Jarque-Bera X2 (2) 10936.5 4955.8 572.1956 569.8450 
Max 4.4639 6.7823 3.7004 7.3905 
Min -7-6227 -14.8593 -6-8262 -8.6422 
Table 7.1: Summary Statistics for Lira and Pound Exchange Rates 
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7.3 Events of the EMS Period and their Im- 
pact on the Pound and Lira 
Firstly, it is relevant to examine each of the realignments experienced by the 
Lira during this period and offer an explanation for why these were considered 
necessary. The UK did not enter the ERM until October 1990 and left in 
September 1992. It follows that the only realignments experienced during 
this period were those from entering and leaving the ERM. 
Realignment Date Lira/DM Central Parities 
13 Mar 1979 457-314 
24 Sept 1979 466.460 
30 Nov 1979 466.460 
23 Mar 1981 496.232 
5 Oct 1981 539.722 
22 Feb 1982 539.722 
14 Jun 1982 578-574 
21 Mar 1983 626.043 
22 Jul 1985 679.325 
7 Apr 1986 699.706 
4 Aug 1986 699.706 
12 Jan 1987 720.699 
8 Jan 1990 748.217 
16 Sep 1992 - 
Table 7.2: Realignment Dates and Central Parities for the 
Lira/DM Exchange Rate 
The exchange rates given in this table are expressed in terms of spot ecu- 
rates, which are recorded at a daily central bank conference at 2.30prn Swiss 
time. 
The first point to note from these realignments is that the exchange rate 
did not jump at every realignment date. These realignments occur without 
a corresponding devaluation. 
Secondly, it has been argued (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, (1993)), that 
much of Italy's financial problems were due to a competitiveness problem. 
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Hence the devaluations were necessary so as to maintain a degree of compet- 
ition amongst its counterparts. At this stage, I will take each realignment in 
turn and explain the events surrounding it. 
June 1979 - The DM rose against the other currencies affecting the weaker 
members of the ERM. Central banks sold DM in an attempt to keep the 
Danish Krone from falling through its lower limit. Sterling was strengthened 
by North Sea Oil and appreciated against the dollar. There were concerns 
that the British economy would become uncompetitive as a result. Pressure 
on the Irish Punt was seen because of the strong economic ties between 
Ireland and Britain. 
September 1979 - The Danish Krone fell through its lower limit due to upward 
pressure on the DM against the dollar. 
November 1979 - Denmark devalued its currency by 5%. 
March 1981 - Italy realigned its currency due to competitiveness problems. 
In addition, Denmark was suffering a sizeable current account deficit and 
there were implications for the Belgian Franc. 
October 1981 - France and Italy devalued their currencies while the DM 
and Dutch Guilder were revalued. This follows the decline of the Franc in 
May 1981 which occurred as a result of an increase in US interest rates. In 
September of the same year, the Danish Krone was weakened as a result of 
Sweden's actions to devalue its currency against a basket of currencies. 
February 1982 - Belgium devalued its currency by 8.9% 
due to high unem- 
ployment and a large current account deficit. This led to Denmark devaluing 
the Krone by 3%. 
June 1982 - The French Franc was devalued by 5.75%. 
This was triggered by 
the strong Dollar and speculation against the currency. As a result, France 
lost in excess of two thirds of its foreign exchange reserves. 
March 1983 - There had been fears dating back to December 1982 over the 
strength of the Irish Punt since sterling was weakening. Sterling then fell to 
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a record low in March 1983. In France, expansionary policies put in place 
by the socialist government were creating concerns on the currency markets. 
France threatened to leave the EMS but opted for a realignment instead. 
July 1985 -A further realignment in the system. The Lira effectively deval- 
ued by 8% within the EMS. 
April 1986 - The French Franc was in trouble again. It was devalued by 3% 
on 7th April 1986. However, there were concerns that this was insufficient. 
The 0.25% reduction in the Bank of France's discount rate confirmed these 
suspicions. 
August 1986 - The Punt was devalued by 8% in August due to concerns of 
lower oil prices and their impact on sterling. 
January 1987 - The French Franc fell to the bottom of its band. This was 
triggered by student riots and strikes. At the same time, Italy announced 
plans to liberalise exchange controls. The Danish Krone also devalued by 3% 
and the Belgian Franc by 2%. 
January 1990 -A further realignment in the system. This followed political 
upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe. 
June 1992 - Denmark rejected the Maastricht treaty. At the end of the 
month, sterling was approaching the bottom of its band since speculators 
sold it in the belief that the monetary union may be delayed. 
August 1992 - There was further heavy selling of sterling following the state- 
ment of the Bundesbank president that the Pound should be devalued. 
September 1992 - Sterling and Lira left the ERM. The Spanish Peseta was 
forced to devalue and the Irish Punt appeared on the point of devaluation. 
The French Franc was also weak and hence the Belgian Franc was also in 
danger. Following this period, the Lira continued to be under pressure of 
depreciation as was sterling. 
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7.4 GARCH Model and its Extensions 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a model which incorporates each of the 
states of being in and out of the ERM. Therefore, a model is needed which 
captures the volatility clustering and fat tail distribution typical of a floating 
rate and also the 'abrupt' changes of realignment present in the ERM period. 
Engel and Gau (1997) find that an MA(l)-GARCH(l, l) provides a suitable 
fit for the data. 
In order to decide which was the more appropriate model for the mean of 
the change in the exchange rate, I tested it for evidence of serially correlated 
errors. This involved collecting the residuals from the regression of 
Alogst = ao + ct (7.6) 
and then performing the regression below: 
et = ao + oziet-I 
where the ets are estimated residuals. This was then tested by comparing nR' 
with a X'(1) statistic. In table 7.3,1 show the R' value, the test statistic and 
also the 5% critical value. Notably, the only exchange rate for which there 
is some evidence of serially correlated errors is the Lira/DM rate. For this 
reason, I have used a simple mean function as shown below. 
Alogst = ao + Et 
where 
2) 
et - N(O, at 
conditional on It-, observable information. 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
For each of the exchange rates, I tested for ARCH(I) and ARCH(4) as a 
preliminary investigation of the data. The results shown in table 7.4 indicated 
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Exchange Rate R' nR X, (1) 
5% Sig. Level 
Lira/DM 0.0104 10.2163 3.84 
Lira/Dollar 0.0001 0.1144 3.84 
Pound/DM 0.0025 2.5042 3.84 
_Pound/Dollar 
0.0022 2.1412 3.84 
Table 7.3: A Test of Serial Correlation in the Mean Exchange Rate 
that long lags in the variance were required and hence, this prompted me to 
model the data in terms of a GARCH process. 
Exchange Rate LM Statistic LM Statistic 
X 
2(j) X2 (4) 
Lira/DM 48-3384 101.7178 
Lira/Dollar 0.18841 32.2845 
Pound/DM 7.7073 27.3920 
Pound/Dollar 42-0874 69.0591 
Table 7.4: ARCH Tests of the Exchange Rate Data 
Therefore, the conditional variance was modelled as follows: 
072 
22 
t- bo + blct-, + 
b20ýt-l (7.9) 
The results are reported in table 7.5 and are set out to show the parameter 
estimate, its standard error and also the associated t statistic where the 
statistic is calculated as follows: 
tu - 
0-0 
SE(A) 
This is then compared with the critical value. For the 5% level this is 11.6451. 
For the 10% level this is 11.2821 and for the 25% level it is 10.6741. 
In addition, I have performed a Ljung Box portmanteau test for model 
misspecification. This tests up to 15th order serial correlation in the squared 2 
standardised residuals, ý'_'2_ -If the model has been correctly specified, then t 
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the null of independent residuals cannot be rejected and the LB statistic 
will not be significantly different from zero. For all exchange rates tested 
here, this null cannot be rejected at the 5% level. I also measure the degree 
of skewness and kurtosis in the residuals. For a null hypothesis of i. i. d. 
normally distributed standardised residuals, has a mean of zero and a U2 t t 
variance of --L for skewness and 
24 for kurtosis. Note that in each case, while V/, n- 7n 
skewness does not represent a large problem, there is considerable evidence 
of kurtosis especially in the Lira rates. 
This is supported by the Jarque-Bera test for normality in the residuals. 
As described earlier, this is given by: X2 (2) = n(lrl + _L n2) where ri is 6 24 2 
the squared reported result for skewness and K2 is the reported result for 
kurtosis. In each case, there is considerable evidence of non normality. Much 
of this is due to excess kurtosis. 
In examining the results I shall discuss each parameter in the model. 
Firstly there is the constant term, ao. The sign on this indicates whether 
there has been an appreciation or depreciation in the currency over the time 
period. Clearly for the Pound and Lira, this suggests a depreciation of the 
currency against both the Deutschmark and the Dollar. Examining the es- 
timates, all are significant at the 25% level but only the estimate for the 
Lira/DM is significant at the most commonly used 5% level. 
The bo term is the constant term in the conditional variance function. 
For the Pound, this is greater for the Pound/DM exchange rate than it is for 
the Pound/Dollar rate. However, for the Lira the opposite scenario holds. 
All results are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The b, term is the parameter on the lagged squared errors in the condi- 
tional variance function. This is the moving average component of the model 
and indicates the extent to which past errors determine the error variance 
of the data. The Pound/DM and Pound/Dollar rates display very similar 
values of this parameter. However, the estimate on the parameter for the 
Lira/Dollar is far greater than that on the Lira/DM. Once again, all results 
are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The final parameter, b2 is the parameter on the lagged error variances 
and forms the autoregressive component of the model. A significantly large 
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value here indicates that the error variance is heavily dependent on its past 
values. Notably, each result is significantly greater than zero. 
Within this framework, persistence of the GARCH effect can be examined 
by considering b, + b2- If this is not significantly different from 1, then 
one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is complete persistence in the 
conditional variance function. This would suggest possible integration in the 
variance and thus point to MARCH as a suitable model. However, in the 
context of this analysis I do not pursue this possibility. Note that, for each 
rate, the results indicate a large amount of persistence. 
7.4.1 Position in the Band 
It has been shown (Bekaert and Gray, (1998)) that including a currency's 
position in the band into the conditional mean encapsulates the idea of mean 
reversion in the exchange rates. It is argued that this type of model is 
consistent with Krugman (1991) since the expected change in the exchange 
rate is larger when the exchange rate is close to the edge of its band. 
The original GARCH model is adapted as follows: 
Alogst = ao + a, PBt + ct (7.10) 
where 
2) 
ct - N(O, at 
conditional on It-, observable information and 
072 
= bo + bliE 
2, 
+ b2 0' 
2, + b3 IPBt-11 (7-12) 
The position in the band takes on a value in the interval, [-1,1]. When the 
exchange rate is at the centre of its band, PBt = 0. When the exchange rate 
is at its upper boundary, PBt =I and at its lower boundary it is PBt = -1. 
It is calculated using the following: 
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Sf. - Cj 
(Ut - Id 
where st is the exchange rate, cl is the centre of the target zone, ut is the 
upper boundary of the target zone and lt is the lower boundary of the target 
zone. 
I applied this to the data sets for the Lira and Pound. Plots of each 
currency's position in the band are given in figures 7.5 and 7.6. 
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Parameters Estimates St. Errors t statistics 
ao -0.0390 0.0325 -1.2 
bo 0.1274 0.0206 6.1845 
b, 0.0907 0.0170 5.3353 
Pound/DM b2 1 0.8081 1 0.0295 1 27.3932 
Mean Log Likeli hood -1.49332 
Jarque-Bera Test X'(2) 1031.7897 
Skewness = -0.7370 Kurtosis = 4.3726 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.12323 Ljung-Box (15) = 7.8280 
ao -0.0288 0.0388 -0.7423 
bo 0.0905 0.0196 4.6173 
b, 0.0831 0.0139 5.9784 
Pound/Dollar b2 0.8760 0.0214 40.9346 
Mean Log Likeli hood = -1.74565 
Jarque-Bera Test X'(2) = 594.67818 
Skewness = 0.53018 Kurtosis = 3.3388 
LJjung-Box (1) = 0.29620 Ljung-Box (15) = 6.9052 
ao -0.0456 0.0256 -1.7813 
bo 0.0397 0.0022 18-0455 
b, 0.1322 0.0098 13.4898 
Lira/DM b2 1 0.8168 0.0094 86-8936 
Mean Log Likeli hood -1.05242 
Jarque-Bera Test X'(2) 111143.31 
Skewness = -3-8056 Kurtosis = 51.5329 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.003629 Ljung-Box (15) = 0.69991 
ao -0.0374 0.0409 -0.9144 
bo 0.1747 0.0484 3.6095 
b, 0.2386 0.0291 8.1993 
Lira/Dollar b2 0.7182 1 0.0411 17.4745 
Mean Log Likeli hood -1.76288 
Jarque-Bera St X2 (2) 13559.29 
Skewness = -1-5298 Kurtosis = 17-9356 
Ijung-Box (1) = 0.49882 Ljung-Box (15) = 6.6839 
Table 7.5: The GARCH Model Using Pound And Lira Exchange 
Rate Data 
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The results of the modified GARCH framework may be found in table 
7.6. The interpretation of the variables is as before with the addition of the 
position in the band variable in the mean and the lagged absolute value of 
the position in the band variable in the conditional variance. I shall take 
each exchange rate in turn and also compare the results with the standard 
GARCH model. 
Firstly, there is the Pound/DM rate. In the mean function, the parameter 
estimate on the constant has dropped slightly but is still negative indicating 
an overall depreciation of the currency. The t statistic has dropped and the 
result is insignificant at the 5% level but significant at the 25% level. The 
parameter on PBt is large but so too is the standard error. The t statistic 
suggests that this is not significant at the 5% level but again, it is significant 
at the 25% level. 
Within the conditional variance function, the constant is still statistically 
significant although lower than in the original framework. The parameter 
on the lagged squared error term is also slightly lower as is its standard 
error. The parameter on the lagged conditional variance remains highly 
significant. The final parameter is that of the absolute position in the band 
variable. This is significantly different from zero. The overall result suggests 
that the standard GARCH model can be improved upon by including the 
lagged absolute value of the position in the band variable. However, the 
current position in the band does not have a significant effect upon the mean 
function. The persistence of the system has been reduced by the inclusion of 
the position in the band variable. This is in line with the findings of Bekaert 
and Gray in their examination of the French Franc against the Deutschmark. 
The LB statistics are statistically insignificant and the degree of skew- 
ness and kurtosis are smaller than under the original GARCH framework. 
However, the Jarque-Bera test still indicates non normality in the residuals. 
I now consider the Pound/Dollar rate. The parameter on the constant in 
the mean function is still negative indicating an overall depreciation but this 
is less than under the original GARCH framework and insignificant at the 
5% level. The parameter on the position in the band variable is large but 
its standard error is also large as in the Pound/DM case producing a result 
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which is not significant, at the 5% level. 
In examining the conditional variance function, the parameter on the 
constant is still significant and positive. The pammeter on the lagged squared 
error term is statistically significant. The same may be said of the parameter 
on the lagged conditional variance. As in the case of the Pound/DM rate, 
the parameter on the absolute lagged value of the position in the band is 
large and significant. 
Therefore, a pattern is emerging for the Pound. In each case, the position 
in the band did not play a significant part in the mean function. However, the 
lagged absolute value did play a part in the conditional variance function. 
This is not surprising since I have examined a large data set and the UK 
was only a member of the ERM for a very small proportion of this time 
(approximately 100 observations out of 1164). Furthermore, the persistence 
given by b, + b2 has been reduced by including this extra variable. 
The LB(15) statistic is insignificant at the 5% level. As with the Pound/DM, 
skewness and kurtosis have also been reduced but the Jarque-Bera test in- 
dicates non normality in the residuals. 
This correlation between the Pound/DM and Pound/Dollar rates may 
be emerging because of the link between the DM and the Dollar. If these 
currencies are strongly related, then it is no surprise that events in Europe 
will ultimately impact on the Dollar and vice versa. 
I now consider the Lira/DM rate and compare with the standard GARCH 
framework. Firstly, the parameter on the constant in the mean function is 
negative as one would expect from a depreciating currency but less than 
under the standard model. It is still statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The parameter on the position in the band is significant contrary to the 
results of the Pound rates. This is consistent with my findings in table 7.3 
indicating serial correlation in the errors when the simple mean funtion given 
by equation 7.7 is used. 
The parameter on the constant in the variance function is considerably 
smaller than under the original model but still significant and positive. Not- 
ably, the parameter on the lagged squared error term is larger than under 
standard GARCH as is that on the lagged squared variance. Both are sig- 
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nificant at the 5% level. The parameter on the absolute lagged value of the 
position in the band is small but still significant. 
In contrast to the Pound exchange rates, the persistence found in the 
Lira/DM rate has actually increased as a result of including the position in 
the band variable. 
The LB(15) statistic is insignificant at the 5% level. More importantly, 
is that kurtosis has dropped considerably as has the degree of skewness. 
However, the Jarque-Bera test still shows considerable evidence of non nor- 
mality. 
A different story may be told for the Lira/Dollar rate. As before, the 
parameter on the constant in the mean function has a negative sign and is 
less than under the standard GARCH model. The parameter on the position 
in the band variable is less than under the Lira/DM rate. Again, this is 
no surprise since one would expect the position in the band variable to be 
more relevant to the Lira against an EMS currency then against a non-EMS 
currency such as the dollar. It is significant at the 10% level but not at the 
5% level. 
The parameter on the constant in the conditional variance function is 
smaller than under the standard GARCH but significant at the 5% level. 
The parameter on the lagged squared error term is still significant but less 
than under the original framework. However, the parameter on the lagged 
conditional variance is larger than under the original framework and highly 
significant. For this exchange rate, the parameter on the lagged absolute 
value of the position in the band is large and significant. The persistence has 
been reduced slightly by including the position in the band. 
Again, the LB(15) statistic is insignificant at the 5% level and the degree 
of kurtosis has dropped considerably as has skewness. The Jarque-Bera test, 
however, shows evidence of non normality in the residuals. 
These results suggest that the position in the band plays a role in both 
the Lira/Dollar and Lira/DM rates although the results are more pronounced 
for the Lira/DM. 
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7.4.2 Shocks to the Currency 
It may be argued that GARCH effects are often detected in financial data 
because this data includes a number of outliers. In effect, a model of GARCH 
is a model of these outliers. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to 'dummy 
out' these shocks and then to test for evidence of GARCH. This is what 
I achieve in the following modified GARCH model. I include dummies for 
realignments and monetary policy changes into the conditional variance func- 
tion. As a result, I still find evidence of GARCH and also find strong evidence 
to support these shocks. 
I set up two dummies for the Italian Lira. The first indicates realignment 
dates within the ERM. These have been given in table 7.2. The second 
captures those announcements or policy changes which cause a significant 
change in the exchange rate. 
For the case of the UK, I set up the one dummy to take into account those 
policy changes or announcements which generate a significant movement in 
the exchange rate. 
In tables 7.7-7.10,1 show the dates at which the exchange rates have 
moved by a significant amount and indicate the possible cause. This in- 
formation has been obtained from the National Institute Economic Review 
(1975-97). It is from this information that I build the dummy variables 
described above. 
Note that 1992 did not represent the first currency crisis experienced 
by the UK. 1976 also proved to be a year of sterling crises. As noted in 
the National Institute Economic Review (1977), 'It was the year of sterling 
crises, of worsening unemployment, of public expenditure cuts and of the 
IMF visit'. This helps to explain the need for a dummy variable to capture 
large policy changes which occurred as a result of this and other events. 
I incorporate these shocks into the GARCH model as follows. 
Alogst - ao + Et (7.13) 
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where 
2) 
ct - N(O, at 
conditional on It-, observable information and 
2 
62 
2 
at = bo + bi t-I + 
b2 Oýt- 1+ do. Dum (7.15) 
where Dum denotes the dummy for large policy shocks. In its place, one 
may also test for the realignment dummy on the Italian exchange rate data. 
The results may be seen in tables 7.11 and 7.12.1 firstly discuss the 
results of including the policy change dummy and compare with the standard 
GARCH model. For the Pound/DM, the parameter on the constant in the 
mean function is still negative and insignificant at the 5% level whereas the 
parameter on the constant in the conditional variance function is large and 
significant at the 5% level. The same may be said of the parameter on 
the lagged squared error term. The parameter on the lagged conditional 
variance is still significant but considerably smaller than originally. Finally 
the parameter on the dummy variable is large and the result is significant at 
the 5% level. Note also that by including the dummy into the conditional 
variance function, the persistence has reduced dramatically. 
The degree of skewness and kurtosis is smaller than under original GARCH 
although the Jarque-Bera test still indicates non normality. However, the 
LB(15) statistic is still insignificant at the 5% level. 
In considering the Pound/Dollar rate, the parameter on the constant in 
the mean function is still negative as expected but insignificant and smaller 
than under original GARCH. The parameter on the constant in the vari- 
ance function is larger than in the original model as is that on the lagged 
squared error term. Both are statistically significant. The parameter on the 
lagged conditional variance is highly significant at the 5% level. Finally, the 
parameter on the policy change dummy is large and significant with a con- 
siderably smaller standard error than for the Pound/Dollar. Persistence has 
been reduced but not by as much as for the Pound/DM rate. 
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As with Pound/DM rates, the LB(15) statistic is not significant at the 
5% level. Skewness and kurtosis are smaller than under the original CARCH 
setup but the Jarque-Bera test indicates non normality in the residuals. 
I now examine the Lira exchange rates. I firstly consider the Lira/DM 
rate. The parameter on the constant in the mean function is still negative 
in sign and significant whereas the constant in the variance function is less 
than under the original GARCH model. However, it remains statistically 
significant. The parameter on the lagged squared error term is larger than 
originally but the parameter on the lagged conditional variance is slightly 
smaller although still statistically significant. The parameter on the dummy 
variable is again large and significant. Persistence is only slightly lower than 
under the original GARCH model. 
The LB(15) statistic is insignificant at the 5% level. However, as before, 
the Jarque-Bera test indicates non normality in the residuals. 
For the Lira/Dollar rate, the parameter on the constant in the mean 
function is still negative and insignificant at the 5% level but significant at 
the 25% level. The parameter on the constant in the variance function is 
considerably larger than under the original GARCH model and also for the 
Lira/DM rate. The parameters on the lagged squared error terms and lagged 
conditional variance are considerably smaller than with the original GARCH 
model. However, they are still statistically significant. The parameter on the 
dummy is large and significant at the 5% level. Including this policy change 
dummy has had the effect of reducing persistence considerably. 
Here, the LB(15) statistic is now significant, at the 5% level. However, 
skewness and kurtosis are now negligible and the Jarque-Bera test suggests 
that the residuals are normal. 
I now consider the results of including a realignment dummy in place of 
a policy shock dummy for the Lira. I compare the results with the original 
GARCH model and of the model including the policy shift dummy. Firstly, 
I take the case of the Lira/DM rate. The parameter on the constant in the 
mean function is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, it is much smaller 
than under the original GARCH and policy change models. The parameter 
on the constant in the conditional variance function is larger than that of 
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the original GARCH and policy change models. It is also significant at the 
5% level. The parameter on the lagged squared error term is considerably 
larger than under each of these alternative models. Notably, the parameter 
on the lagged conditional variance is still significant but considerably smaller 
than under original GARCH or policy change models. The parameter on the 
realignment dummy is significant at the 5% level. Persistence as measured 
by b, + b2 is greater than under the original GARCH framework. 
The LB(15) statistic is insignificant at the 5A level. Kurtosis has dropped 
from 51.5329 to 10.0624 and skewness has also fallen. However, the Jarque- 
Bera test still indicates considerable evidence of non normality. 
In considering the Lira/Dollar rate, a similar pattern emerges for the 
mean function. The parameter on the constant is insignificant and smaller 
than under the previous two models. The parameter on the constant in the 
variance function is smaller than with the policy shift dummy but greater 
than with the original GARCH model and statistically significant. The para- 
meter on the lagged squared error term is smaller than with original GARCH 
and policy change models but still significant at the 5% level. The parameter 
on the lagged conditional variance is greater than for the model containing 
the policy change dummy but smaller than that for the original GARCH 
framework. The parameter on the realignment dummy is smaller than for 
the policy change dummy but equally its standard error is also smaller. The 
result is at statistic which far exceeds the 5% critical level. Note also that 
persistence is less than under the original GARCH model. 
Skewness and kurtosis are both smaller than under original GARCH and 
the LB(15) statistic remains insignificant at the 5% level. However, the 
Jarque-Bera test still indicates non normal residuals. 
7.4.3 A GARCH Model Including Position in the Band 
and Policy Changes 
In this section, I incorporate both the position in the band and policy change 
variables into the standard GARCH framework. As before, the lagged ab- 
solute value of the position in the band appears in the conditional variance 
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function. The current position in the band appears in the mean function. 
However, there is now a dummy variable in the conditional variance function 
for major shifts in policy. The model becomes: 
Alogst = ao + a, PBt + Et (7.16) 
where 
2) 
ct - N(O, at (7-17) 
conditional on It-, observable information and 
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at = bo + do-Dum + blct_l + b20't-l+ b3 
I PBt- 1 (7.18) 
As before, I consider each exchange rate in turn. The results may be 
found in table 7.13. For the Pound/DM, the constant in the mean is still 
statistically insignificant while the parameter on the position in the band 
is significant at the 10% level. In the conditional variance function, the 
constant is highly significant at the 5% level as is the parameter estimate 
on the lagged squared error term and also the lagged conditional variance. 
The lagged position in the band, however, appears to play no role in this 
model. The parameter on the policy change dummy is significant at the 5% 
level. The key feature of this model involves the persistence of the system. 
Note that b, + b2 is smaller than under the original GARCH framework. This 
supports the work of Bekaert and Gray (1998) and Jorion (1988) who each 
show that allowing for jumps greatly reduces the degree of persistence of 
shocks to exchange rates. 
In looking at model misspecification, the LB(15) statistic is insignificant 
at the 5% level. Skewness and kurtosis are also considerably reduced although 
the Jarque-Bera test suggests some non normality in the residuals. 
A different story may be said of the Pound/Dollar. The constant in the 
mean function is still insignificant at the 5% level as is the position in the 
band. However, the constant in the conditional variance function is signific- 
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ant as are the parameters on the lagged squared errors and lagged conditional 
variance. The estimate of the lagged absolute value of the position in the 
band is only significant at the 25% level. The parameter on the policy change 
dummy is highly significant. Note that in this instance, there is still consid- 
erable persistence as exhibited by 61 + 62- 
Again the Ljung Box statistic is statistically insignificant. Measures 
of skewness and kurtosis are again, smaller than under original GARCH. 
However, the Jarque-Bera test suggests some non normality in the residuals 
but much less than under any of the other models considered. 
I now consider the Lira exchange rates. For the Lira/DM, the constant 
in the mean function is significant at the 10% level. The parameter estimate 
on the position in the band variable is significant at the 5% level. Within 
the conditional variance function, the constant is highly significant at the 5% 
level as are the parameter estimates of the lagged squared errors and lagged 
squared variance. However, in this model, there is no role for the lagged 
position in the band variable. The policy change dummy is also significant. 
There is still considerable persistence exhibited in this model. 
The LB(15) statistic is still insignificant at the 5% level and skewness 
and kurtosis are considerably smaller than under the original GARCH model 
although the Jarque-Bera test suggests that the residuals are still non normal. 
For the Lira/Dollar rate, the constant in the mean function is only signi- 
ficant at the 25% level and there is no role for the position in the band within 
this function. This is not unexpected given the results of the Pound/Dollar 
and the fact that one would not expect the position in the band to play a 
large part in a non-EMS rate. 
However, each of the parameter estimates in the conditional variance 
function are significant at the 5% level. Furthermore, as in Bekaert and 
Gray, the inclusion of the absolute value of the position in the band and the 
policy change variable significantly reduces the persistence. 
Measures of skewness and kurtosis are far less than under original GARCH 
and insignificant at the 5% level. The Jarque-Bera test indicates normal re- 
siduals and the LB(15) statistic is also statistically insignificant at this level. 
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7.5 Summary of GARCH Results 
The standard GARCH model provides an adequate description of the data. 
For each of the exchange rates considered, there was considerable evidence 
of persistence as indicated by b, + b2- However, I argue that for the time 
period in which the currency was inside the ERM band, the position in the 
band played an important part in exchange rAe determination. This was 
apparent from the results of the modified GARCH model allowing for the 
position in the band in mean and variance functions. 
I also argue that 'news' or major policy announcements have an impact 
on the dynamics of exchange rate changes. It is argued that this type of 
announcement manifests itself as an outlier in the data and hence GARCH 
effects are merely the results of attempting to model these outliers. For 
these reasons, I introduce a dummy variable for policy changes and another 
for ERM realignments into the conditional variance function. Significantly, I 
still find evidence of GARCH. I also find that the parameter on the dummy 
variable is significant. 
I then incorporate policy changes and position in the band information 
into the standard GARCH framework. This is a better model of the exchange 
rates considered. This is supported by the Ljung-Box portmanteau tests and 
also the tests for skewness and kurtosis. 
7.6 Regime Switching Model 
The regime switching model has proved popular in modelling financial data 
since it captures switches in the direction of movement of the variable in 
question. Engle observes that the dollar exchange rate appears to follow 
'long swings' in that it drifts upwards for a period of time and then switches 
to a downward drift. Similarly, this type of approach has been suitable for 
modelling US interest rate behaviour betwen 1979 and 1982. During this 
time, policy changes by the Fed led to volatility in the interest rate. 
Therefore, this model is appropriate for analysing the Lira and Pound 
exchange rates both in and out of the ERM. During this period, there have 
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been major policy changes for each of the countries in question. My aim in 
this part of the chapter is to find If the regime switching model is better at 
detecting these changes than the GARCH framework incorporating a policy 
change dummy. If it is no better, then it would be simpler to use a modified 
GARCH model in examining exchange rate clata. 
I assume that there are two possible exchange rate regimes for the Pound 
and Lira. In regime 1, the exchange rate is low and in regime 2 it is high. 
The intuition here is that the first regime corresponds with a depreciating 
currency and the second with an appreciating currency. A switch in this 
model implies a movement from one regime to another. 
This model calculates regime-switching estimates for a two regime Hamilton 
Markov model. It is assumed here that there is constant mean and variance 
in each regime. Conditional normality is assumed for each regime so that the 
conditional distribution of Ast is a combination of distributions depending 
on the regime. In regime 1, it is N (pl, or 2) and in regime 2 it is N(112 i Or2). 12 
The first regime occurs with probability pit and the second with 1- pit. This 
can be written as: 
N(pi, 0,2) W. P. Pit I 
St I It- 1 2) 
(7.19) 
N(P2 
i ý72 
where: 
pit = Pr(St = Ilit-1) (7.20) 
so that: 
pit = PT(St - IlSt-li St-27 ... 
(7.21) 
The regime indicator variable, St is parameterised as a first order Markov 
process so that: 
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Pr(st - list-, = 1) =p 
Pr(St = 21St-, = 1) = (I - P) 
Pr(St = 21St-I = 2) =Q 
Pr(St = IlSt-, = 2) = (I - Q) 
It follows that pit is given by: 
(7.22) 
Pit Q) 
92t-I Plt-1) 
+p 
git-1pit-i [glt-lPlt-1 
+ 92t-I (I - Plt-1) 
- [glt-lPlt-I 
+ 92t-1 (I - Plt-1) 
(7.23) 
in which: 
91 t=f GA st I St = 1) 
and 
_q2t -f 
(Ast ISt = 
The results are reported in table 7.14. For each set of exchange rate 
data, the likelihood function is constructed so as to obtain estimates for the 
conditional probabilities, P and Q, the means in each regime, /-I, and A2 and 
22 the variances in each regime, ol andU2 .I report the standard errors and 
also the relevant t-statistics in order to evaluate the suitability of the model. 
The first point to note is that for each set of exchange rate data, the 
estimate of /-tj is negative indicating a depreciation in the currency in regime 
1. In the case of UK data, this is particularly marked for the Pound/DM. 
The t statistic shows that this is significant at the 5% level. However, this 
effect is not so profound for the Pound/Dollar which is only significant at the 
25% level. For the Italian Lira, this estimate is large both for the Lira/DM 
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and the Lira/Dollar. The former is significant at, the 5% level while the latter 
is significant at the 10% level. 
The estimate of the mean in regime 2, is small and positive for each of 
the Pound/DM and Pound/Dollar indicating an appreciation in the currency 
which one would expect following a realignment in the currency. However, for 
the Pound/Dollar, this is statistically insignificant whereas for the Pound/DM, 
this is significant at the 5% level. 
For each of the Lira rates, these values are negative which indicates a 
depreciation in regime 2. The Lira/DM rate is statistically significant at the 
5% level while the Lira/Dollar is not. 
I now consider the variances for each regime. For the Pound, the sig- 
nificant estimate on the variance of regime I is almost the same for the 
Pound/DM and Pound/Dollar both of which are highly significant at the 5% 
level. For the Lira, this figure is particularly large for the Lira/Dollar rate. 
In all cases, the estimate on the variance of regime 2 is smaller than for 
regime 1. This is consistent with the findings of Vigfusson (1996). In trying 
to analyse chartist-fundamentalist behaviour in Canada-US daily exchange 
rates, he discovered that the two regimes were instead characterised by high 
and low variance regimes. This is an important feature of this model. It 
has shown that for the regime in which the currency is depreciating, there 
is a large conditional variance. However, in the second regime, where there 
is a smaller degree of depreciation or an appreciation in the currency, the 
conditional variance is smaller. 
In examining the conditional probabilities of being in each regime, the 
estimates on P and Q are in every case greater than 0.85. This suggests a 
large probability of the current regime being the same as that which prevailed 
in the previous period. For the Lira, Q exceeds P suggesting that if regime 
2 was followed in the previous period, it is more likely to continue in the 
current period than if regime I had been followed in the last period. 
The same scenario exists for the Pound/D. M but curiously not for the 
Pound/Dollar rate. Here, P exceeds Q suggesting that if regime 1 has been 
followed in the past, it is more likely to continue than if regime 2 had been 
followed in previous periods. 
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7.6.1 A Comparison of the Regime Switching Probab- 
ilities with the Policy Change Dummy 
In running the regime switching model, I also constructed the smoothed 
probabilities associated with the probability of being in regime 1. Plots 
of these are given in figures 7.7-7.10.1 shall take each of these in turn and 
attempt to interpret the information shown. By examining the dates at which 
the probability of being in regime I is close to or equal to 1, it is possible 
to form a comparison with the policy change dummy formed in the previous 
section. It may be argued that if a policy change dummy can perform the 
job of a regime switching model in predicting a policy switch, then it would 
be easier to use a GARCH model with a dummy included as shown in the 
previous section. Following this, I will use a correlation coefficient to test the 
correlation between these two variables. 
Figure 7.7 shows the smoothed probability for regime 1 for the Pound/DM 
rate. This series is characterised by a series of peaks and troughs indicating 
a regular change in regime. 
The regime switching model detects a high probability of being in regime 
I for each of the major policy events indicated by the policy change dummy. 
In addition to this, it also highlights other events for which there was a 
smaller movement in the exchange rate regime. Thus, I argue that the regime 
switching model is sensitive to small policy changes and effective for the 
modelling of the Pound/DM rate. In addition to those events given by the 
dummy it detects the following: 
2nd June 1976 - The central banks of Group of 10 plus that of 
Switzerland 
and Bank for International Settlements make standby credit of 5 billion dol- 
lars available to Bank of England. 
15th and 29th September 1976 -I can find no concrete evidence to suggest 
a policy change in this period. 
Ist November 1978 - Minimum lending rate increased to 12.5%. 
19th September 1979 and 22nd October 1980 - Again, I can find no concrete 
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evidence to suggest a polic, y change here. 
5th November 1980- Lead up to election for leadership of labour party. 
10th December 1980 -A number of increases in US banks prime lending rate 
has impact on European rates. 
15th June 1983 - The Conservative Party wins the General Election with 
an overall majority of 144. EC finance ministers to allow the European 
Commission to borrow the equivalent of 1500 million Ecus on international 
currency markets for project financing in member states. Clearing banks cut 
base lending rates from 10 to 9.5%. 
27th March 1985 - Nigel Lawson announces the Budget. Leading banks re- 
duce base lending rates by half percentage point to 13.5%. 
Ilth December 1985 - Again, I can find no concrete evidence to suggest a 
policy change here. 
27th January 1993 - Irish Punt devalued by 10 per cent. UK base rates 
reduced to 6% - lowest level for 15 years. 
Invariably, this 'news' is bad and thus indicates a depreciating currency. 
For the Pound/Dollar rate, the model detects a high probability of being 
in regime I for each of the dates given by the policy change dummy. Again, 
these policy changes were predominantly bad news and thus the model in- 
dicates that during these periods, there was a high probability of being in 
the lower mean, higher variance state. In addition to this, it detects smal- 
ler policy changes for which the movement in the exchange rate was not so 
marked. Figure 7.8 illustrates these events. I list them as before: 
7th November 1984 - Ronald Reagan is elected as US President 
for a second 
term. 
17th April 1985 - Barclays and Midland banks cut base lending rates by 0.5% 
to 12.75%. 
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11th September 1985 - Government announces the launch of a 2.5 billion 
dollar floating rate note issue to increase foreign exchange reserves. 
14th June 1989 - US cuts prime rate to 11% but dollar stays strong. 
20th March 1991 - In UK interest rates are cut to 12.5%. 
15th January 1992 - Again, I can find no concrete evidence to suggest a policy 
change here. 
30th September 1992 - IMF and World Bank meet in Washington. USA, 
Germany and Italy encouraged to cut their deficits. Further 1% base rate 
cut in UK. This is the lowest since 1988. 
7th October 1992 - UK base rate cut to 8%. 
Note that following the start of 1994, the smoothed probability of being 
in regime I was very small. As can be seen by examining the raw exchange 
rate data, this corresponds with a time when the Pound was appreciating 
against the dollar. 
For the Lira/DM rate, the regime switching model produces 82 dates at 
which the probability of being in regime I is equal to 1! However, many 
of these are clustered around particular economic events. I describe those 
events for which there is a clustering of high probabilities of being in the 
depreciating currency regime. The first point to note is that, in comparison 
with the policy change dummy, all but two realignments (16th April 1986 
and 14th January 1987) are detected by this approach. 
October-November 1978 - The first cluster of dates for which there is a high 
probability starts on 18th October 1978 and finishes on Ist November 1978. 
1 can find no concrete evidence to suggest a major change in policy in this 
period. 
September- November 1992 - This corresponds with the ERM crisis of 1992. 
Following the Italian departure on 16th September, the Lira depreciated fur- 
ther. This was accompanied by public sector paY freezes and the introduction 
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of new taxes in Italy. In the meantime, the German central bank was inter- 
vening massively in the foreign exchange markets to defend the French Franc. 
In addition, the German cabinet approved plans to support East German in- 
dustry. 
Late November -December 1992 - German economic advisors give a pessim- 
istic prediction for the country's economy in 1993. Sweden floats the Krone 
thereby abandoning plans to peg it to the ECU. Spain and Portugal devalue 
by 6%. Figures indicate a sharp rise in German money supply. 
January 1993 - Single European Market established. Reduction in German 
short term money interest rates helps to ease pressure in ERM. 
Mid February-Early March 1993 - Unemployment reaches 3.5 million in Ger- 
many. Share prices across the world rise in the hope of the beginning of EC 
recovery. G7 finance ministers meet in London. 
April 1993 - In Italy, two former prime ministers are under suspicion of illi- 
citly financing Christian Democratic Party. Giuliano Amato resigns as Italian 
Prime Minister. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi is asked to form government. 
July 1993 - Spain, Portugal and Denmark struggle within ERM and Germany 
props up the French Franc. 
February-March 1994 - Germany cuts discount rate by ý'%. G7 meet in 
Germany and predict further interest rate cuts and inflation free growth. 
February-March 1995 - Lira falls to an all time low against the DM due to 
fears of an early General election. Italy introduces taxes and spending cuts 
to make up for the X8 billion shortfall in 1995 budget. 
Mid April-May 1995 - G7 finance ministers meet in Washington with central 
bank governors and agree to cooperate in exchange markets over the weak 
Dollar. 
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July-August 1995 - On 15th August, the Dollar has the largest one day rise 
for 3 years following intervention from Japanese, German and US central 
banks. 
September-November 1995 - EU Summit beginning on 22nd September high- 
lights the row between EU and Germany over economic criteria for EMU. 
This brings the Deutschmark to a9 year low against the Swiss Franc. On 
8th October, GIO agree to IMF borrowing an extra X17 billion to cope with 
world financial crises. 
Following Lira's departure from the ERM in September 1992, it is well 
documented (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, (1993)) that the currency continued 
to depreciate against the Deutschmark. This is apparent from figure 7.9. 
The smoothed probability of being in regime I remains high until the end of 
the data set. 
Figure 7.10 shows the smoothed probabilities for the Lira/Dollar rate. 
Here, the regime switching model is not as successful in finding major changes 
in policy. It omits 7 major events which are recorded by the policy change 
dummy and for which, there is a substantial movement in the exchange rate. 
Again, there is a clustering around particular events which I shall describe 
here. 
Late January-February 1981 - Most large US banks cut prime rates from 20% 
to 19.5% while smaller banks reduced theirs to 19% on 3rd February. 
Late July 1985 - Italian lira devalued by 8% within the EMS. 
September 1985 - EC finance ministers approve an Ecu 32 billion draft budget 
which exceeds the self imposed ceiling. 
January-May 1991 - The model indicates large smoothed probabilities of re- 
gime 1 for this entire period. Gulf war starts on 16th January. Military 
activities suspended on 28th February. Ceasefire announced on 2nd March. 
Series of bank reforms announced in US to try and stop bank failures. An- 
other Washington based bank declared insolvent in May. 
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September-October 1992 - This corresponds with the ERM crisis of 1992. 
Following the Italian departure on 16th September, the Lira depreciated 
further. This was accompanied by public sector pay freezes and the intro- 
duction of new taxes in Italy. IMF and World Bank meet in Washington. 
USA, Germany and Italy urged to cut deficits. 
Late December 1992-February 1993 - Bill Clinton inaugurated as 42nd Pres- 
ident of USA on 20th January. 
It would appear that the regime switching model is only partially success- 
ful in detecting changes in regime for the Lira/Dollar exchange rate. It does 
not detect some significant realignments within the EMS which impacted on 
the Lira/Dollar. It also does not detect such large events as a change in 
Italian prime minister or changes in US economic policy. 
In order to provide a more substantial test of the comparison, I construct a 
correlation coefficient for the policy switch dummy and smoothed probability 
of the regime switching model. This is calculated as follows: 
En 
Pij t=l 
(Xit 
- Ti) 
(Xjt 
- Tj) 
(n - I)SiSj 
where Yj and Yj are means and Si and Sj are standard deviations of the data 
sets in question. The size of the data set is given by n. The result is seen in 
table 7.15. 
Clearly, there is no substantial evidence to suggest that the regime switch- 
ing model can be replaced by a policy change dummy in a GARCH setting. 
Indeed, this supports the argument made which suggests that each approach 
provides different information and that the optimal stance involves a com- 
bination of these two approaches. 
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Parameters Estimates St. Errors t statistics 
ao -0.0363 0.0329 -1.1033 
al 0.3996 0.5321 0.7510 
bo 0.1005 0.0189 5.3175 
bi 0.0860 0.0162 5.3086 
Pound/DM b2 0.8299 0.0276 30-0688 
b3 0.1709 0.0331 5.1631 
Mean Log Likelihood -1.4884 3 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) 627.13354 
Skewness = -0.63992 Kurtosis = 3.3621 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.014244 Ljung-Box (15) = 6.6995 
ao -0-0106 0.0401 -0.2643 
al 0.3895 0.5149 0.7565 
bo 0.0898 0.0189 4.7513 
b, 0.0731 0.0133 5.4962 
Pound/Dollar b2 0.8768 0.0212 41.3585 
b3 0.6986 0.2462 2.8375 
Mean Log Likeliho od = -1.7334 
- 
5 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) = 239.26343 
Skewness = -0-30793 Kurtosis = 2.1350 
Ljung-Box (1) 0.0010426 Ljung-Box (15) = 8.5295 
ao -0-0365 0.0214 -1.7056 
a, 0.3737 0.0377 9.9125 
bo 0.0069 0.0016 4.3125 
b, 0.1635 0.0115 14.2174 
Lira/DM b2 0.8321 0.0075 110.9467 
b3 0.0403 0.0076 5.3026 
Mean Log Likelihood -0.988394 
Jarque-Bera test X'(2) 9630.3364 
Skewness = -1.8803 Kurtosis = 14-8655 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.14582 Ljung-Box (15) = 6.6473 
ao -0.0118 0.0403 -0-2928 
al 0.1729 0.1099 1.5732 
bo 0.0897 0.0284 3.1585 
b, 0.1356 0.0289 4.6920 
Lira/Dollar b2 0.7904 0.0370 21.3622 
b3 0.3970 0.1007 3.9424 
Mean Log Likelihood -1.7433 3 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) 222.34259 
Skewness = -0.22739 Kurtosis = 2.2851 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.65772 Ljung-Box (15) = 10.752 
Table 7.6: The GARCH Model Including Position in the Band 
Data 
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Lira/DM 
Date Reason 
7/10/81 Devaluation of Italian Lira by 3%. DM revalued by 5%. 
3/2/82 US banks raise prime rate from 15.75% to 16.5%. 
24/7/85 Lira effectively devalued by 8% within EMS. 
16/4/86 Realignment of EMS currencies. 
14/1/87 Realignment of EMS currencies. 
16/9/92 Black Wednesday. Lira floats outside ERM. 
7/10/92 German Bundestag ratifies Maastricht on condition that they 
have a say on the introduction of the single currency. 
14/10/92 Birmingham summit of EC heads of state. Held in response 
to currency crisis and loss of confidence over Maastricht ratification. 
6/1/93 Single European Market established. 
28/4/93 Giulano Amato resigns as Italian prime minister on 22/4/93. Carlo 
Azeglio Ciampi, Governor of Bank of Italy is asked to form government. 
8/3/95 Lira drops by further 4% against DM. The largest decline since 
crisis of Sept 1992. This follows tax increases and spending cuts 
to make up for 18 billion shortfall in 1995 budget. 
Table 7.7: Dates of Large Movements in Lira/DM Exchange Rate 
With Corresponding Events 
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Lira/Dollar 
- - : Da: t, e= R-eason 
19/3/80 US banks raise prime rate from 18.5% to 19%. 
This follows increases on 4th and 7th March 1980. 
28/1/81 UK to receive S262 million refund as the 2nd 
stage in reducing EC budget payments. 
16/9/82 US Federal Reserve Board cuts discount rate from 11% to 10.5% 
and several major banks cut prime rates from 15% to 14.5%. 
16/12/82 US Federal Reserve Board cuts discount rate from 9% to 8.5%. 
27/3/85 Major reforms of the institutions and working of EC likely as 
Greece lifts its veto on terms of membership for Spain and Portugal. 
24/7/85 Lira effectively devalued by 8% within EMS. 
25/9/85 EC finance ministers approve an Ecu 32 billion (. 08.4 billion) 
draft budget which exceeds the self imposed ceiling. 
16/4/86 Realignment of EMS currencies. 
14/1/87 Realignment of EMS currencies. 
5/7/89 British PM addresses EC summit in Madrid setting terms for 
Britain's entry to ERM. Interpreted as acceptance of Delors stage 1. 
23/1/91 Gulf war started on 16/1/91. G7 meeting takes place on 20/1/91 
to discuss this. The aim is to 'maintain stability in 
international financial markets'. 
24/4/91 EC and Mexico sign a deal on cooperation. Finance ministers and 
central bank governors meet at G7 meeting in Washington. 
They agree to cooperate in exchange markets despite 
disagreement between US and Germany on interest rates. 
26/12/91 US cuts its discount rate by I point. France, Italy and Spain 
raise interest rates putting increasing pressure on UK. 
16/9/92 Black Wednesday. Lira floats outside ERM. 
7/10/92 German Bundestag ratifies Maastricht on condition that they 
have a say on the introduction of a single currency. 
6/1/93 Single European Market established. 
3/2/93 Bill Clinton inaugurated as 42nd President of US. 
28/4/93 Giulano Amato resigns as Italian prime minister on 22/4/93- 
Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Governor of Bank of Italy is asked to form 
government. 
Table 7.8: Dates of Large Movements in Lira/Dollar Exchange 
Rate With Corresponding Events 
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Pound/DM 
Date Reason 
10/3/76 Sterling Crisis. 
27/10/76 Sterling Crisis - IMF to visit on 3/11/76 for discussion 
of $3.9 billion loan to UK. 
12/11/80 Michael Foot wins leadership of labour party. 
28/1/81 UK to receive X262 million refund as the second stage 
in reducing its EC budget payments. 
25/2/81 EC provides UK with an additional X20 million for cheap 
loans to be used in job creation projects. 
9/9/81 French banks to cut prime lending rate from 15.3% to 14.5%. 
17/11/82 Sterling falls sharply against DM. Geoffrey Howe announces 
economic package on 8/11/82. 
7/8/85 Britain's banks cut base lending rates by 0.5% to 11.5%. 
22/1/86 Bank base rates increase by 1% to 12%. 
11/3/87 UK leading banks cut base rates by 0.5% to 10.5%. 
23/9/92 Black Wednesday on 16/9/92- UK interest rate rose by 2% and then 
promised a further 3% the next day. This 2nd rise was cancelled as 
UK leaves ERM. On 18/9/92, Lamont blames Germany for problems 
with ERM. 22/9/92 saw a further 1% base rate cut in UK. 
Table 7.9: Dates of Large Movements in Pound/DM Exchange 
Rate With Corresponding Events 
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Pound/Dollar 
Date Reason 
10/3/76 Sterling Crisis. 
20/3/85 Nigel Lawson announces Budget on 19/3/85. Leading banks 
reduce base rates by 0.5 percentage point to 13.5%. 
27/3/85 2 of Britain's leading clearing banks cut base lending rates by 
0.5 percentage point to 13%. Major reform of institutions and 
working of EC likely as Greece lifts its veto on terms 
of membership for Spain and Portugal. 
10/7/85 Chile announces 7.8% devaluation of the Peso. 
7/8/85 Britain's banks cut base lending rates by 0.5% to 11.5%. 
29/9/85 EC finance ministers approve an Ecu 32 billion (118.4 billion) 
draft budget which exceeds the self imposed ceiling. 
24/4/91 UK interest rates drop by a further 0.5% to 12%. 
EC and Mexico sign a deal on cooperation. Finance ministers and 
central bank governors meet at G7 meeting in Washington. 
They agree to cooperate in exchange markets despite 
disagreement between US and Germany on interest rates. 
16/9/92 Black Wednesday. UK interest rate rose by 2% and then 
promised a further 3% the next day. This 2nd rise was cancelled 
as UK leaves ERM. 
23/9/92 On 18/9/92, Lamont blames Germany for problems with ERM. 
22/9/92 saw a further 1% base rate cut in UK. 
21/10/92 John Major claims he is 'going for growth' in shift in government 
economic policy. UK base rate is cut to 8%. 
3/2/93 UK base rates cut to 6% - lowest level for 15 years. 
Bill Clinton inaugurated as 42nd President of US. 
Table 7.10: Dates of Large Movements in Pound/Dollar Exchange 
Rate With Corresponding Events 
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Parameters Estimates St. Errors t statistics 
ao -0-0136 0.0292 -0.4658 
bo 0.4616 0.0607 7.6046 
b, 0.1367 0.0340 4.0206 
Pound/DM b2 0.3799 0.0676 5.6198 
do 9.4915 4.1354 2.2952 
Mean Log Likeli hood -1.42686 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) 42.232683 
Skewness = -0.022084 Kurtosis = 0.93251 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.19244 Ljung-Box (15) = 22.6177 
ao -0-0034 0.0374 -0.0909 
bo 0.1303 0.0276 4.7210 
b, 0.1052 0.0221 4.7602 
Pound/Dollar b2 0.8107 0.0289 28-0519 
do 7.3191 1.6964 1 4.3145 
Mean Log Likeli hood = -1.70275 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) = 27-587995 
Skewness = -0.16154 Kurtosis = 0.68186 
Ljung-Box (1) = 3.2362 Ljung-Box (15) = 20.5551 
ao -0.0405 0.0175 -2.3143 
bo 0.0270 0.0025 10.8 
b, 0.2299 0.0229 10.0393 
Lira/DM b2 0.7057 0.0178 39.6461 
do 6.6755 1.5497 4.3076 
Mean Log Likelihood = -0.862724 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) = 1295.7179 
Skewness = -1.1618 Kurtosis = 5.1221 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.33373 Ljung-Box (15) = 10-5397 
ao -0.0449 0.0402 -1.1169 
bo 1.0556 0.1343 7.8600 
b, 0.0822 0.0428 1.9206 
Lira/Dollar b2 0.2211 0.0749 2.9519 
do 21.2881 5.1221 4.1561 
Mean Log Likeli hood = -1.67899 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) = 1.0408528 
Skewness = 0.0013517 Kurtosis = 0.15939 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.04756 Ljung-Box (15) = 26.7350 
Table 7.11: The GARCH Model Incorporating a Dummy Variable 
For Policy Shocks 
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Parameters Estimates St. Errors t statistics 
ao -0-0058 0.0125 0.464 
bo 0.0632 0.0041 15.4146 
b, 0.7001 0.0430 16.2814 
Lira/DM b2 0.3777 0.0158 23.9051 
do 2.9677 0.3272 9.0700 
Mean Log Likelihood -0.917768 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) 4157.8752 
Skewness = -0-25635 Kurtosis = 10.0624 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.16604 Ljung-Box (15) = 3.2287 
ao -0.0196 0.0422 0.4645 
bo 0.4050 0.0878 4.6128 
b, 0.2143 0.0453 4.7307 
Lira/Dollar b2 0.5781 0.0647 8.9351 
do 5.7758 0.5947 9.7121 
Mean Log Likeli hood = -1.74152 
Jarque-Bera test X2 (2) = 65-633423 
Skewness = -0-083922 Kurtosis = 1.2547 
Ljung-Box (1) = 2.7576 Ljung-Box (15) = 22.7482 
Table 7.12: The GARCH Model Incorporating a Dummy Variable 
For Realignment Dates For the Lira/DM and Lira/Dollar Exchange 
Rates 
193 
Parameters Estimates St. Errors t statistics 
ao 0.0027 0.0294 0.0918 
a, 0.5388 0.3683 1.4629 
bo 0.4075 0.0563 7.2380 
b, 0.1394 0. F3 3-3 4.1862 
Pound/DM b2 0.4298 0.0659 6.5220 
b3 0.0001 
- - 
- - 
do 8.16 2 5 2.8968 2.7971 
Mean Log Likelihood = -1-42451 
Jarque-Bera test XI(2) = 38.783017 
Skewness = -0.048379 Kurtosis = 0.96826 
_Ljung-Box 
(1) = 0.26904 Ljung-Box (15) = 21.5643 
Skewness -0.048379 Kurtosis = 0.96826 
ao -0-0054 0.0373 -0.1448 
a, 0.0001 - - bo 0.1267 0.0269 4.7100 
b, 0.1035 0.0221 4.6833 
Pound/Dollar b2 0.8125 0.0289 28.1142 
b3 0.2365 0.2348 1.0072 
do 6.8277 1.7373 3.9301 
Mean Log Likelihood -1-7021 1 
Jarque-Bera test X'(2) 23.91284 
Skewness = -0.16871 Kurtosis = 0.68588 
Ljung-Box (1) = 3.3267 Ljung-Box (15) = 20.6606 
ao -0.0228 0.0167 -1-3653 
a, 0.1075 0.0462 2.3268 
bo 0.0320 0.0032 10 
b, 0.2994 0.0282 10-6170 
Lira/DM b2 0.6442 0.0198 32-5353 
b3 0.0001 
do 7.4279 2.2096 3.3616 
Mean Log Likelihood = -0.8584 0 
Jarque-Bera test X'(2) = 1252.1929 
Skewness = -1.1093 Kurtosis = 5.0646 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.11917 Ljung-Box (15) = 10.780f- 
ao -0.0458 0.0400 -1.145 
a, 0.0001 - - 
bo 0.8994 0.1298 6.9291 
b, 0.0870 0.0433 2.0092 
Lira/Dollar b2 0.2517 0.0756 3.3294 
b3 0.4385 0.2658 i . 6497 
do 20-3259 4.9401 4.1145 
Mean Log Likelihood = -1.67704 
Jarque-Bera test X'(2) = 0.9117429 
Skewness = -0.0011815 Kurtosis = -0.14918 
Ljung-Box (1) = 0.12634 Ljung-Box (15) = 22.9577 
Table 7.13: The GARCH Model Incorporating a Position in the 
Band Variable and a Dummy Variable For Policy Shocks 
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Parameters Estimates St. Errors t statistics 
/4 -0.2148 0.0724 -2.9669 
t12 0.0521 0.0314 1.6592 
Pound/DM 91 1.5200 0.0515 29.5146 
62 0.6331 0.0305 20.7574 
P 0.8505 0.0330 25.7727 
Q 0.8902 0.0244 36.4836 
Me an Log Likeli hood = -1.4391 4 
11 -0-0350 0.0458 -0.7642 
/12 0.0079 0.0313 0.2524 
Pound/Dollar 011 1.5084 0.0203 74.3054 
0'2 0.1709 0.0177 9.6554 
P 0.9922 0.0034 291.8235 
Q 0.8570 0.0578 14.8270 
Me an Log Likeli hood = -1-7576 7 
-0.2297 0.0886 -2.5926 
P2 -0.0298 0.0121 -2.4628 
Lira/DM Orl 1.4283 0.0371 38.4987 
Or2 0.2970 0.0089 33.3708 
P 0.8792 0.0225 39.0756 
Q 0.9476 0.0103 92 
Me an Log Likelih ood = -0.8197 75 
-0.2750 0.2119 -1.2978 
2 -0.0223 0.0442 -0-5045 
Lira/Dollar a1 2.4177 0.0771 31.3580 
0'2 1.1507 0.0367 31-3542 
p 0.9031 0.0354 25-5113 
Q 0.9776 0.0099 98.7475 
Me an Log Likeli hood = -1.742 92 
Table 7.14: The Regime Switching Model Using Pound And Lira 
Exchange Rate Data 
Exchange Rate-- F-Correlation CoeFfi-cien-t 
Lira/DM 0.16635 
Lira/Dollar 0.351597 
Pound/DM 0.194501 
Pound/Dollar 0.150346 
Table 7.15: Correlation Coefficients for the Policy Change Dummy 
and the Smoothed Probability of the Regime Switch Model 
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7.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to compare the results from two different 
modelling processes with respect to exchange rate data covering ERM and 
non-ERM periods. The standard CARCH model provides an adequate de- 
scription of the Lira and Pound data. For each of these rates, there was 
considerable evidence of persistence as indicated by b, + b2. However, it has 
been argued that a currency's position in its ERM band played an important 
part in determining the mean and variance of the exchange rates. Therefore, 
I incorporated this into the standard GARCH ftarnework to test this hypo- 
thesis. For each exchange rate, I found evidence to suggest that the lagged 
position in the band played a part in the conditional variance function. For 
the Lira exchange rates, the current position in the band was also an import- 
ant determining factor in the mean function. This was not so marked for the 
Pound/DM or Pound/Dollar rates. 
It has also been argued that 'news' or major policy announcements have 
an impact on the dynamics of exchange rate changes. I introduce a dummy 
variable for policy changes into the conditional variance function. The para- 
meter on the dummy variable is statistically significant in all cases. Fur- 
thermore, I still find evidence of GARCH in the Pound/DM and Lira/DM 
rates. However, persistence is greatly reduced for the Lira/Dollar rate and 
the specification tests suggest evidence of serial correlation for this rate. 
In the case of the Lira, I include a realignment dummy in place of the 
policy change dummy to test for an effect in the conditional variance. The 
parameter on the dummy variable was significant in each case and there was 
still considerable evidence of persistence especially in the Lira/DM rate. The 
specification tests also proved favourable. 
I then incorporate policy changes and position in the band information 
into the standard GARCH framework. For each of the Pound/DM and 
Lira/DM rates, the lagged position in the band does not impact upon the 
conditional variance function whereas the current position in the band is a 
determining factor of the mean function. By contrast, for the Pound/Dollar 
and Lira/Dollar rates, the position in the band did not enter into the mean 
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function, but the lagged variable did enter into the conditional variance. 
The Ljung Box portmanteau tests and tests for skewness and kurtosis were 
favourable for each exchange rate considered. 
The regime switching model provides a good fit for the Pound/DM and 
Lira/DM rates but not such a good fit for the dollar rates as indicated by the 
t statistics. It identifies two regimes, one with a negative mean indicating a 
depreciating currency and the other with a higher mean. In the case, of the 
Pound, this is positive indicating an appreciating currency. For the Lira, this 
mean is still negative but not as negative as that for regime 1.1 argue that 
this model provides a different type of information from that of the modified 
GARCH model. The correlation coefficent revealed that the policy change 
dummy and the smoothed probability of being in regime I were not closely 
related. This suggests that the regime switching model is not merely another 
way of producing a policy change dummy. Close inspection of the smoothed 
probabilities given in figures 7.7-7.10 shows that where the probability of 
being in regime I is the highest there have been significant economic events. 
However, it also highlights a number of dates for which the probability of 
being in regime 1 is high yet these do not appear to correspond with a 
significant economic event. This may suggest that the model is detecting 
expectahons of a change in regime. In each of figures 7.7-7.10, there are 
a number of 'spikes' before an actual shift in regime occurs. Clearly, the 
GARCH policy change dummy identifies the major policy changes but not 
the possible expectations of a change in regime. 
A main criticism of regime switching models is that they have proved 
to be poor forecasters of a change in regime. However, I argue that this is 
due to the fact that changes in probability only take place when there is an 
actual policy change. It follows that a regime switching model provides a 
good in-sample fit but not generally a good forecasting model. 
The GARCH model, by contrast is useful in examining the impact of 
individual variables such as the currency's position in the band or, as in 
Bekaert and Gray, a country's level of foreign exchange reserves. However, 
it does not detect these pre-event increases in the probability of a regime 
shift. I argue that a more suitable approach would be a combination of 
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a modified GARCH framework with a regime switching element. In part, 
this has already been achieved in the work of Dueker (1994) among others. 
However, as yet, there is no work considering the Pound and Lira exchange 
rates incorporating both ERM and non-ERM periods. I argue that this would 
provide a valuable future line of research. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
This thesis has focused on three diverse areas of research with the common 
theme of currency crises and speculative behaviour. The aim of the thesis was 
to analyse the events of the 1992 currency crisis and discuss the implications 
of these findings. Therefore, it seemed logical to examine the theory and 
empirical evidence surrounding these events. 
Initially, I examined the theory literature. There has been a vast lit- 
erature written in the area of currency crises and I described some of the 
most influential papers in chapter 2. This starts with the pioneering work of 
Krugman (1979) into speculative attack models and then the contribution of 
Obstfeld (1986) with self fulfilling speculative attacks. However, I observed 
that there were a number of features of currencY crises which had not been 
explained by the literature to date. Firstly, the previous work had not con- 
sidered the issue of the timing of a currency crisis. Therefore, I provided a 
model of information externalities and search which offered an explanation 
for the timing of such an attack. I found that by imposing a Tobin tax, a 
government could delay the onset of a speculative attack on a currency. 
Secondly, I observed that the duration of these crises were not explained 
by the literature. Therefore, I set up a 'war of attrition' model which showed 
the optimal time at which a government concedes and incurs a major policy 
change as a result of a currency crisis. In a third model, I showed how 
informational events and the lack of common knowledge of the value placed 
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by the government in remaining in the ERM can make it optimal for investors 
to abandon a currency. 
Clearly, these models address particular features of currency crises. A 
potential future line of research would be to create a model which captures 
each of the features described. 
The literature in foreign exchange markets is very diverse in that it covers 
a wide range of areas in economics. Recent approaches have concerned the 
application of models of informational cascades and herd behaviour to explain 
the behaviour in financial markets. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an 
early example of such behaviour when they consider bank runs. While this 
area is growing, there has been very little work in terms of experimental 
economics to test the validity of these models. The exception to this is the 
model of Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer and Welch (1992) which has been tested 
in the laboratory by Anderson and Holt (1997). In chapter 5,1 set up this 
model and discuss the experiment and its results. This acts as a preview to 
the experiment presented in chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 is the result of joint work with Professor John Hey of the 
University of York. Initially, we investigate a theoretical point in the Banerjee 
model and demonstrate that the results of his model depend crucially on an 
assumption he makes concerning the behaviour of individuals. We then test 
the validity of the Banerjee framework by performing two experiments. The 
first contains the crucial assumption in question and the second omits this 
assumption. These results suggest firstly, that, the assumption in question 
plays an important role in the Banerjee model. Secondly, we discover that in 
the experiment including assumption A, herding does not occur as frequently 
as predicted by his model. 
In the final chapter, I examine the empirical evidence. Again, I discovered 
a tremendous literature in this area. However, this had largely focused on 
those currencies which were long standing members of the ERM. Since many 
currencies spent long periods outsi(le the ERM, this represented an important 
omission. Therefore, I model the exchange rate data for two currencies, 
the British Pound and Italian Lira, for the periods before, during and after 
their membership in the ERM. Furthermore, I provide a comparison of two 
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different modelling techniques. Firstly, I model each dat, a set using a GARCH 
model modified to include changes in economic pollcY and position in the 
ERM band. I then compare the outcome with a regime switching model. I 
find that these approaches are not interchangeable and that each provides a 
different form of information. Therefore, I argue that the optimal modelling 
strategy would involve a combination of these two approaches. Clearly, this 
offers a great deal of potential future research. 
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